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Abstract 
 
 
Two international treaty frameworks – Amended Protocol II (APII) to the Convention 
on Certain Conventional Weapons and the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention 
(APMBC) – have been developed to prohibit or restrict the use of landmines. 
However, reflecting a gap in current academic research, there is a lack of knowledge 
of their effectiveness in supporting the humanitarian goals that underpin both treaties. 
In order to address gaps in the existing literature, this thesis applies an analytical 
framework grounded in regime theory to develop new insights into the design, 
implementation and effectiveness of APII and the APMBC within the broader 
framework of international humanitarian law (IHL). Two main hypotheses are 
explored. The first considers the importance for regime effectiveness of the 
relationship between design and implementation processes. The second analyses the 
significance for the landmine regimes of regime interplay and nesting within wider 
IHL and mine action discourses. In addressing these hypotheses, 
design/implementation interplay, agency dynamics and normative considerations 
represent key themes that enable us to develop new insights to a specific issue area 
that also demonstrates important linkages to wider humanitarian, security and 
developmental agendas. 
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Chapter 1 
 
The Design, Implementation and Effectiveness of Landmine Regimes 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
This thesis seeks to increase knowledge and understanding on the development, 
implementation and effectiveness of the two treaty frameworks established under 
international humanitarian law (IHL) to specifically address landmines. While IHL in 
general and the landmine issue in particular have generated a considerable body of 
literature from both international law and international relations perspectives, a 
central research motivation underpinning this thesis is that the existing literature does 
not adequately address the effectiveness of these international legal frameworks in 
meeting the challenges that prompted their creation. The research questions explored 
in this thesis seek to address this lacuna. In particular, it is argued that design factors 
and their relationship to subsequent implementation are critical to regime 
effectiveness. By applying an analytical framework drawing on regime theory, this 
thesis seeks to make an original contribution to knowledge that generates new insights 
for the landmine treaties and the broader field of IHL within which they are situated. 
The relatively recent entry into force of both regimes provides a constraint to this 
analysis. However, situating our research questions within the broader framework of 
IHL can deepen and contextualise our understanding of the landmine regimes while 
developing new insights to the design, implementation and effectiveness of related 
regimes with a longer historical pedigree. 
 
IHL is based on the premise that the legitimate means of warfare are not unlimited 
and that a balance must be struck between humanitarian concerns and the onus of 
military necessity. The body of treaty law and custom that seeks to achieve this goal 
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thus attempts to reconcile conflicting interests that can span the national security 
concerns of authoritarian governments to the objectives of peace advocates, 
humanitarian and development workers. The range of actors involved is thus 
extremely diverse. Primary stakeholders are states, service personnel and civilians 
caught up in armed conflict and its aftermath. However, other interested parties may 
include international organisations, commercial companies, the media, international 
lawyers, academics and civil society more broadly. Even within national 
governments, responsibilities and interests that touch on IHL are split, inter alia, 
between foreign and defence ministries, development agencies and trade and industry 
departments. Multiple issues, interests and actors therefore provide a complex basis 
from which to analyse the effectiveness of IHL.  
 
The complexities of IHL are particularly apparent in the international treaties that 
address landmines. The existence of two applicable treaties with the common goal of 
alleviating the human suffering caused by landmines
1
 suggests that the international 
community recognises the importance of this issue. According to the prevalent 
narrative on the anti-personnel mine ban convention (APMBC), this treaty represents, 
in both process and substance, a novel and effective approach to IHL that has been 
responsible, among other effects, for the emergence of an international norm against 
the use of anti-personnel mines (APMs). The corollary to this argument is that the 
other landmine treaty, Amended Protocol II (APII) to the Convention on Certain 
Conventional Weapons (CCW), contains ineffective restrictions developed through a 
process that is slow and inadequate. However, there is significant scepticism from 
                                                 
1
 The APMBC is explicit about this humanitarian goal, made clear in the first preambular paragraph to 
the treaty which declares its determination to stop the killing and maiming of civilians, especially 
children, by APMs. Article 3(7) of APII prohibits the use of any weapons covered by the protocol 
against civilians or civilian objects. 
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some mine action practitioners over the effectiveness of both regimes in alleviating 
the suffering caused by landmines. This uncertainty as to the practical effects of the 
landmine regimes provides a powerful motivation for the research questions posed in 
this thesis. 
 
Specific gaps and lacunae in the existing literature centre on a lack of knowledge on 
the effectiveness of measures to address landmines. A common normative framework 
under IHL as well as overlapping and interlocking stakeholder groups point to the 
need for a more nuanced understanding of potential linkages and distinctions between 
APII and the APMBC. It also highlights an under-explored relationship of these 
treaties to the broader context of IHL within which they are situated. This thesis is 
thus concerned with developing knowledge in these areas. 
 
Regime theory provides an appropriate framework for this research because it 
attempts to unpack the principles, norms, rules, procedures, actors and issue areas that 
shape the design, implementation and effectiveness of multilateral regimes. This 
approach seeks to understand the shift from policy goals to the practical reality of 
their application and considers why theoretically sound principles come unstuck when 
faced with challenging real world situations. Regime theory seems particularly 
appropriate to the study of landmine regimes as effectiveness in this subject area 
depends on addressing complex technical challenges that also require important levels 
of political will in order to be resolved.   
 
This introductory chapter begins by situating the landmine issue within the broader 
context of IHL. It then introduces the analytical framework of regime theory applied 
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throughout this thesis. The following section poses the primary research questions for 
this thesis and a number of associated secondary questions that seek to develop new 
insights into the design, implementation and effectiveness of APII and the APMBC 
understood as „regimes.‟ It then establishes an elaborated research framework for the 
analysis of landmine regime effectiveness developed in subsequent chapters. The 
penultimate section outlines the research methodology applied throughout this thesis. 
This chapter concludes by setting out the structure, focus and sequencing of 
subsequent chapters and how these relate to the overall objectives of this thesis. 
 
2. Landmine regimes in context 
 
IHL comprises two approaches to the conduct of armed conflict (jus in bello): Geneva 
law focuses on the protection of war casualties and non-combatants while Hague law 
addresses the rights and duties of belligerents in limiting the means of warfare. 
Landmine regimes therefore fall within the scope of Hague law. In many cases, there 
are significant overlaps between IHL and arms control agreements that regulate or 
prohibit specific weapons. Indeed, APII and the APMBC contain elements of both. 
However, there is a fundamental shift in discourse between arms control frameworks 
that seek to balance concerns of military necessity with appropriate use and the 
imperative of IHL to alleviate human suffering. This thesis therefore considers the 
weight that the respective landmines regimes accord to these two approaches and their 
consequent bearing on regime rules, norms and actors involved in design and 
implementation. 
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2.1 Landmine regimes and IHL 
 
Not all provisions in IHL have found expression within a specific international 
regime. The principles behind the regulation or prohibition of weapons draw on 
customary international law tenets of jus in bello such as the need to prevent 
„unnecessary suffering‟ or „superfluous injury.‟ The prohibition on weapons that 
cause additional suffering for no military gain is therefore applicable to all states. 
Similarly, customary IHL includes the principle of „discrimination‟ to ensure that 
non-combatants are not deliberately targeted. One hypothesis explored in this thesis is 
that this quality of regime nesting within a wider normative framework is an 
important distinguishing feature from „hard‟ security regimes or regimes in other 
issue areas. In order to develop our analysis of landmine regimes it is thus important 
to take into account how far the regimes, individually and collectively, engage with 
the broader framework of treaty law and IHL norms that all states are bound to 
observe regardless of their membership of individual regimes. 
 
Given the relatively short period since APII and the APMBC entered into force, the 
analysis of relevant historical case studies allows a more mature critique of strengths 
and weaknesses in regime implementation from a longer historical perspective. 
Analysing related IHL treaties as regimes can help to situate the landmine regimes 
within this broader framework through clarifying commonalities and distinctions in 
efforts under IHL to ban or restrict the use of weapons. This analysis also provides 
new insights by offering an initial comparative analysis of how far landmine regime 
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characteristics – constellations of actors, interests and norms – are specific to this 
issue area or can be linked to dynamics found in other IHL regimes. In this regard, 
within the corpus of Hague law, the 1899 Hague Declaration 3 Concerning 
Expanding Bullets (Hague Declaration 3) and the 1925 Geneva Protocol for the 
Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of 
Bacteriological Methods of Warfare (the 1925 Gas Protocol) offer particularly 
relevant cases.  
 
In considering these historical cases the purpose is not to develop a legal-historical 
analysis. Instead, a regime perspective helps us to develop new insights into under-
researched treaties that remain relevant today by analysing them through the optic of 
regime theory. A specific research goal addressed through this approach is to 
critically question the claim found frequently in the APMBC literature that the 
„Ottawa Process‟ represents a new and unprecedented departure in the field of IHL. 
More generally, these cases can inform our understanding of how IHL regimes 
develop over time. This enables us to refine our questions for landmine regimes 
through identifying trends, processes and influences that, if not visible to primary 
regime stakeholders, are nevertheless highly influential in shaping their design, 
implementation and effectiveness. 
 
Hague Declaration 3 is the only IHL treaty prior to the APMBC that bans a 
conventional weapon in widespread use. Like APMs, expanding bullets – commonly 
known as dum dum rounds – were condemned by medical practitioners who had 
witnessed at first hand the effects of these weapons. The international advocacy 
campaign that generated widespread public support for Hague Declaration 3 bears 
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comparison with the Ottawa Process. While the latter is often highlighted in the 
literature as a unique example of international civil society and media mobilisation, 
these same factors would seem to have proved influential in building support and thus 
pressuring governments to adopt a ban in 1899. A gap of nearly one hundred years 
between Hague Declaration 3 and the APMBC represents a lengthy period in order to 
trace the dynamics of implementation and assess the regime‟s effectiveness. Hague 
Declaration 3 therefore provides an important comparative case study in order to 
understand how far the two landmine regimes represent continuity or change within 
the corpus of IHL. Through framing our analysis within a regime theory approach, 
this case study also enables us to distinguish factors that may share common features 
with security, trade or environmental regimes from those that are specific to IHL. 
 
The 1925 Gas Protocol is one of the earliest binding legal restraints on a specific 
weapon. The regime formation process tapped into strong public concern over the 
horrifying human costs of trench warfare in the First World War. Like landmines, a 
major impression was made by evidence of victims left alive to suffer from terrible 
injuries after exposure to these weapons. The 1925 Gas Protocol provides an early 
example of civil society exerting pressure to outlaw a weapon, resulting in an 
international norm against their use. The negotiating process that led to its agreement 
was also marked by the exclusion of states from the developing world. Like Hague 
Declaration 3, this case therefore provides a number of significant parallels to the 
processes surrounding the design and implementation of the landmine regimes.  
 
Considering Hague Declaration 3 and the 1925 Gas Protocol though the lens of 
regime theory offers an opportunity to develop new insights into these regimes, their 
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interplay and the factors that have contributed to their effectiveness over time. 
Analysis of issues such as the norms that underpin these regimes and the shifting 
clusters of actors involved in design and implementation allows us to identify how 
these processes resonate with APII and the APMBC. The weapons addressed by these 
regimes share with APMs the quality of having been stigmatised in the international 
public consciousness. Consequently, this thesis explores the hypothesis that important 
regime issues for APII and the APMBC such a norm-building, spillover effects and 
regime nesting can only be understood through situating this analysis within its 
broader historical context. 
 
2.2 Origins and emergence of the landmine regimes 
 
The use of landmines in armed conflict can be traced back as far as the American 
Civil War although this practice only became widespread during the Second World 
War.
2
 The specific regulation of APMs under IHL began in 1980 with the agreement 
of Protocol II to the CCW. However, growing international recognition in the early 
1990s of the effects of APMs in contemporary conflicts and the inadequacies of the 
existing regulatory framework to protect both combatants and in particular civilians 
led to a CCW review conference. This involved eight months of negotiations between 
1995-96 that resulted in the further elaboration of existing regulations. The rules of 
procedure for the negotiating conference limited participation to government 
representatives. This prevented many other interested stakeholders from playing a 
direct role in the shaping of the treaty, and contributed to a lack of public interest in 
the negotiations except through criticism of the process from a vociferous pro-ban 
                                                 
2
 Blagden, P. (1996) Antipersonnel Mines: Friend of Foe? (ICRC) 
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lobby. The resulting APII provides for a number of more stringent restrictions on the 
design of landmines, booby traps and „other devices‟ than is contained in the original 
Protocol II. 
 
A significant element of those excluded from the CCW negotiations comprised the 
non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and civil society actors that between 1992-
93 began to coordinate a campaign to ban APMs. This group formed the nucleus of an 
International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL), which, by 1995, incorporated 
some 350 different NGOs. Support for a ban also came from the International 
Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) as well as the United Nations with UN Secretary 
General Boutros Boutros Ghali highlighting the issue in his 1992 Agenda for Peace.
3
 
At a conference held in Ottawa during October 1996, Canadian Foreign Minister 
Lloyd Axeworthy took the initiative to set a date for a negotiating conference with the 
goal of agreeing a complete ban on APMs. Following a year-long two-track process 
that combined state-level discussions with an extensive civil society driven advocacy 
campaign, a negotiating conference was held in Oslo over a three week period in 
September 1997. A wide range of states from both the developed and developing 
world participated while numerous NGOs, international organisations and mine action 
practitioners were given full access to the conference. Decision-making was by two-
thirds majority and lengthy position statements were prohibited in order to achieve an 
agreed treaty text within a short timeframe. The resulting APMBC provides for a 
complete ban on the use, production, transfer and stockpiling of APMs. 
 
                                                 
3
 Boutros Ghali, B. (1992) Agenda for Peace. Retrieved 20 March 2002 from the World Wide Web: 
www.un.org/Docs/SG/agpeace.html  
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Protocol II and APII are consistent in pursuing ways to minimise the effects of 
landmines through regulating their use while seeking to balance restrictions against 
concerns of military utility. A number of criticisms are levelled at this approach. In 
particular, applying a logic that draws heavily on arms control antecedents, the 
humanitarian impact of these weapons are not directly acknowledged. Moreover, the 
temporal consideration that landmines may pose a danger to communities and 
individuals decades after conflicts have ended is unaddressed. Neither APII nor the 
APMBC contain strong verification provisions. However, an informal civil society-
driven verification mechanism has emerged, centred around the annual Landmine 
Monitor publication, which provides a detailed analysis of regime compliance 
globally. A further criticism is that APII essentially proposes technical „fixes‟ that 
presuppose a technological and resource base out of reach for many developing 
countries, suggesting that APII may have limited relevance in the very countries that 
suffer the most from landmines. According to many critics of APII, it is unsurprising 
that the regime has a relatively weak support base in the developing world. The 
counterpoint to criticism of APII is that a restrictions-based approach, developed 
through consensual negotiations, draws landmine producers and users that would not 
consider an outright ban into a constructive arms control process. While the APMBC 
has a considerably wider membership than APII,
4
 many militarily-significant states 
including China, India, Pakistan, Russia and the United States (that are members of 
APII) have not joined the APMBC regime.  
 
The APMBC has generated a great deal of analysis and commentary in a relatively 
short period. In contrast, APII has attracted little attention outside of governmental 
                                                 
4
 As of 24 November 2009 APII has 93 full members while the APMBC has 156 states parties. 
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circles. Yet much existing work on the evolution of the former focuses narrowly on 
the achievements of the coalition of like-minded states and civil society organisations. 
The central narrative, encapsulted in Cameron, Lawson and Tomlin‟s seminal volume 
on the subject, To Walk Without Fear, the Global Movement to Ban Landmines,
5
 
emphasises the unique nature of this process. It starts from the position that the 
Ottawa Process is fundamentally „a good thing‟ that has re-written the rules for the 
design and implementation of IHL treaties. This perspective sees international civil 
society, in conjunction with like-minded states, successfully pressuring more reluctant 
states through the medium of coordinated, well-targeted advocacy to be bound to new 
humanitarian treaty obligations.
6
 In parallel, beyond champions of the APII regime 
such as the US – portrayed as supporting the regime to save face due to their 
unwillingness to join the APMBC – APII is cast simplistically as an ineffectual 
response to the global landmine problem from states unwilling to ban these weapons.  
 
Despite extensive attention by the media, civil society, policy analysts, lawyers and 
researchers, there is no systematic analysis of the strengths and weaknesses of APII 
and the APMBC. This represents an important gap in the existing literature which this 
thesis seeks to address. Significantly, regime theory qualifies effectiveness according 
to different phases of regime evolution. While political will may represent a key 
criterion for effectiveness in the landmine regime formation phase, such 
                                                 
5
 Cameron, M.A., Lawson, R.J. & Tomlin, B.W. (eds.) (1998) To Walk Without Fear, The Global 
Movement to Ban Landmines. See also: Mathew, R.A., McDonald, B and Rutherford, K.A. Landmines 
and Human Security (2004) 
6
 See for example: Anderson, K. „The Ottawa Convention Banning Landmines, the Role of 
International Non-Governmental Organisations and the Idea of International Civil Society. European 
Journal of International Law. Volume II. No.1.  Bleicher, M. „The Ottawa Process: Nine Day Wonder 
or a New Model for Disarmament Negotiations?‟ Disarmament Forum No.4. (1999)  Hubert, D. „The 
Landmine Ban: A Case Study in Humanitarian Advocacy‟. Humanitarianism and War Project. 
Occasional Paper #42. 
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considerations are combined with the context-specific technical challenges of mine 
action in the implementation phase.  
This points to important research questions relating to the influence of mine action 
practitioners across regime design and implementation. Building on this point, while 
there is much overlap, distinct stakeholder groups can be identified in relation to the 
two regimes. This raises research questions on the relevance of stakeholder clustering 
to the nature of regime development as well as in distinguishing effectiveness from 
effective regime marketing. The de facto stigmatisation of APMs through the Ottawa 
Process brings to the fore normative considerations applicable to and thus linking both 
regimes regardless of the antipathy of partisan regime supporters. 
 
3. Framing landmine regime effectiveness 
 
Regime theory provides an analytical framework that has developed new insights into 
a number of different issue areas. The relative absence of extant research that 
systematically considers IHL from the perspective of „regime‟ offers a significant 
opportunity to develop new understandings of what contributes to an effective (or 
defective) regime within this field. Significant parallels seem to exist between the 
landmine issue and the wider fields of security, trade and the environment. Drawing 
on findings from regimes in these issue areas thus enables us to develop new insights 
to the landmine regimes while also helping to clarify those characteristics that may be 
particular to the field of IHL. This approach provides a means to fill gaps in the 
current literature through structuring our analysis around key questions of design, 
implementation, effectiveness and consequences. This section begins by setting out 
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the primary research questions posed in this thesis, identifying the contributions to 
knowledge that this analysis seeks to make. It then elaborates a number of hypotheses  
and secondary research questions considering landmine regime effectiveness within a 
broader IHL framework. This establishes the outlines of a research framework that is 
elaborated in Chapter 2 and applied in subsequent chapters.     
 
3.1   Primary research questions 
 
The central research question explored in this thesis posits that the relationship 
between the design phase and regime implementation is a key determinant of regime 
effectiveness. Focusing on the political and technical challenges of regime 
development links a critical analysis of the emergence of the treaty frameworks to a 
practitioner-driven mine action literature. It is argued that drawing together these 
related, if disconnected literatures is highly significant in order to understand regime 
implementation, highlighting practical and political challenges that contribute to 
voluntary or involuntary defection. In developing this approach, the significance of 
political will in regime formation and implementation phases as well as the ability of 
APII and the APMBC to demonstrate regime learning and adapt in order to better 
meet implementation challenges represent key research questions.   
 
The multi-level nature of landmine regime effectiveness generates important 
questions on how agency shapes the nature of regime provisions and influences the 
extent to which regime members are able to meet their obligations. The APMBC 
literature in particular emphasises the innovative nature of both the diverse global 
coalition and the tightly organised core group that were pivotal to the successful 
14 
 
regime formation phase. These characteristics are commonly juxtaposed with a 
narrower (and therefore less effective) constituency contributing to the agreement of 
APII. An important set of research questions therefore relates to the role, influence 
and interactions of different stakeholder groups. Drawing on insights from the wider 
regime theory discourse, one hypothesis proposes that how actors cluster at different 
stages of regime evolution has an important bearing on regime effectiveness. The 
relationship between agency and legitimacy is also significant. In particular, how far 
claims to legitimacy linked to the engagement of the global South actually extend 
beyond representation to ownership of an implementation process that in terms of 
mine action almost always plays out within developing states has evident 
consequences for regime effectiveness. 
 
The significance of the broader framework of IHL to landmine regime dynamics 
represents an important research focus. On one level, applying a comparative 
approach that relates IHL to regimes in other issue areas permits us to explore 
commonalities across regime types as well as to better understand characteristics 
particular to IHL regimes. On another, the concept of regime nesting links important 
questions on the role of norms within and across the two landmine regimes to a more 
mature IHL discourse. This permits us to move beyond the facile differentiation 
between the two regimes prevalent in the extant literature and enables a critical 
assessment of claims to the uniqueness of particular regime characteristics. From a 
theoretical perspective, embedding landmine regime analysis in this wider normative 
framework allows us to explore important issues of regime nesting and interplay and 
thus to delineate „deep‟ linkages that need to be unpacked in order to determine 
effects across regimes. Consequently, it may be apposite to conceptualise these 
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regimes as sub-regimes situated within a broader IHL regime addressing inhumane 
weapons.  
 
3.2 A research framework for landmine regimes 
 
If the APMBC has been held up as an unprecedented, successful example of how to 
drive forward the IHL agenda, part of the success of the Ottawa Process has been in 
promoting the APMBC „brand‟ and juxtaposing it with the CCW. The research 
questions outlined above are intended to move beyond a perceptions-based approach 
by developing new insights into the effectiveness of the two landmine regimes. It is 
therefore essential to assess not just if and why regime rules are obeyed but to 
understand how this behaviour contributes to the realisation of regime objectives. This 
sub-section further elaborates research questions that are tested in subsequent 
chapters. These are grouped under the themes of the interplay between design and 
implementation, key actors and normative considerations. 
 
3.2.1 the interplay between design and implementation 
 
This thesis explores a dynamic relationship between design factors and the quality of 
regime implementation. Decisions made in the regime design phase can be highly 
influential in supporting or constraining regime effectiveness. In particular, a central 
hypothesis guiding the approach to regime evolution within this thesis is that 
understanding common or distinct principles, norms, rules, procedures, issues and 
actors within and across these regimes can provide an important contribution to 
knowledge on regime effectiveness both individually and in comparative terms. 
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Drawing on work within the regime theory discourse that analyses the key component 
features of regimes, this thesis argues that a deeper understanding of process factors 
can greatly enhance our knowledge of landmine regimes.  
 
Implementation measures regime obligations against the practical realities and 
political constraints that contribute to defection. These constraints are particularly 
relevant for landmine regimes given that the problem is most acute in developing 
countries that face a range of political, economic and security challenges of which 
landmines form only one part. This is important because implementation presents a 
double test. On the one hand this relates to the ability of members to meet regime 
demands and avoid involuntary defection. On the other, the implementation phase 
provides the litmus test of whether states‟ willingness to cut a positive international 
figure by joining a regime with evident humanitarian credentials is matched by the 
political will to accept the costs associated with fulfilling regime obligations. The 
ability of the regimes to recognise and address implementation issues as well as the 
flexibility to demonstrate regime learning and adjust to meet challenges that may not 
have been considered in regime design are key research issues relating to regime 
implementation. 
 
The effectiveness of an international regime is based not just on observing regime 
rules but on the contribution of compliant behaviour to achieving regime goals. This 
raises the key issue of defining effectiveness in the context of the landmine regimes. 
Our review of the broader IHL literature from a regime perspective leads us to 
identify an important variable to landmine regime effectiveness beyond the economic 
and political factors identified within the wider literature. Acknowledging the nesting 
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of the landmine regimes within the broader context of IHL points to a humanitarian 
criterion that requires the impact of the regime on the human security of individuals 
(both military and civilians) to be taken into account. 
 
Effective regimes in different issue areas often demonstrate the ability to evolve in 
order to address shortcomings in regime design or to meet new challenges that were 
not apparent to treaty drafters. How regimes learn is thus identified as a significant 
element of regime evolution. Flexibility in order to support the achievement of regime 
goals and enable necessary course corrections requires regimes to be responsive to the 
conduct of their members. Overtly, the two regimes apply very different approaches 
to regime learning. APII provides for flexibility in implementation through permitting 
optional deferral periods for certain regime obligations. In contrast, the APMBC seeks 
to preserve the integrity of the core prohibition on APMs by categorically ruling out 
reservations or deferrals. While both approaches may be seen to have merits, detailed 
analysis of implementation processes in relation to specific mine action priorities 
within the treaties represents a key means within this thesis to better understand the 
consequences of these different approaches for regime effectiveness. 
 
Consequences of international regimes beyond the issue area they are intended to 
address can be significant. Examples considered within this chapter highlight changes 
to relations between regime members (as well as non-members) and shifts in broader 
policy positions as a result of learning through regime-driven interactions. Regime 
nesting can also result in spillover effects into related issue areas. For example, in the 
case of landmine regimes there is a need to understand how spillover effects are 
reflected in the efforts of some regime participants to extend the regimes‟ coverage 
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into new issue areas beyond their original scope or to apply lessons from the process 
of regime evolution to the development of new regimes. 
 
3.2.2 Key actors 
 
Experience from different regimes shows that implementation may necessitate very 
different skills and requires the contribution of sets of actors beyond those involved in 
the regime formation phase. This points to the need to understand the contributions of 
stakeholder groups in relation to the different phases of regime evolution. In 
particular, mapping the clustering of regime-relevant actors and determining how 
these groupings shift from design to implementation provide important insights to 
regime effectiveness. 
 
One perspective juxtaposes the landmine regime implementation process with the 
humanitarian imperatives that led to their creation: while the experts are back in the 
field, the process is being driven by Western diplomats and lobbyists. The perception 
is of an over-emphasis on bureaucracy at the expense of practical work to solve the 
global landmine problem. This raises important questions for the support provided by 
the regimes to mine action since effective regimes in many issue areas require 
practitioner expertise in both design and implementation phases. Moreover, if political 
will is essential to move from consensus around an issue of concern to the negotiation 
of an international treaty, sustained political commitment remains key to ensuring 
compliance with provisions that are costly and potentially sensitive in terms of their 
national security implications. 
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While states are central players in international regimes, certain regime theory 
approaches emphasise the function of regimes as social institutions, bringing the roles 
of different non-state actors (NSAs) to the fore. Mine action is a complex activity, 
uniting demanding technical challenges with socio-economic issues that require a 
close understanding of the „impact‟ of landmines on communities and individuals. 
Within this field international organisations as well as a range of NSAs play an 
influential role in advocacy, policy-making and programming. APII is more state-
centric, has a lower profile and is viewed with markedly less enthusiasm by many 
NSAs, notably the NGO community within the ICBL. Given the contrasting 
approaches adopted by the two regimes, it is posited that better understanding the 
relationship of the regimes to international organisations, states and NSAs is 
particularly relevant to understanding APII and APMBC regime effectiveness.  
 
The problems posed by landmines are most acute in and need to be addressed by 
developing countries that are often least equipped to deal with them. The nexus 
between agency and political will is therefore particularly relevant to the study of 
landmine regimes. This is an area where there would seem to be a clear distinction in 
regime terms between APII and the APMBC given the lack of engagement of the 
former with developing world concerns and the centrality of the global South to the 
latter. However, challenges faced by environmental regimes point to important 
research questions for APII and the APMBC. In particular, do regime frameworks 
distinguish between political support for regimes and political will to assume the costs 
of regime membership? 
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3.2.3 Normative considerations 
 
Normative considerations would seem to represent a key factor in understanding the 
two regimes and their relationship to IHL. This represents a significant point of 
distinction between the APMBC, which emerged rapidly through capitalising on the 
momentum created by a „norm bandwaggon‟ effect and the more military-technical 
approach of APII which developed over a more drawn out period. The emergence of a 
norm against the use of APMs seems to follow Finnemore and Sikkink‟s description 
of a „norm cascade‟7 with the support of states coalescing around the position that a 
ban was the only appropriate response to the suffering caused by APMs. In 
considering the choices made by states in balancing domestic and international 
interests, the influence of norms on how two-level games play out should be 
considered. External events may also be relevant to this calculus. Although not 
directly linked to the regime formation process, the death of Princess Diana just prior 
to the Oslo negotiations provides an example of an event that further increased public 
pressure, at least within the UK, to support a humanitarian cause that was known to be 
close to her heart. 
 
The historical case studies on dum dum bullets and chemical gas share with APMs a 
common feature that the use of these weapons has become widely acknowledged as 
unacceptable within the international community. Understanding how the concept of 
„stigmatisation‟ influences the effectiveness of IHL through analysing these treaties as 
regimes is therefore a significant means to link analysis of APII and the APMBC to 
the broader normative framework of IHL. Considering the regimes as part of the IHL 
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tradition also points to questions that seek to understand the effects of the landmine 
regimes beyond their stated objectives. In particular, it is important to determine what 
(if any) spillover effects in other issue areas can be attributed to the existence of the 
landmine regimes. 
 
Research into some regimes points to a quality of regime resilience that is found when 
they are nested within broader normative frameworks. Both landmine regimes can be 
situated within the wider framework of international efforts under IHL to regulate or 
ban certain types of weapon. Normative considerations may thus provide a bridge 
between APII and the APMBC. On one level there may be a lack of apparent overlap 
between the different regime frameworks. However, from a regime perspective the 
normative framework of IHL would seem to provide an overarching regime within 
which APII and the APMBC are nested. This points to the need to unpack „deep‟ 
linkages of overlap and interplay that may not be apparent (or are denied) by regime 
stakeholders. 
 
4. Research methodology 
 
The conceptual framework of regime theory has enabled new contributions to 
knowledge in areas of international cooperation as diverse as security, trade and the 
environment. However, this analytical approach has not been applied to the field of 
IHL more broadly or the landmine regimes in particular. This thesis therefore utilizes 
a regime approach to these issue areas for the first time. New insights are  
                                                                                                                                            
7
 Finnemore, M. and Sikkink, K. ; „International Norm Dynamics and Political Change‟; Paper 
presented, at the Ideas, Culture and Political Analysis Workshop, Princeton University (May 15-16 
1998), p.7. 
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pursued through addressing two deficits in the current literature: the absence of 
systematic analytical critique of a partial and self-interested literature; and, a 
significant gap in the existing literature that fails to define or evaluate the 
effectiveness of the landmine regimes in achieving the goals they were set up to meet.  
 
Addressing an absence of conceptual clarity within the literature is particularly 
important. Applying a definition of „regime‟ that focuses on principles, norms, rules 
procedures and programmes establishes a range of interrelated concepts through 
which to develop our analysis of complex, multi actor and multi-level social 
institutions. Related to this is the significance of a process-based perspective inherent 
to the regime theory approach. Distinguishing the different phases of regime 
development – formation, implementation, effectiveness and consequences – provides 
a comprehensive structure within which to situate our research questions. For the 
purposes of conceptual clarity, it is useful to distinguish these four categories. 
However, their characteristics are intrinsically linked and mutually reinforcing (in 
positive or negative terms) with decisions made in one phase impacting upon other 
aspects of regime evolution. Deconstructing APII and the APMBC in this way thus 
enables us to move beyond a perceptions-based approach and address important gaps 
in the current literature.   
 
A twofold definition of effectiveness proposed by Arild Underdal is significant 
because it highlights that even if widely adhered to and fully implemented, a regime 
may not alleviate the problems it was set up to address.
8
 For a regime to be effective, 
the relevance and appropriateness of specific provisions must therefore go hand in 
                                                 
8
 Underdal, A. (1992) „The Concept of Regime Effectiveness‟; Cooperation & Conflict 27: pp. 227-40. 
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hand with the political will to implement them. Thus, effectiveness is a function of the 
interplay of design and implementation factors. Related to this point is the question of 
how to measure effectiveness. Beyond other criteria proposed in the regime literature, 
humanitarian impact provides an important dimension specific to IHL regime 
effectiveness that is applied systematically throughout this thesis. In particular, this 
approach casts into relief the question of how far normative considerations – such as 
the de facto stigmatisation of APMs – contribute to regime effectiveness. 
 
As discussed above, the extant literature is strongly biased in favour of the Ottawa 
Process. This is reflected both in the volume of articles and books available on the 
APMBC in comparison to APII and in terms of the positive evaluation of the former 
at the expense of the latter. This critique is significant because it is self-interested (the 
majority of these works are written by participant observers with a stake in the 
APMBC regime) as well as narrow in focusing primarily on the political „success‟ of 
creating a new and „unprecedented‟ international instrument banning APMs. In order 
to move beyond these limitations, this thesis systematically applies Underdal‟s 
twofold definition of effectiveness emphasising both observance of regime rules and 
the extent to which regime objectives are fulfilled. The latter criterion is critical. Since 
the underpinning objective of both regimes is to alleviate the humanitarian suffering 
caused by these weapons, the achievement of mine action-related implementation 
goals must be a pre-condition for landmine regime effectiveness.  
 
The research methodology applied in this thesis seeks to bridge related but hitherto  
disconnected literatures through a regime theory framework. One literature focuses  
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on the political evolution of APII and the APMBC while the other addresses different 
components of the mine action agenda. In order to distinguish a humanitarian – as 
opposed to political or economic – criterion for effectiveness, this thesis utilises data 
sources from within the mine action literature that are heavily based on field research. 
Considering both together links political developments to mine action pay-offs and 
thus adds to our knowledge of the actual (rather than perceived) impact of these 
regimes. Given that different stakeholders supported mine action before the existence 
of the regimes while many non-regime members are also important contributors in 
this area, such an approach is also necessary to address significant counter-factual 
questions related to landmine regime effectiveness. 
 
To inform this research I draw on previous personal experience both as desk officer 
for IHL within the UK Ministry of Defence (1998-2000) and as a project manager 
within the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) (2000-
2002). The former position gave me privileged access to the national policy process 
for the implementation of both landmine regimes as well as key insights into the 
relationships between the UK and other state and non-state actors in this issue area. 
My work at GICHD provided exposure to a wide range of mine action stakeholders 
and involved field based research into the effectiveness of humanitarian demining 
support. This thesis therefore builds on insights, relationships and experience 
developed in both these positions.   
 
Both APII and the APMBC are relatively young regimes. On the other hand, they 
form part of an IHL tradition with extremely long historical antecedents. For this 
reason, this thesis draws lessons from analyzing IHL regimes with a more mature 
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implementation history. Close analysis of related regimes that also have strong 
normative content – as with Hague Declaration 3 and the 1925 Gas Protocol – is 
essential in order to test the hypothesis explored in relation to both regime formation 
and implementation that there is an important, positive link between humanitarian 
norms and regime effectiveness. 
 
A central focus on the humanitarian impact of the landmine regimes determines the 
literatures that are reviewed and analysed in subsequent chapters. Given that IHL has 
not been considered to date through the optic of regime theory, important insights can 
be developed through considering parallels and distinctions with regimes in different 
issue areas. Analysing both treaty texts in relation to the state of the art in the field of 
mine action is particularly important to identify the extent to which regime designers 
have taken into account concrete implementation challenges. Available empirical data 
on the implementation histories of states parties drawn from civil society based 
monitoring efforts is particularly significant. While the results of such analysis may 
itself provide one measure of regime effectiveness, it can also provide important 
insights into broader regime issues such as the clarity of regime obligations, changing 
patterns of behavior over time and evidence of regime defection that are explored 
through subsequent chapters of this thesis. 
 
5. Thesis approach and structure 
 
The research questions introduced above address an evident gap in the existing 
academic literature by analysing the design and implementation of APII and the 
APMBC. Regime theory offers a rigorous analytical framework that is applied to 
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provide analytical depth to a subject area that has not benefited from extensive 
academic critique. This section therefore begins by re-stating the main objectives and 
research questions examined in this thesis. The relationship between APII, the 
APMBC and resulting mine action „outcomes‟ is developed through several chapters 
of this thesis. The primary and secondary research questions explored in this 
introductory chapter are addressed through detailed consideration of APII and 
APMBC regime development. In order to align regime effectiveness as closely as 
possible to mine action objectives, a particular focus is given to the relationship 
between the regimes and developments in the areas of humanitarian demining and 
stockpile destruction. This section concludes by introducing the thesis structure 
reflected in subsequent chapters. 
 
5.1   Thesis objectives and research questions 
 
It is now useful to re-state the main objectives and research questions examined in this 
thesis in light of our initial discussion of regime theory approaches. The overall aim 
of this thesis is to examine in-depth key aspects of the design, implementation and 
effectiveness of international agreements relating to landmines within the framework 
IHL through applying a regime analysis perspective and approach. There are two 
overall research questions / hypotheses:  
 
1.  The effectiveness of the landmine regimes depends greatly on the character 
and extent of the relationship between the design and implementation 
processes. 
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To address this primary hypothesis, we examine a number of key secondary research 
questions, including: 
 
 In what ways does regime design influence commitment to regime formation 
processes? 
 How important is the involvement of implementation actors in regime design 
and what can be learned from our analysis of of stakeholder clustering 
dynamics in different phases of regime development? 
 What consequences can be discerned from the gaps between international 
regime commitments and domestic implementation processes under the 
regimes? 
 What are the implications for regime effectiveness of how the regimes 
acknowledge and address both technical and political dimensions of 
implementation?  
 How significant are different approaches to regime rules in shaping the ability 
of the regimes to „learn‟ and adapt to challenges? 
 
2.  The design, implementation and effectiveness of international efforts to 
address landmines depends substantially on the interplay between, and nesting 
of, the relevant treaty regimes within both broader IHL and mine action 
discourses. Landmine regime effectiveness thus cannot be properly understood 
outside of this broader context. 
 
To address this second main hypothesis, the thesis examines a second set of secondary 
questions, including: 
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 How significant is the role of norms in determining regime effectiveness 
across design and implementation phases? 
 In what ways does landmine regime evolution draw on longer historical 
processes of IHL regime development (in particular Hague Declaration II and 
the 1925 Gas Protocol) and what are the consequences for their effectiveness? 
 Are normative considerations significant in generating „deep‟ linkages 
between the two regimes (regardless of distinct frameworks and membership)? 
 How does the concept of regime nesting within a broader IHL framework help 
us to understand important regime dynamics? 
 Can disjunctions between regime and mine action priorities be discerned and 
what are the resulting costs to regime effectiveness? 
 
5.2   Thesis structure 
 
Chapter 2 reviews and analyses the state of the art in regime theory in order to 
establish the research framework applied in subsequent chapters. To develop its 
comparative dimension, insights derived from regimes in other issue areas are 
considered in relation to processes of APII and APMBC regime design and 
implementation. A review of IHL literature provides a new perspective on antecedents 
that refine our research questions for treaty regimes with a much shorter 
implementation history. This analysis thus informs a more specific and detailed 
critique of the landmine regimes from a regime perspective.    
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Consideration of two „historical‟ IHL regimes in Chapter 3 leads to theoretically 
motivated questions on the significance of specific issue areas within IHL as well as 
the influence of different stakeholder groups on regime effectiveness. The extent to 
which Hague Declaration 3 and the 1925 Gas Protocol have been effective in 
achieving regime objectives provides important insights for the relatively recent 
processes of APII and APMBC regime implementation. Given the lengthy 
implementation period of these early IHL treaty regimes, both provide significant 
opportunities to develop new insights into strengths and weaknesses in regime design 
and how this relates to regime effectiveness.  
 
Chapters 4 and 5 respectively consider the formation and implementation of the 
landmine regimes. This analysis builds on Chapter 3 by seeking to identify elements 
of continuity and change with broader processes of IHL regime development. While 
the primary research objective of this thesis is to contribute new knowledge to the 
effectiveness of APII and the APMBC, applying a comparative approach can provide 
insights to underlying interactions that may not be visible (or are denied) in both 
regimes. Particular emphasis is placed on understanding the consequences of different 
approaches applied by the two regimes in order to address similar humanitarian 
challenges. Different regime rules, overlapping but distinct stakeholder groups and the 
significance of restrictions versus prohibitions-based approaches represent key foci. 
Our analysis of processes of regime development feeds into subsequent chapters that 
apply insights drawn from regime development and implementation to different 
pillars of the mine action agenda. 
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Chapters 6 and 7 consider the ways in which the two landmine regimes contribute to 
mine action in the areas of humanitarian demining and stockpile destruction. An 
important point of departure in relating the regimes to mine action is the need to 
clarify relevant regime obligations and to identify influential actors in regime design 
and implementation. Distinguishing implementation from effectiveness is particularly 
important. If important stakeholder groups within the regimes do not have mine action 
expertise, this can lead to misperceptions over regime performance. Moreover, the 
onus of demonstrating „success‟ may contribute to a reluctance to highlight challenges 
to regime implementation. Contributions to knowledge therefore touch on the ability 
and willingness of the regimes to set out and enforce realistic, appropriate obligations. 
These chapters also provide a means to measure regime contributions to specific 
elements of the mine action agenda against overarching regime goals to address the 
human suffering caused by landmines. 
 
The concluding chapter considers the specific contributions to knowledge made by 
this thesis. It identifies where our understanding of IHL more broadly as well as the 
landmines issue in particular have been enhanced through analysing them as 
„regimes.‟ It draws together insights from across the previous chapters that relate 
specifically to regime effectiveness and considers them under the themes set out in 
this chapter: the interplay between design and implementation, key actors and 
normative considerations. As discussed above, landmine regimes represent an area of 
research that cannot be de-linked from the policy implications of a „live‟ issue on 
international security, humanitarian and development agendas. Creating a bridge 
between this analysis and wider research priorities is thus an important consideration. 
The insights developed within this thesis therefore attempt to link research goals with 
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their practical implications in an issue area where the practical payoffs from enhanced 
academic critique may be substantial. 
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Chapter 2 
Reviewing the Landmines Literature through Regime Theory 
 
1. Introduction 
 
There is an apparent gap between the underpinning objectives of the two regimes 
established under international law to restrict or prohibit the use of landmines and 
their actual impact in reducing the humanitarian costs of these weapons. This is 
reflected in widely varying views on the relevance of these regimes in addressing the 
humanitarian challenges they were set up to alleviate. The ultimate goal of this thesis 
is thus to make a new contribution to knowledge in understanding the effectiveness of 
the two landmine regimes. A central hypothesis is that the relationship between the 
design and implementation of APII and the APMBC is critical to understanding 
regime effectiveness. This chapter contributes to that overarching research goal 
through reviewing different literatures that can add to our knowledge of regime 
effectiveness in the field of IHL. This enables the further elaboraion of the research 
framework and refinement of the research questions considered in subsequent 
chapters. 
 
The subject of this thesis is characterised by multi-level issues, a diverse range of 
actors that shifts from negotiation to implementation and a partial literature. There is 
therefore a need for a structured approach to research within this field. Regime theory 
provides an analytical framework that can help systematically analyse the 
complexities of landmine regimes. As discussed in Chapter 1, considering fields as 
diverse as security, trade and the environment as regimes has proved effective in 
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developing new insights into international efforts to influence behaviour in these issue 
areas. For analytical purposes, the ongoing implementation of both regimes is 
relatively new and therefore insights must be derived from a short period. However, 
the broader framework of IHL is significant. Analysis of historical IHL regimes with 
parallels to APII and the APMBC in this chapter can contribute to research questions 
that address regime interplay and nesting within the broader context of IHL.  
 
Landmine regimes cannot be assessed in isolation. The field within which these 
regimes are situated covers, inter alia, international relations, international law, IHL, 
as well as arms control and disarmament. As part of the body of IHL, APII and the 
APMBC must be understood within the architecture of international legal measures 
developed to protect combatants and civilians in time of war. They also rest within the 
framework of agreements negotiated to regulate or eliminate specific categories of 
weapon. This is significant because, if situated within a common normative 
framework, APII draws on arms control approaches in seeking a balance between 
military utility and humanitarian concerns while the APMBC focus directly on 
humanitarian impact. While advocates of the Ottawa Process clearly favor the latter 
approach, a major research focus of this thesis is to develop a more nuanced 
understanding of the individual and cumulative effects of both regimes. Landmine 
regimes have spawned official texts, policy-related material, advocacy-driven work 
and technical studies. These multiple perspectives reflect the humanitarian, political 
and economic interests that overlap and intersect within this field. Analysis of a 
number of different literatures is therefore required to capture the complex dynamics 
that shape landmine regime design, implementation and effectiveness.   
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This chapter begins with a review of key elements of the regime literature. From the 
starting point of perspectives on what constitutes a „regime,‟ it identifies important 
approaches and insights that have emerged in the regime theory discourse that are 
relevant to this thesis. Work to date on security, trade and environmental regimes is 
assessed in order to understand the characteristics of different types of regime,  
highlight commonalities and distinctions and thus to inform our subsequent analysis. 
Critically assessing different regime theory approaches and insights from different 
thematic areas permits us to generate refined hypotheses and research questions for 
IHL in general and the landmine regimes in particular. Having reviewed the 
conceptual framework of regime theory, including key thematic issue areas, this 
chapter then considers the history, development and scope of IHL from a regime 
perspective. After introducing landmine treaties as „regimes,‟ the chapter concludes 
by refining key primary and secondary research questions posed in Chapter 1 in light 
of insights developed from this review of relevant literatures.   
 
2. Understanding regime theory 
 
Regime theory provides the analytical framework applied systematically throughout 
this thesis in order to develop new insights to APII and the APMBC within a broader 
IHL context. This section reviews and analyses key elements of the regime theory 
discourse in order to situate IHL within this analytical framework. Beginning with a 
conceptualisation of different definitions of regime, significant regime theories are 
considered. This section concludes by assessing significant elements in the evolution 
of regime theory. 
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2.1 Definitions of regime 
 
A useful starting point for an analysis of regime theory and its utility within the field 
of IHL is to consider different definitions of a regime. In one of the earliest 
conceptualisations of regime, a definition provided by John Ruggie in 1975 describes 
„a set of mutual expectations, rules and regulations, plans, organizational energies and 
financial commitments which have been accepted by a group of states.‟9 This concept 
is of value because although, as discussed later in this chapter, there are widely 
contrasting views on the role played by regimes, different schools agree that while the 
international system is characterized by anarchy, it is governed by rules. The concept 
of regime, although with long historical antecedents, reflects the fact that „it is only 
during the course of the twentieth century that regimes can be regarded as a global 
phenomenon, with states becoming enmeshed in increasingly complex sets of rules 
and institutions which regulate international relations around the world.‟10 
 
Ernst Haas, writing in 1980, suggests that „regimes are norms, rules and procedures 
agreed in order to regulate an issue area.‟11 Stephen Krasner in 1983 offered the 
definition of a regime as „implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules and decision-
making procedures around which actors‟ expectations converge in a given area of 
international relations.‟12 Another definition was offered in 1989 by Robert Keohane 
as „institutions with explicit rules, agreed upon by governments, which pertain to 
                                                 
9
 Ruggie, J. (1975) „International Responses to Technology: Concepts and Trends‟; International 
Organization 29 (3): p.570. 
10
 Little, R. „International Regimes‟ in Baylis, J. and Smith, S. (2001) The Globalization of World 
Politics 2
nd
 edition (Oxford University Press): p.299. 
11
 Haas, E.B. (1980) „Why Collaborate? Issue Linkage and International Regimes‟, World Politics (32): 
p.358. 
12
 Krasner, S.D. (1983) International Regimes (Ithaca, NY): p.2. 
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particular sets of issues in international relations.‟13 The similarities and distinctions 
between these three early definitions are instructive. All include explicit rules or 
procedures and an agreed organizational framework as essential to the 
characterization of a regime and the role that actors play within it. Keohane offers a 
„minimalist‟ definition of regimes as formalized constructs agreed and established by 
states. In this respect, he acknowledges that rules alone do not make a regime; there is 
also a need for validity and recognition by states for a regime to exist. However, in 
responding to the Krasner definition, Keohane is wary of defining regimes in terms of 
observed behaviour due to the complexity in interpreting implicit rather than overt 
regime characteristics such as principles and norms.
14
   
 
In introducing the concept of norms to their definitions of a regime, Krasner and Haas 
point out that participation in international regimes is more complex than a function 
of rules and procedures. Norms explicitly incorporate multi-actor involvement in 
regimes beyond the states that make up their formal membership. In other words, 
regimes are an expression of interdependence in international relations and this is as 
relevant as structural aspects in defining and explaining them. It should also be noted 
that neither Krasner nor Haas refer solely to states, allowing for wider interpretations 
of the actors involved in international regimes. This is important because research has 
recognised the danger that „a state centric approach runs the risk of introducing a 
conservative bias into regime analysis and fails to confront many interesting 
developments currently underway in international and transnational affairs.‟15 
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The regime theory discourse has moved beyond these earlier definitions of regime. In 
particular, Krasner has been criticized because of the difficulty in differentiating the 
four main components of regimes. Distinguishing these elements is essential if 
regimes are to be classified in ways that help to explain their design, implementation 
and effectiveness. Levy, Young and Zurn recognize this challenge to operationalising 
the concept of international regimes. They note that the ability to understand the costs 
and benefits of legal rules is essential but has been lacking in earlier research. This is 
an important gap because „given the basic thrust of regime analysis as a tool for 
understanding international cooperation, there is a need to go beyond merely 
routinized or patterned behavior.‟16 
 
Levy, Young and Zurn define international regimes as „social institutions consisting 
of agreed upon principles, norms, rules, procedures and programs that govern the 
interactions of actors in specific issue areas.‟17 The authors elaborate on their 
classification of international regimes:
18
 
 
 Principles, understood as coherent bodies of theoretical statements, and norms 
constitute central elements of international regimes. These concepts permit a 
classification of regimes in all phases of their evolution that facilitates our 
understanding of regime effects and consequences. The authors point to work 
by Robert Keohane and Harald Muller suggesting that „when the principles 
and norms of a regime are nested together with other regimes, the regime 
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becomes highly resilient in the face of deterioration in the overall relationships 
to which it relates….furthermore, where networks of regimes link the same set 
of participants, actors‟ perceptions of each other‟s behavior are more likely to 
be affected than where regimes are isolated.‟19 
 
 Posing the question as to what observable characteristics of rules increase both 
their legitimacy and the likelihood of compliance, Levy, Young and Zurn 
highlight an argument by Thomas Franck that international rules exert a 
normative pull to the extent that they are legitimate. Franck proposes four 
legitimacy-enhancing characteristics: (1) determinateness and clarity; (2) 
symbolic validation within the participating community; (3) internal 
coherence; and, (4) vertical links between the primary obligation and 
secondary rules which establish „normative standards that define how rules are 
to be made, interpreted and applied.‟20 
 
 With regard to procedures and programmes the authors note that typologies of 
regimes show wide variations in decision making procedures.  They suggest, 
however, that regimes which are evolutionary, with the ability to learn and 
adapt, may offer greater chances for success in the long run.
21
 
 
 Looking at actors, Levy, Young and Zurn emphasise the number and type of 
actors that may be involved in a given regime. They point to work showing 
that the involvement of NSAs, at least in the case of environmental regimes, 
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improves the effectiveness of the regimes and fosters regime learning. They 
also highlight the impact of „epistemic communities‟ – understood as 
„network(s) of professionals with recognized expertise and competence in a 
particular domain and an authoritative claim to policy-relevant knowledge‟22 – 
in shaping priorities and pushing forward the debate in specific subject areas.
23
 
These issues raise broader questions on international policy coordination and 
the impact of different numbers and types of actors on regime design, 
implementation and effectiveness.  
 
 The authors emphasise that although links may be derived between issue areas 
and processes of regime formation, much work remains to be done on the 
influence of different issues on the nature of regime formation and 
implementation.
24
 In the case of the two landmine regimes, the significance of 
the humanitarian catalyst underpinning the regime formation process must be 
considered.     
 
Clear definitions are important in order to distinguish regimes from other entities 
within the international system. There is a need for conceptual clarity because actors 
and institutions are interrelated. However, Levy, Young and Zurn note that „in 
practice, international organizations and international regimes are often closely 
intermeshed. Specific international organizations regularly perform a number of 
functions for international regimes, including monitoring, information-gathering and 
rule-revising. On the other hand, international organizations can also operate as 
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regime-making mechanisms.‟25 Keohane also stresses the importance, given that 
regimes are social institutions, of distinguishing between organizations, regimes and 
conventions. He specifies that „international organizations are purposive entities, with 
bureaucratic structures and leadership, permitting them to respond to events. 
International regimes are institutions with explicit rules, agreed upon by governments, 
that pertain to particular sets of issues in international relations. Conventions are 
informal institutions, with implicit rules and understandings, that shape the 
expectations of actors.‟26  
 
2.2 Theories of international regimes 
 
Although regime theory emerged as a field of study in the 1970s, the issue of rules 
and their influence on the behavior of states has much longer antecedents. Richard 
Little suggests that the study of regimes should therefore be set within a tradition that 
can be traced back to Hugo Grotius (1583-1645), the „father of international law.‟27 
Thus the study of international regimes falls within a wider framework of 
international rule-making and governance that embraces both international relations 
and international law traditions. However, the study of international regimes poses 
significant challenges that have required scholars to go beyond established theoretical 
frameworks stemming from International Relations theory. For example, assumptions 
of state centrality within international relations are not taken for granted in regimes 
dealing with transnational issues that involve a range of international, state and non-
state actors. Equally, the distinction between national and international politics is 
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blurred by processes whose consequences are felt on both domestic and international 
stages. 
 
Three broad approaches can be discerned in the study of international regimes: the 
Realist approach focuses on power relationships and coordination; Liberal 
Institutionalists adopt an interest-based perspective to collaboration; while 
Cognitivists emphasise knowledge dynamics, communication and identities. A major 
difference between the three schools is their relative emphasis on how far institutions 
matter. The degree of „institutionalism‟ of a given theory derives from the 
assumptions made about actors and their motivation. A central Realist argument is 
that the distribution of power affects the prospects for an effective regime to emerge 
and persist as well as defining the central characteristics of the regime. Liberal 
institutionalist theories, emphasise that „regimes help (self-interested) states to 
coordinate their behavior such that they may avoid collectively suboptimal 
outcomes.‟28 Cognitivists focus on knowledge-based theories which embrace 
institutionalism in a causal sense with regime members learning through exposure to 
the social norms within a given institution. 
 
From the point of view of classification it may be useful to juxtapose these three 
approaches. However, properly conceptualizing regimes does not allow for such clear 
distinctions. Andreas Hasenclever, Peter Mayer and Volker Rittberger suggest the 
potential for synthesis between the traditions, stating that „power, interests and 
knowledge interact in the production of international regimes.‟29 Realism and 
neoliberalism are both rationalist approaches which in a sense provide respectively 
42 
 
„pessimistic‟ and „optimistic‟ interpretations of international regimes. Drawing from 
both traditions may result in what Duncan Snidal calls „a contextually richer theory 
that is able to explain international politics better than either vulgar realism or vulgar 
liberalism in isolation.‟30 Equally, cognitivist approaches can provide valuable 
insights to the goals of actors or the options they perceive themselves as having.   
While it is not the purpose of this thesis to develop the methodological debate on 
approaches to regime theory, it is useful to draw on all three traditions when exploring 
specific cases in the field of IHL.      
 
2.3 The evolution of regime theory 
 
Stephan Haggard and Beth Simmons position the regime literature as an attempt to 
reconcile idealist and realist traditions relating to international institutions by 
suggesting that states‟ activities are influenced by norms but that this is also 
consistent with the pursuit of national interests.
31
 This accords with the view of Ernst 
Haas who answers the question why states collaborate through the mechanism of 
international regimes with the assertion that „if it were possible to predict the outcome 
of international negotiations by projecting the power of the parties, our question 
would be answered….the existence of an unstable hierarchy of issues on the 
international agenda means that minds are being changed all the time.‟32 Although 
research in the field of regime theory no longer centres on refuting neorealist claims 
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that international organizations are unnecessary to world politics, this does not mean 
that issues of power politics are irrelevant. A significant theoretical debate focuses on 
assessing the balance between power, knowledge and interests as causal factors in 
institutional development and effectiveness.
33
   
 
It is clear that states are key actors within international regimes. However, debate 
within this field has moved beyond the assumption of state centrality to consider a 
range of actors involved in international regimes. This reflects recognition of regimes 
as international social institutions shaped not just by formal institutional structures but 
by a wider community of actors, norms and social processes interacting in complex 
ways within a given issue area. Acknowledging the dual nature of regimes as rule 
bound treaty frameworks and social institutions is important. It highlights the need to 
capture the dynamic nature of international institutions and the relationship between 
technical and political considerations that influence the behaviour of regime 
stakeholders. Taking into account these issues is essential if we are to understand why 
regimes are established, how they are implemented and to what extent they are 
effective in achieving the goals they were set up to meet.   
 
One issue that has received increasing attention is the role of NSAs in international 
regimes. Recognition of this fact is important because it moves the debate forward 
from a comparison of the relative weight of influence of states versus NSAs towards 
„the analysis of the roles non-state actors actually play in a society whose membership 
is still composed largely of states.‟34 An important element of understanding the 
influence of state and non-state actors in international regimes is how changing 
                                                 
33
 Hasenclever, Mayer and Rittberger (1997): p.283. 
44 
 
clusters of actors affect different phases of regime formation and implementation. 
Joseph Camilleri and Jim Falk take this notion further by citing transnational 
movements as sources of „support for a new system of multiple allegiances and 
jurisdictions, held together not by supreme authority but by an emerging world culture 
and a dynamic network of communities, movements and organizations.‟35 Although 
this perspective may be regarded as extreme in its downplaying of the role of states, it 
raises important questions as to the impact of globalization on international 
governance. 
 
Questions relating to international regimes have become much more specific. Marc 
Levy, Oran Young and Michael Zurn in a survey of international regime literature 
divide these questions into four areas:
36
 
 
1) Under what conditions and through what mechanisms (why and how) 
do international regimes come into existence? 
2) Do regimes persist even when the circumstances in which they came 
into existence change?  What makes regimes robust, effective and flexible, can 
this be generalized? 
3) What are the observable consequences of regimes for state behaviour 
and problem solving?  Do regimes serve the goals that led to their creation? 
4) What long term effects do regimes have on national political systems 
and the structure of world politics? 
 
                                                                                                                                            
34
 Levy, Young and Zurn (1995): p.317. 
35
 Camilleri, J.H. and Falk, J. (1992) The End of Sovereignty.  The Politics of a Shrinking and 
Fragmenting World (Edgar Elgar): p.232. 
36
 Levy, Young and Zurn (1995): pp. 268-269 
45 
 
These broad sets of questions addressed by regime theory provide a means to 
structure the more specific research questions considered in this thesis within a 
coherent analytical framework. Consideration of different aspects of regime theory 
developed in this chapter provide a means to address the knowledge gaps motivating 
this thesis through structuring our analysis around questions of regime design, 
implementation and effectiveness. 
 
 3. Four phases in the evolution of international regimes 
 
This section reviews key elements of the regime theory discourse that can help to 
frame research questions on landmine regimes. Regime theory identifies a number of 
clear phases in the development of international regimes: regime formation; 
implementation; effectiveness; and, consequences. Deconstructing APII and the 
APMBC through focusing on the interrelationships between different phases of 
regime evolution enables us to move beyond a perceptions-based assessment and 
address important gaps in the current literature. This provides a novel, structured 
approach to an issue area that has not been considered to date through the optic of 
regime theory. 
 
3.1 Regime formation 
 
Peter Mayer, Volker Rittberger and Michael Zurn account for the emergence of so 
many new regimes in the past sixty years as stemming from the reality that 
„interactions and transactions in the international arena have increased and resulted in 
46 
 
a new quality of interdependence among international actors in a shrinking world.‟37 
In particular, the authors note the effects of such diverse phenomena as increased 
capital mobility, the emergence of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and global 
ecological threats in reducing the ability of states to deal effectively with trade, 
security or the environment on a unilateral basis. Robert Keohane emphasises that the 
post-1945 boom in international institutions does not reflect a decline in state power 
but a growth in interdependence and consequent demand for multilateral 
institutions.
38
 In contrast, Lisa Martin suggests that states only turn to multilateralism 
when self-interest justifies such a course. While agreeing that the profusion of new 
organizations following the Second World War is evidence of the utility of 
multilateralism, she questions whether this corresponds to any kind of multilateral 
norm. Rather, in an increasingly complex world, a skein of bilateral relations is 
difficult to sustain with multilateral solutions requiring less enforcement effort from 
powerful states.  
 
Oran Young and Gail Osherenko break the study of regime formation into three 
linked topics:
39
 
 
 The ability to agree an institutional arrangement 
 The length of time between the issue appearing on the international agenda 
and the conclusion of a regime agreement 
 The extent to which the regime is tailored to the specific issue(s) 
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Although states are recognized as core regime members, the role of the various actors 
and entities involved in regime formation is complex and requires considered 
analysis. Haggard and Simmons account for this because „growing interdependence 
means that groups at the domestic level increasingly have „regime interests‟…welfare 
is tied not only to particular policy decisions, but to other states‟ compliance with 
regime norms, the way in which cooperation is institutionalized, and the access 
regimes provide for private actors.‟40   
 
Norms are clearly important to regime formation. Martha Finnemore and Kathryn 
Sikkink describe the phenomena of „norm cascades‟ and „norm bandwagons‟ when a 
certain number of states adopt a principle or norm and other states feel obliged to 
adopt the same approach.
41
 John Ruggie argues that regimes can only succeed when 
they reflect the dominant normative orientation in the domestic practices of the 
leading members of a regime.
42
 Richard Putnam further develops this issue, 
demonstrating that international negotiations are a two-level process with domestic 
issues and actors bringing influence to bear on the international level. Governments 
seek to maximize their ability to meet domestic pressures while minimizing adverse 
consequences of foreign developments. However, he emphasizes that „the political 
complexities for the players in this two-level game are staggering. Any key player at 
the international table who is dissatisfied with the outcome may upset the game board, 
and conversely, any leader who fails to satisfy his fellow players at the domestic table 
risks being evicted from his seat.‟43 While considering the specific factors that 
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influence regime formation, it is therefore also important to recognize the importance 
of context and the influence of external events.   
 
Actors can play qualitatively different roles in regime formation. In this context, Oran 
Young describes three kinds of leadership:
44
 Structural leaders who represent states 
and seek ways of bringing material power to bear on regime formation processes; 
Intellectual leaders who shape the way ideas are framed and energized; and, 
Entreprenneurial leaders who craft options for consensus and broker contractual 
deals. Finnemore and Sikkink link individual leadership and norm emergence in 
regime formation. „Norm entrepreneurs‟ play a significant role in convincing states to 
form a regime around a given issue area.
45
 However, ways in which entreprenneurial 
skills are clustered with intellectual leadership in the regime formation phase can have 
important consequences for subsequent implementation and effectiveness. 
 
3.2 Regime implementation 
 
A seminal study on the subject by Jeffrey Pressman and Aaron Wildavsky
46
 defines 
„implementation‟ as „a process of interaction between the setting of goals and actions 
geared to achieving them.‟47 It analyses a US Government programme that sought to 
reinvigorate a depressed area with high unemployment. The key lesson drawn from 
the failure of the Oakland Project, which failed in spite of the necessary political will 
and sufficient funding, was that „from the outset, emphasis was on designing the 
programme, obtaining initial agreement at the local level, and committing the 
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funds…. the later steps of implementation were felt to be „technical questions‟ that 
would resolve themselves if the initial agreements were negotiated and commitments 
were made.‟48 This highlights that many of the challenges of regime implementation 
rest on how far „ideal‟ regime stipulations reflect the practical realities of the contexts 
in which they must be implemented.  
 
Regimes invariably require action from their members so a clear understanding of 
what is needed to comply with regime rules must underpin the design of specific 
provisions. It is therefore essential that actors have the capacity to comply with 
regime provisions. Richard Putnam describes as „involuntary defection‟49 the situation 
where states fail to meet regime requirements because the obligations placed on them 
are unrealistic. Implementation challenges also argue for effective compliance 
verification with obligations stipulated under the regime. The absence of a monitoring 
capability can mean that regimes lack the self-awareness to understand 
implementation and thus recognise if changes are needed to improve regime 
compliance. A lack of clarity on these issues can also undermine confidence in the 
regime, leading some regime members to question whether others are observing 
obligations to which all have agreed to be bound. 
 
Political will is key to encouraging wide ratification of treaty regimes. However, 
adherence to an international treaty is only the first step. It is equally important that 
treaty requirements are fully integrated into domestic legal structures and regulations 
in order to influence behaviour at the national level. In this respect, Antonio Cassese 
notes that „international law cannot work without the constant help, cooperation, and 
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support of national legal systems.‟ This integration of international rules in national 
frameworks is particular important to implementing treaty regimes in what Andrew 
Hurrell refers to as the „hard cases‟ where national security interests form part of the 
debate.
50
   
 
3.3 Regime effectiveness 
 
Levy, Young and Zurn define regime effectiveness as „the contributions institutions 
make to solving the problems that motivate actors to create them.‟51 However, they 
acknowledge that the range of different cases and the variety of possible measurement 
criteria makes generalizing from specific cases extremely difficult. This is 
compounded by the fact that problems which compel the setting up of an international 
regime tend to be serious enough for actors to pursue their resolution through a 
variety of means which may or may not be linked to the regime in question.   
 
Underdal‟s dual approach to regime effectiveness – how far members abide by regime 
rules and the extent to which regime objectives are fulfilled
52
 – raises the possibility 
that a regime can be extremely effective in terms of compliance without fulfilling its 
overarching objectives. A comprehensive definition of effectiveness therefore goes 
beyond the implementation of legal provisions or policy adjustments by regime 
members to include „changes in the behaviour of actors and in patterns of interactions 
among them in ways that contribute to management of targeted problems.‟53 Oran 
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Young cites two widely used criteria for regime performance: „An economic criterion 
stresses efficiency and asks whether the same results could have been achieved at a 
lower cost or, alternatively, better results achieved at the same cost….a political 
criterion directs attention to equity and raises questions about the fairness both of the 
results of institutional arrangements and of their procedures or processes.‟54 However, 
behind both landmine regimes is a broader humanitarian onus to reduce the suffering 
caused by these weapons. A humanitarian criterion therefore represents an important 
third dimension of landmine regime effectiveness. 
 
Jorgen Wettestand and Steinar Andresen adopt a counter-factual approach to 
assessing regime effectiveness, asking what would have happened if the regime had 
never existed. This implies a causal link between the operation of the regime and the 
behavior of the relevant actors and makes the important point that a regime that does 
not appear successful in terms of before-and-after comparison may look more 
effective when causal links and counter-factuals are taken into account.
55
 Certain 
issue areas lend themselves more or less to before-and-after comparison. Ronald 
Mitchell‟s study of oil pollution before and after the introduction of equipment 
standards
56
 offers an interesting comparative example for landmine regimes. Both 
involve a wide range of actors and interest groups, have an environmental component 
to the issue and, arguably, allow for measurement of the problem before and after 
regulation. However, as already discussed, the caveat applies that any conclusions 
drawn from such analysis should take into account whether other factors beyond the 
regime may account for a perceived change. 
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Influences on regime effectiveness can be divided between exogenous and 
endogenous factors. Among the former, a popular Realist argument has made the case 
for „hegemonic stability.‟ This posits that a concentration of power in a state that 
supports institutional goals is essential for institutional success through providing 
enforcement of regime rules. Endogenous factors contributing to regime effectiveness 
are tied to the premise that there are good and bad ways of structuring and 
administering regimes. Michael McGinnis and Elinor Ostrom provide a set of „design 
principles,‟ derived from domestic institutions, which they argue are applicable for 
the effectiveness of international institutions:
57
 
 
 Rights to utilize resources are clearly defined 
 Rules match local circumstances 
 Individuals affected by operational rules can participate in modifying them 
 Monitoring of resources and participants behaviour is by accountable agents 
 There are graduated sanctions for violators 
 Existence of low-cost conflict resolution 
 The rights of participants are not challenged by outside authorities 
 Institutional activity is layered and nested 
 
These design principles are useful only for illustrative purposes. They remain 
hypotheses until applied to specific cases. However, they raise the pivotal question for 
regime effectiveness of the linkages between the principles and obligations that 
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constitute a regime framework and the reality of how they are implemented. This 
reconciles lessons from the failings of the Oakland Project with the challenges posed 
by landmines through underlining the need to understand „how the design features and 
programmatic activities of institutions interact with the configurations of interests and 
patterns of influence within which they operate.‟58 
 
3.4 Regime consequences 
 
Definitions of regime consequences are often linked to the effectiveness of 
international institutions in achieving regime goals and objectives. This approach has 
the benefit of integrating related phases of regime evolution. However, for the 
purposes of my research, „regime consequences‟ refer to the broader effects of 
regimes. Compliance with regime provisions may generate a number of „outputs‟ 
from members that are intended to contribute to the specific „outcome‟ a regime is 
established to achieve. However, consequences may affect actors outside of the 
regime while emulation effects and other consequences may shape outcomes in other 
issue areas.  
 
The direct effects of regimes are often easier to trace than indirect effects. Equally, 
when a regime has consequences outside its own issue area, it can be a question of 
perspective whether effects are negative or positive. While recognizing the 
complexities of international society and the consequent difficulty in tracing all the 
effects of a specific regime, a distinction can be drawn between two kinds of regime 
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consequence: those that affect state and inter-state relations; and, those that affect 
international society and transnational relations.
59
 Between stakeholders, regimes can 
play a role in altering perceptions of each other. Equally, through facilitating greater 
understanding of a particular subject area, policy changes can be effected that have 
consequences beyond a given issue.  
 
Regimes can also foster transnational links and, as with inter-state relations, 
encourage common understanding among actors that influence how they calculate 
their interests. Consequently, whether regime consequences are linked to states or to 
international society, regime learning constitutes an important concept. Interactions 
between stakeholders may result in new ways of thinking about specific problems as 
well as the ways regime members think about each other.  
 
Drawing from experience of environmental regimes, Oran Young notes that „some 
regimes produce spillover effects by influencing relations among members in 
functional areas beyond their nominal scope. Regimes, especially those widely 
regarded as successful, can also generate demonstration effects by creating precedents 
that affect the thinking of both their own members and others as they confront new 
problems.‟60 Individual regimes can be embedded in wider normative frameworks as 
with Ruggie‟s example of embedded liberalism and post Second World War 
international trade institutions. Oran Young stresses the importance of these cognitive 
constructs as „international institutions cannot remain effective for long after the 
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collapse of their intellectual underpinnings.‟61 Overlapping normative or ideational 
frameworks can also generate spillover effects between linked issue areas. This raises 
important questions relating the development of a norm against the use of APMs and 
its consequences within the wider normative framework of IHL. 
 
4. Regimes in different issue areas 
 
This section discusses examples from security, trade and environmental regimes that 
may provide valuable lessons for the regimes that are the main focus of this thesis. 
Factors that shape regime evolution, key actors and normative considerations 
represent themes that seem particularly significant in order to understand the 
characteristics of different regimes. Considering these questions can inform our 
approach to APII and the APMBC and allow us to develop insights drawn from these 
issue areas that may be applied to the field of IHL more broadly and the landmine 
regimes in particular. 
 
4.1 Security regimes 
 
The Concert of Europe – an agreement signed in 1815 between the states of post-
Napoleonic Europe with the aim of preventing major war on the continent – could be 
regarded as an early example of a security regime.
62
 Indeed, the absence of war 
involving more than two Great Powers between 1815 and 1914 is testament to the 
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effectiveness of the regime.
63
 The Concert of Europe also included a review 
mechanism to resolve disputes through regular congresses although with the corollary 
that decision-making was shaped by the Great Powers so „did not correspond to a 
United Nations, but rather to the Permanent Members of the UN‟s Security 
Council.‟64 Security regimes in the modern sense began to emerge following the 
Second World War. In particular, the onset of the Cold War saw the development of a 
number of bilateral, regional and global security regimes. The effectiveness of some 
of these regimes has been questioned. Other security regimes, however, have been 
judged more effective. 
 
4.1.1 The NPT 
 
The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), which opened for signature in 1968, is 
the central treaty in the global nuclear non-proliferation regime. It is a global treaty 
regime which regulates the possession of nuclear weapons. The Comprehensive Test 
Ban Treaty (CTBT) is a distinct but related regime embedded within the NPT which 
seeks „to achieve the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all 
time.‟65 The CTBT entered into force in 1996 and includes a verification system 
combining seismic monitoring and on-site inspections. All states parties must agree to 
inspections by the International Atomic Energy Association (IAEA).
66
 If requested, 
the IAEA can also monitor the nuclear facilities of non-regime members. The 
exception to this voluntary inspection regime is Iraq where, from the end of the 1991 
Gulf War to just before the military action that led to the fall of the Saddam regime, 
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the IAEA conducted „special inspections‟ in order to verify that Iraq was not 
continuing to develop a covert nuclear weapons programme. 
 
All five recognized nuclear weapon states and 184 non-nuclear weapon states are 
currently NPT regime members.
67
 However, the Iraq case highlights the difficulty in 
determining regime effectiveness when a state is not committed to demonstrating 
compliance. After intensive inspection efforts, and even after regime change as a 
result of US led military operations in Iraq in 2003, a clear picture of Iraq‟s nuclear 
weapons programme has still not emerged. Moreover, India, Israel and Pakistan are 
not party to the NPT but are acknowledged to have a nuclear weapons capability. 
Equally, Iran, Iraq, Libya and North Korea are NPT members but have demonstrated 
an interest in acquiring nuclear weapons.
68
 
 
4.1.2 The ABM treaty 
 
The 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty is a Cold War strategic nuclear arms 
regime agreed bilaterally between the US and the Soviet Union. The regime was 
challenged when US President Ronald Reagan announced plans for a Strategic 
Defense Initiative (SDI) which proposed a unilateralist missile defence system in 
direct conflict with the ABM regime‟s principles of mutual vulnerability and strategic 
stability. Harald Muller uses this case as an example of divergent interests and their 
interplay when a security regime is threatened.
69
 The US Department of Defense 
supported scrapping the ABM treaty in favor of SDI, a position initially adopted by 
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the President. The State Department, the US Senate, the arms control community and 
European allies of the US all supported the treaty regime and opposed SDI. Muller 
points to a number of reasons why the regime was sufficiently robust that President 
Reagan was forces to backtrack: 
 
 The principle of pacta sunt servanda. Once a regime is in place it is difficult to 
scrap it. Not least, the ABM treaty was enshrined in US law so the Senate 
would not permit manipulation of the treaty by the Administration: „when 
rules are translated into domestic law, regimes gain strength from legal and 
constitutional reflexivity.‟70   
 
 Compliance with regime rules was more likely once the issue became a matter 
of public debate. Public and media attention constrained the Administration‟s 
freedom of action. 
 
 This case highlights the potential role of foreign ministries as regime 
advocates in contrast to the „hawkish‟ position of the security establishment. 
 
 SDI and the ABM treaty was not regarded as a stand alone issue but as 
forming part of a wider security framework and abolishing the ABM treaty 
was perceived as a threat to the credibility of deterrence. Muller deduces from 
the support for the regime, both domestically and internationally, that „security 
regime compliance, hence, takes into account the consequences that non-
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compliance might have for the broader framework of arms control, security 
cooperation, and peace.‟71 
 
Muller also emphasizes the broader normative role of bilateral security regimes in the 
1980s. On the one hand, regime cooperation showed the US that the Soviets could be 
a reliable arms control partner; while on the other hand, „security cooperation with the 
United States had convinced a considerable part of the Soviet foreign policy elite and 
the security apparatus that their Manichaean image of the world was wrong. The 
Soviet elite started understanding the interdependence of security policy.‟72 The 
specific regime was nested in a wider normative framework, encouraging learning by 
regime participants beyond the specifics of the regime itself and thus facilitating 
confidence-building between the Soviet Union and the West.
73
 
 
4.2 Trade regimes 
 
The origins of trade regimes have been linked to technological advances in the fields 
of transportation and communication which facilitated the development of cross-
border cooperation. The principle of freedom of passage for shipping is an example of 
a tacit regime that can be traced back to the sixteenth century. The standardization of 
international postal agreements represents one regime within the communications 
field that is rooted in nineteenth century technological advances. Richard Little argues 
                                                 
71
 Muller in Rittberger (1993): pp.384-85. 
72
 Muller in Rittberger (1993): p.384. 
73
 See Efinger, M., Mendler, M. and Rittberger, V. (1990) „Towards an East-West Security Regime: 
The Case of Confidence and Security Building Measures‟; Journal of Peace Research 27(1): pp.55-74. 
60 
 
that „the resulting network of regimes can be seen to provide an essential part of the 
infrastructure underpinning the modern international economy.‟74 
 
4.2.1 Global trade regimes 
 
On a global level, the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT) was 
established in 1947 to realise the principles of free trade in practice. It reflected 
recognition of the need to regulate international trade and comprised both a general 
director and a secretariat responsible for preparing international trade conferences and 
agreements. Impetus for establishing the GATT came from the US, the dominant 
economic power of the time, and from that perspective could be regarded as reflecting 
the principle of hegemonic stability. However, characterising this phenomenon as 
„cooperation after hegemony,‟ Robert Keohane notes that if US economic power had 
dwindled by the 1970s, the regime remained effective. The rules and procedures 
governing the GATT were substantially modified during the regime‟s history as a key 
agenda item in several GATT conferences.
75
  
 
Adopting a counterfactual approach, Thomas Biersteker provides insights into the 
effects of the global debt regime of the 1980s.
76
 Biersteker describes how the 
international financial system was close to collapse in the 1980s due to the 
accumulation of debt from developing countries and the severe overexposure of many 
US and European banks in the face of this debt. A number of countries became unable 
to make their debt repayments and matters were brought to a head by Mexico‟s 
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balance of payment crisis in August 1982. The debt regime that was developed to 
address this crisis incorporated both formal and informal instruments with a clear 
normative goal of assisting developing countries. However, this assistance was 
conditional on debt-laden countries pursuing market-oriented economic reform. The 
principal institution of the regime, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), provided 
relief from debt burdens only on the basis that this criterion was observed. New 
facilities were created and enhanced surveillance mechanisms were introduced to 
monitor countries‟ performance. 
 
Biersteker poses the question whether this regime influenced the environment within 
which states interacted, the behavior of those actors, and, in particular, whether the 
regime had any significant effects that could not be explained by other causal 
explanations. He focuses on two key effects: the indebted countries did not renounce 
their debts; and, they generally did engage in market-oriented economic reform.
77
 
Biersteker argues that if we go back to the „branching point‟ of August 1982 when 
Mexico appealed for assistance, the absence of an emergency financial package and 
an IMF agreement linked to access to commercial bank finance would have resulted 
in a very different world political economy. Assuming that behavioral logic remains 
the same, he argues that without the regime Mexico would have defaulted and, as a 
consequence, less credibility would have been given to attempts to assist other 
indebted countries, thereby increasing the likelihood of further defaults and thus 
inhibiting efforts to address the situation in other indebted countries. 
 
                                                 
77
 Biersteker, in Rittberger (1993): p.334. 
62 
 
The GATT had always been seen as an interim agreement from its inception in 1947.  
Increasing trade protectionism in the 1970s and the developing country debt crises of 
the 1980s highlighted the need for change. The final Uruguay Round (1986-94) of 
international trade talks established the World Trade Organisation (WTO) as a 
successor institution to the GATT. The WTO has evolved in regime terms beyond the 
GATT framework, covering services, intellectual property and investments. The 
WTO also has greater enforcement powers through its dispute settlement mechanism. 
This is a significant example of regime evolution once it became clear that the 
institutions created at Bretton Woods were not appropriate to the changing nature of 
the international system in the 1980s and 1990s. However, as discussed below, 
serious questions have been raised as to the compatibility of the WTO framework 
with international development goals.  
 
4.2.2 Regional economic communities 
 
On a regional level, the development of the various post-1945 European institutions 
was a response to the failures of states acting individually. With the founding of the 
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) in 1948, the 
European Coal and Steel Community in 1952, the European Economic Community in 
1958 and the European Union (EU) in 1965, increasing, gradual European 
cooperation in economic and trade policies – as part of wider political, economic and 
social integration – can be traced. This process was driven by a core group of states 
and the evolving nature of these regimes was set within, and therefore constrained by, 
the institutional frameworks which they had established.    
 
63 
 
If European regional cooperation was driven by the legacy of the Second World War, 
then it could be argued that regional economic cooperation beyond Europe has been 
driven by the post-Cold War phenomenon of globalization. The end of the bipartite 
world order provided new opportunities for regional trade cooperation with the term 
the „new regionalism‟78 coined to describe a phenomenon which, in part, has come 
about as a response to European economic integration. The North American Free 
Trade Association (NAFTA) – comprising Canada, Mexico and the US – is notable 
because it is the most far reaching example of a regional cooperation project that 
includes countries from both North and South.
79
 Cooperation is particularly 
challenging because of the imbalances in the economies of the different regime 
members but, as was the case with Mexico‟s financial crisis in 1997, the organization 
has successfully maintained cooperative approaches to problem solving.    
 
In another region, Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) – comprising 21 
pacific rim countries or regions – seeks to coordinate members‟ economic policies as 
well as reducing tariffs and duties. The impetus for the development of this regime 
came through the structural leadership of the US. APEC prioritises the role of NSAs, 
in particular business leaders, to contribute towards regime goals of enhancing trade, 
investment and a sense of „community‟ in the region. Although APEC‟s progress has 
been slowed due to disparities between its members economies, as well as the impact 
of the Asian financial crisis of the late 1990s, the inclusiveness of the regime has 
generated broader consequences through providing a forum that permits discussion of 
wider political and security issues. 
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4.3 Environmental regimes 
 
Environmental regimes have developed out of an increasing awareness across the 
international community of the need to address the damage being done to the global 
environment. By the year 2000 there were over 130 multilateral environmental 
regimes.
80
 This represents a prolific rate of growth when it is considered that regimes 
in this area first began to emerge only during the 1970s.   
 
4.3.1 The evolution of environmental regimes 
 
The 1972 United Nations Conference on the Human Environment (The Stockholm 
Conference) was an important early step in the development of environmental 
regimes. The declaration agreed at the conference contains a number of principles 
that, even if not widely accepted at first, over time gained international stature and 
became a benchmark for environmental diplomacy. The conference led to the 
establishment of environmental monitoring networks as well as to the creation of the 
United Nations Environmental Programme (UNEP). This provides an institutional 
framework that has shaped the environmental debate as well as facilitating the 
linkages between the environment and related issues. The conference also had a wider 
impact in that many governments subsequently formed Ministries for the 
Environment or national agencies responsible for environmental monitoring and 
regulation. The increased public awareness of environmental issues has also been 
reflected in the growth of NGOs and networks of NGOs focusing specifically on these 
questions.  
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Although scientific analysis on the dangers posed by ozone depleting substances 
(ODS) had been emerging since the early 1970s, the dramatic discovery of an „ozone 
hole‟ above the Antarctic proved the catalyst for international action. Public and 
political concern prefaced a volte-face from the international companies that had 
previously opposed restrictions on chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) – some of the most 
damaging ODS – but now accepted the need to participate in (and thus influence) the 
development of an international agreement on this issue. The Montreal Protocol, 
signed in 1987, committed signatories to cutting CFC consumption by 50% by 1999. 
One early problem was that many developing countries refused to sign the protocol 
unless the cost of implementation was met by the developed world. This principle was 
agreed in 1990 and a multilateral fund established for this purpose. UNEP, supported 
by states and NGOs, played an important role in widening the scope of the protocol: 
the range of controlled products was increased and the timescales for implementation 
tightened over time. There were (and are) problems with compliance in certain 
countries. However, serious challenges to the credibility of the regime have been 
averted through international pressure combined with offers of conditional 
assistance.
81
 
 
The scope of the global environmental challenge was put at the forefront of the 
international agenda during the 1992 Rio „Earth Summit‟. Around 150 states were 
represented and 45,000 people attended one of the largest summit meetings ever 
held.
82
 If the dangers posed by CFCs had already become an issue of grave concern 
for the international community, the Earth Summit was intended to deal with the 
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broader consequences of this bete noire: global warming, climate change, the 
extinction of certain species and deforestation. Two documents emerged from the Rio 
Conference: the Rio Declaration of 27 principles on the environment and 
development; and, Agenda 21, a detailed plan of action (400 pages contained in 40 
chapters) covering the span of sustainable development issues. 
 
Agenda 21 illustrates that no single regime can address the range of national, regional 
and global environmental challenges. Rio established framework conventions on 
climate change, biodiversity and desertification but complex implementation issues 
remained after the Conventions entered into force in 1994, only two years after the 
Earth Summit. One of the basic difficulties in implementing the Rio Conventions was 
that they failed to impose legal commitments on states. The goal was therefore set to 
develop a more legally binding protocol on the issue of greenhouse gas emissions to 
be negotiated in Kyoto, Japan. National and regional interests complicated 
negotiations but the Kyoto Protocol was agreed in December 1997 and achieved more 
stringent commitments on the emission of greenhouse gases in developed countries. 
Yet both political and practical challenges remain. As well as the technical challenges 
of implementing commitments, ongoing US opposition to the protocol has hindered 
progress. Equally, as across the range of environmental issues, there is a fundamental 
difference in priorities between the developed world‟s emphasis on preservation and 
the economic imperatives of the developing world. This issue clearly demonstrates the 
problematic of the Prisoners‟ Dilemma where dominant individual strategies lead to 
sub-optimal results in terms of common interests. The challenge is particularly 
conspicuous in issues where national interests and global commons intersect. 
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4.3.2 Characteristics of environmental regimes 
 
Peter Haas, Robert Keohane and Marc Levy argue that environmental regimes are 
effective through fulfilling three criteria: increasing concern; improving the 
contractual environment; and, enhancing the capacity of governments – the 3 Cs.83 
These criteria link institutions with their external environment as a deficiency in any 
one area may cause failures in the collective management of the regime. Oran Young 
also highlights the innovative role that NSAs have played in environmental regimes, 
including through the introduction of procedures that overcome the potential paralysis 
engendered by consensus decision-making.
84
 Greene concurs, making an important 
distinction between different types of regime by noting that „it increasingly became 
the norm that non-Governmental groups should have wide access to 
intergovernmental meetings on the environment, to an extent that would have shocked 
earlier generations of diplomats and is still unknown in some other spheres of 
international activity.‟85 
 
Haas emphasises the importance of transnational groups of scientists and policy 
makers who become carriers and transmitters of ways of thinking about international 
problems and their solutions.
86
 Drawing from international efforts to protect regional 
seas, he describes these epistemic communities as having three characteristics: a 
regional community interested in the issue; respect by the political community for 
these experts; and, channels of contact between experts and policy makers. This 
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corresponds with Young‟s observation that „regimes form a horizontal rather than a 
vertical or hierarchical system of public order.‟87 
 
There is currently significant debate over whether the objectives and approaches of 
the global trade regime embodied in the WTO are compatible with achieving 
sustainable development and environmental protection. The transnational NGO 
campaigns that mark each WTO meeting with massive protests are testament to this 
contradiction. This raises questions about how two international regimes in different 
issue areas but with similar memberships can generate such differing perspectives on 
their effectiveness and utility. It also recalls the two-level problematique of domestic 
versus international interests and the balance of power between state and non-state 
actors in international regimes.   
 
5. Regimes in international humanitarian law 
 
This section provides an overview of regimes in IHL in order to situate and 
contextualize a subsequent introduction to key elements of the landmine regimes. This 
initial review, together with insights from the regime theory discourse (Sections 2 and 
3), and from research findings in other issue areas (Section 4) informs the refined 
research framework, hypotheses and research questions elaborated in the subsequent 
section. 
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5.1 Overview 
 
IHL, also known as the laws of war, is intended to minimise the suffering caused in 
armed conflict. It refers to rules between states governing armed conflict (jus in bello) 
but not the resort to armed conflict (jus ad bellum). The origins of IHL can be traced 
back almost as far as warfare itself. For example, the Greeks and the Romans 
customarily prohibited the use of poison or poisoned weapons in combat.
88
 There is 
an extensive body of literature on IHL in general as well as particular treaty regimes. 
These include negotiating histories and other commentaries
89
 as well as work looking 
at the impact of IHL within the broader framework of international relations.
90
   
   
IHL can be divided into two branches. „Geneva law‟ deals with the treatment of 
combatants, non-combatants and civilians caught up in armed conflict while „Hague 
law‟ regulates the means and methods of warfare. Geneva law includes Conventions 
drawn up in 1864, 1906, 1929 and 1949 with the Geneva Conventions of 1949 
replacing the previous ones. The two Additional Protocols of 1977 to the 1949 
Geneva Conventions are considered to combine both Geneva law and Hague law in 
that they govern the treatment of individuals caught up in war but also prohibit 
weapons that cause „unnecessary suffering‟ or „superfluous injury.‟91 The restrictions 
and regulations on the means and methods of warfare found in Hague law are most 
relevant to the subject of this thesis. An important distinction is made between 
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binding international treaties and „customary‟ rules of warfare. Custom complements 
treaty law because any treaty provision which embodies customary law is binding on 
all states whether or not they are parties to the treaty in question. From a regime 
perspective, this adds the complicating factor that rules are not simply laid down in a 
specific treaty but must also be drawn from a much wider corpus of international law 
and practice. 
 
There are significant links between rules governing the conduct of armed conflict and 
controls and prohibitions on specific weapons systems. The 1925 Gas Protocol, like 
the CCW and APMBC, falls into both categories, containing strong elements of IHL 
and arms control. However, the distinctions between these two branches of 
international law are equally important. In particular, there is a clear shift in discourse 
between arms control frameworks that take into account the military utility of a given 
weapon with the humanitarian perspective of IHL premised on alleviating the human 
suffering caused by certain means and methods of warfare. It follows that if regimes 
are to be effective they must take into account the different approaches reflected in 
both IHL and arms control discourses.  
 
5.2 Selected treaties in IHL 
 
The first international treaty prohibiting the use of a weapon is the 1868 St Petersburg 
Declaration Renouncing the Use, in Time of War, of Explosive Projectiles Under 400 
Grammes Weight. This was negotiated by 16 states at an international Military 
Commission convened by the Tsar of Russia. It provides for a ban on bullets which 
explode on impact with the human body, thus introducing the key IHL principle of 
71 
 
„unnecessary suffering.‟ The 1899 Hague Regulations resulting from the Hague Peace 
Conference of the same year introduce the fundamental principle that the rights of 
belligerents to wage war are not unlimited.
 
Arising from this are the principles of 
proportionality and discrimination: 
 
 Proportionality, as it applies to jus in bello, requires calibrating any military 
response, whether in offence or defence, to the military actions of the enemy, 
and to the anticipated military advantage to be gained 
 
 Discrimination includes the obligation that non-combatants and those hors de 
combat should not be deliberately targeted.
92
  
 
A specific outcome of the 1899 Hague Conference was the banning of dum dum or 
soft-nosed bullets.
 
Expectations over this outcome were not high but by the end of the 
conference 20 of the 23 states represented had agreed to Hague Declaration 3. In this 
case, advocacy by the medical community – in particular doctors who had treated 
wounds caused by these bullets in the field – raised the profile of the issue in the 
national and international media and provided a powerful lobbying force. Sandi 
Cooper describes this phenomenon as „the first major instance where concerned 
citizens – recognizing that technology might run amok, that warfare could destroy 
civilization and that social priorities were suffering from military expenditures – 
organized a movement to push their governments to act preventatively.‟93 
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Public outrage at the gassing of soldiers during the First World War provided the 
political impetus for the 1925 Gas Protocol. The protocol stems from the 1899 Hague 
Declaration‟s prohibition on the use of poison and weapons causing unnecessary 
suffering. However, despite a broad membership, observance of the treaty regime‟s 
provisions by signatories has been uneven. For example, Italy used gas during the 
1935-36 invasion of Ethiopia, the Japanese used gas in China between 1937-45 and 
the UN Security Council in 1988 unanimously adopted a resolution condemning the 
use of chemical weapons in the conflict between Iran and Iraq.
94
 
 
The 1954 Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of 
Armed Conflict reflects efforts enshrined in earlier Hague Conventions to protect 
cultural property in time of war. The failure of these principles of IHL had been 
starkly illustrated with the plunder of occupied territories by the Germans during the 
Second World War. The Convention, and its Additional Protocol which was opened 
for signature in May 1999, establish a regime requiring the identification and marking 
of cultural property and its safeguarding during international and non-international 
armed conflicts and whenever one state occupies the territory of another state. The 
regime seeks a balance between protection and military necessity. However, many 
militarily-significant states did not join the original convention, citing weaknesses in 
its protections and the absence of a mechanism to support implementation. These 
issues were addressed in Amended Protocol II. However, the gap of five years 
between negotiation and ratification by 20 states which triggered entry into force 
highlights the lack of broad international support for this regime.
95
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Following the Second World War, no international treaty regimes appeared banning 
specific weapons until the CCW in 1980. This is an „umbrella‟ treaty under which 
specific protocols have been negotiated regulating or prohibiting:  
 
 weapons that injure through non-detectable fragments (Protocol I) 
 mines, booby traps or other devices (Protocol II and Amended Protocol II)  
 incendiary weapons (Protocol III)   
 blinding laser weapons (Additional Protocol IV) 
 explosive remnants of war (Protocol V) 
 
The conferences in 1978 and 1979 which led to the agreement of the CCW were 
negotiated by governmental representatives and military experts with minimal 
external pressure. Important advances were made but, as discussed below, in the case 
of landmines these measures were shown to be inadequate by the widespread 
continued use of landmines in conflicts throughout the developing world. 
 
5.3 Landmine regimes 
 
This sub-section provides a brief introduction to preface the deeper analysis of the the 
landmine regimes developed in subsequent chapters. The regulation of APMs under 
IHL began only in 1980 with the agreement of the Protocol on Prohibitions or 
Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby-Traps and Other Devices (Protocol II). It 
represents the first elements of a prohibition on a conventional weapon since the 1899 
74 
 
Hague declaration banning dum dum bullets.
96
 The lack of any modern day 
precedents meant that the CCW negotiating process followed the traditional 
consensus-bound pattern that has commonly characterised arms control negotiations 
between states.
97
 In the decade following the agreement of Protocol II, the use of 
landmines, often targeted against civilian populations, became a common feature of 
the increasing number of civil wars around the world. Growing international 
recognition during the 1990s of the humanitarian impact of these weapons led to a 
CCW Review Conference. After 8 months of stop-start negotiations, consensus could 
be reached on a number of improvements to Protocol II.  
 
The outcome of the CCW review conference did not satisfy the growing pro-ban 
coalition that had been blocked by the CCW rules of procedure from participating in 
the review process. Disappointment at its outcome encouraged the Canadian Foreign 
Minister, Lloyd Axeworthy, to initiate a separate negotiating track - the Ottawa 
Process. The period leading up to the negotiating conference saw a dual-track 
approach with civil society actors raising public and media awareness while 
committed states lobbied across national capitals. A core group from within the 
coalition prepared the draft treaty text and was also responsible for ensuring that the 
issue of an APM ban was not raised in inhospitable multilateral frameworks.          
 
Differences in institutional frameworks contribute significantly to the distinctions 
between the two regimes that emerged from these processes. APII negotiations 
followed established CCW procedures: only government negotiating teams were 
recognised; decisions could only be reached by consensus; and, formal negotiations 
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were spread over several months. In contrast, the Ottawa negotiations were not tied to 
any international framework or negotiating forum and included strong representation 
from a range of NSAs. Decision-making was by two-thirds majority and the 
negotiating conference lasted only three weeks. Unlike the CCW, the negotiating 
framework was therefore set towards achieving a definite result within a short 
timeframe. 
 
One of the key factors in influencing undecided states during the Ottawa negotiations 
was the absence of compelling counter-arguments to the expert testimony, provided 
by mine action practitioners and landmine victims, of the humanitarian costs inflicted 
by these weapons. This message was amplified by national and international news 
media reporting on the plight of landmine victims in the worst affected countries. 
High-profile support coupled with powerful – if not always accurate – statistics also 
had a profound effect. In contrast, the humanitarian impact of APMs was not directly 
addressed in the APII negotiations. Although there was external pressure on the CCW 
Review Conference to achieve significant results, these voices were absent from the 
formal negotiations. It was recognised that radical solutions would fail the consensus 
requirement so limited change was always the most likely result in these closed 
negotiations. Military-technical experts necessarily focussed on the technical 
characteristics of APMs and restrictions to these weapons that would be acceptable to 
all.  
 
The ban movement grew because this seemed a logical solution to an obvious 
humanitarian disaster. The visibility of the mine ban issue was, therefore, essential to 
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the success of the pro-ban lobby. The idea of a ban was much easier to transmit to the 
general public than the technical detail of restrictions on certain categories of mines. 
Certainly, widespread resistance to forceful US lobbying during the Ottawa 
negotiations demonstrates the strength of the anti-APM norm. In this respect, Neil 
McFarlane highlights the importance of domestic politics to the Ottawa negotiations, 
noting that the US suffered a rare policy disagreement with close allies on a security 
policy issue.
98
 The two permanent members of the United Nations Security Council 
that joined the regime, France and the UK, had elected new, left of centre 
governments keen to demonstrate their humanitarian credentials by endorsing the 
anti-APM norm.               
 
The APMBC entered into force some 3 months after APII on 1 March 1999. The 
reality that states encompassing more than half the world‟s population (including 
many militarily-significant states) have not signed the APMBC but are part of APII 
shows that membership alone is not an adequate indication of regime effectiveness. In 
this respect, the research questions develop through this thesis provide an opportunity 
to better understand the effectiveness of two treaty frameworks seeking to address the 
same challenge with very different approaches in terms of process and substance. The 
high public profile of the APMBC raises the question of how domestic and 
international issues intersect in terms of national policy decision-making. APII is 
much more state-centric, has a lower profile and is viewed with less enthusiasm by 
many civil society actors. Albeit that the two regimes have different approaches and 
profiles, it is important to understand how their contrasts and similarities have 
positive or negative effects on regime effectiveness. 
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6. Understanding landmine regime effectiveness 
 
This section draws on the analysis of different literatures within this chapter in order 
to refine the research framework for this thesis. First, key insights from regime theory 
approaches in different issue areas are considered. Building on this, hypotheses and 
research questions introduced in Chapter 1 are further motivated and elaborated. 
 
6.1 Issues for landmine regimes 
 
Research to date within the field of security regimes is significant because while the 
landmine regimes may have an underpinning humanitarian objective, both raise 
important „hard‟ security issues. Given the sensitivity of the issue area, interests play 
a highly prominent role in this type of regime. Security regimes that limit or eliminate 
military capabilities bear particular comparison with landmine regimes. Implicit in 
these regimes is the erosion of military capabilities through restricting or removing a 
category of weapons. This issue is thus highly sensitive and subject to a polarisation 
of views between different interests. Security regimes may reassure regime members 
through trade-offs built into regime design, as found in APII, or promote stringent 
measures using advocacy or other forms of pressure as made evident in the APMBC. 
Both approaches can therefore provide insights that may be applied to better 
understand the effectiveness of the landmine regimes. 
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Analysis of different security regimes provides important wider lessons that can 
inform our understanding of both regime challenges and reasons for regime 
effectiveness. It is clear from the case of the ABM treaty that the regime was effective 
because: 1) it fit within an overall strategic framework; 2) in political terms it was 
grounded within a broader arms control policy; and, 3)  in legal terms it was 
enshrined in both domestic and international law. These three frames of reference and 
their influence on the robustness of the ABM treaty regime raise important 
considerations for the two landmine regimes and the broader political context within 
which they are situated. The difficulties in developing effective security regimes point 
to a number of key observations to be considered in the context of the landmine 
regimes:   
 
 Regime membership does not guarantee compliance 
 Non-membership of certain states can have disproportionate effects on  regime 
effectiveness 
 Technical challenges of verifying regime compliance can be exceptionally 
demanding 
 Implementation may be facilitated through combining formal regime 
mechanisms with informal or ad hoc measures by states or other regime 
stakeholders 
 
Trade regimes provide examples of specific mechanisms embedded in broader 
normative frameworks such as post-Second World War liberal economic order or the 
post-Cold War phenomenon of globalisation. The formation and implemention of 
regimes addressing economic issues are particularly relevant for landmine regimes 
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because in both cases achieving „universalisation‟ in membership and promoting 
effective cooperation means addressing inherent inequalities between members. The 
GATT demonstrates a number of significant regime characteristics. The principle of 
free trade and a core norm focusing on the reduction and eventual elimination of tariff 
and non-tariff barriers were particularly influential. Moreover, regime rules and 
procedures demonstrated a flexibility to adapt to a changing external environment, 
including a deterioration in relations among participants. Further reasons for the 
durability of the GATT that offer insights for the landmine regimes are extrapolated 
from Keohane:
99
 
 
 Interactions within the regime lead to a stabilisation of mutual expectations 
 Transaction costs in achieving objectives are reduced within the framework of 
the regime 
 Participation results in the availability of information otherwise not available 
or only at a high cost 
 A frame of reference exists to structure future relations with parties in spite of 
different interests and priorities 
 
The changing nature of the international system over time has required successful 
trade regimes to be evolutionary. This raises the broader point that if it becomes clear 
that regimes are not effective, flexibility and self-awareness to enable regime learning 
are important in order to support regime evolution. In the case of many regional and 
global economic communities, structural leadership has come from the US as the 
world‟s dominant economic power. The concomitant US influence in political, 
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economic and security spheres emphasises the need to understand the significance of 
the US role in relation to the effectiveness of the landmine regimes. This touches both 
on the implications of its policy decision to support only APII and not the APMBC 
but also in how the US position as the single largest bilateral funder of mine action 
activities relates to the realisation of regime goals. 
 
The landmines issue shares with environmental regimes an imperative to address 
problems that go beyond national interests to include concerns over the preservation 
of global commons. Moreover, dangers associated with both environmental issues 
such as ODS and landmines have become better understood over time, resulting in the 
need for flexible, differentiated responses. In the case of environmental regimes, 
review and monitoring mechanisms have proved important in order to maintain 
regime credibility. Bearing out Richard Putnam‟s analysis of a two-level game, with 
concerns at the national level bearing fruit in multilateral negotiations, pressure on 
states and commercial companies to support environmental regimes has been greatly 
facilitated by targeted, civil society-driven advocacy.
100
 The environmental 
experience is therefore particularly significant for landmine regimes in raising 
questions that consider the kinds of monitoring mechanisms that enhance regime 
effectiveness as well as the need to critically assess the influence of regime 
stakeholders beyond the level of the state. 
 
Critical to a successful environmental regime is the ability to adapt and develop. 
Framework conventions that facilitate such flexibility and demonstrate characteristics 
of regime learning have come to be regarded as essential in the context of 
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environmental regimes. The Montreal Protocol provides an important example of 
regime effectiveness, incorporating both rule observance and achievement of intended 
goals. From a „before and after‟ perspective, before the protocol was signed in 1987 
global consumption and depletion of ODS was increasing significantly but by the mid 
1990s this trend had been halted and reversed.
101
 The regime has gained strength from 
being part of a two-level game; public pressure at the national level engendered 
political support within this multilateral framework. Provisions reflect the different 
needs and capacities of its members and the regime framework has shown flexibility 
as new challenges to regime effectiveness have emerged. The domestic versus 
international dimensions of the regime would seem to offer important parallels to the 
landmines issue. More broadly, given technical and political implementation 
considerations, qualities of regime flexibility and responsiveness to new and evolving 
challenges seem particularly significant. 
 
Building on characteristics of environmental regime evolution identified by Owen 
Greene, a number of specific insights for our analysis of APII and the APMBC can be 
distinguished:
102
 
 
 The regime formation phase requires clear scientific monitoring and 
assessment in order to prove a particular environmental threat and appropriate 
remedial action. This stage can also be marked by the jockeying of different 
interest groups. Regime formation is assisted if public concern is mobilized: as 
an example, even though the problem had existed long before, measures 
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against oil pollution at sea were only stimulated after a number of high profile 
oil tanker disasters. 
 At the design stage, knowledge-based epistemic communities have proved 
influential. Greene notes that „delegations from organizations such as 
Greenpeace, World Wildlife Fund or Friends of the Earth at international 
meetings were frequently larger and more expert than those of all but the 
largest states, and through their access to the media and their expertise were 
able to shape international agendas.‟103 
 The implementation phase is equally complex requiring commitment, 
expertise and resources from implementers. Some states take legal obligations 
more seriously than others so review and verification mechanisms are 
important for increasing awareness of, and ensuring compliance with, regime 
obligations. 
 
6.2      An elaborated research framework for landmine regimes 
 
By considering landmine treaties from the perspective of „regime,‟ this thesis adopts a 
relatively systematic and thorough regime analysis approach, focusing on linkages 
between processes of design, implementation and effectiveness  that have been 
lacking within much of the existing literature in this issue area. Reviewing research on 
the design, implementation and effectiveness of security, trade and environmental 
regimes provide a number of significant insights. Landmines are a security issue, as 
apparent from the motives of states that chose not to join the APMBC and lose this 
military capacity. In many ways, the issue is also akin to the environmental 
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experience in terms of the global nature of the threat and the transnational efforts by 
states and NSAs to address it. International trade regimes also highlight important 
links between design factors and agency in contributing to the resilience of 
transnational regimes. However, the caveat applies that while lessons can be drawn 
across different regime types, there are also significant distinctions that must be 
reflected in our analysis. This sub-section therefore revisits research questions 
stemming from our two main hypotheses set out in Chapter 1 in light of our review of 
the relevant literatures. These questions are further developed under three cross-
cutting themes: the interplay between design and implementation, key actors and 
normative considerations  
 
6.2.1     The interplay between design and implementation 
 
Consideration of regimes in different issue areas reinforces our main hypothesis that 
design factors may be highly influential in shaping the quality of regime 
implementation. A comparative approach to landmine regime formation casts into 
relief the range of different regime stakeholders and interests – domestic and 
international – that need to be considered across regime formation processes. The 
central contribution of mine action experts, mine affected states and mine victims to 
APMBC regime design presents a distinguishing feature from APII. This practical 
experience was influential in shaping specific APMBC treaty provisions. Testimony 
from the field also proved particularly effective in convincing the unconverted and 
raising the political stakes of deciding not to join the regime. The influence of 
different stakeholder groups thus emphasises the importance of research questions 
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addressing both technical and political considerations in order to understand the 
relationship between regime design, implementation and effectiveness. 
 
If, in certain cases, states join regimes to share in the political benefits of association, 
membership also comes with material and political costs that need to be assumed in 
the implementation phase. Considerations of cost and benefit at different stages of 
regime evolution thus underpin the hypothesis that regime effectiveness is closely 
linked to the interplay of political and technical issues within the landmine regimes. 
Important research questions for chapters addressing implementation issues focus 
around whether obligations are realistic when measured against the capacities of 
states parties or, in contrast, if they are likely to result in involuntary defection. 
Regime members may also pursue strategies of voluntary defection to avoid fulfilling 
their obligations. For this reason, the ability of the regimes to bridge gaps between 
international commitments and national compliance through deploying „carrots‟ or 
„sticks‟ is identified as a significant consideration for regime effectiveness. 
 
Although implementation and effectiveness are closely linked, the regime literature 
strongly emphasizes the need to distinguish between compliance with treaty 
provisions and the impact of a regime on the problems it was set up to address. The 
twofold definition of effectiveness proposed by Arild Underdal is significant because 
it highlights that even if widely adhered to and fully implemented, a regime may not 
alleviate the problems it was set up to address. For a regime to be effective, the 
relevance and appropriateness of specific provisions must therefore go hand in hand 
with the political will to implement them. Thus, effectiveness is a function of the 
interplay of design and implementation factors.  
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Despite the importance of transparency as a basis for regime learning, neither 
landmine regime binds members to rigorous compliance verification measures. 
Understanding the consequences of both regimes adopting a „light‟ approach to 
verification is therefore important. While civil society has filled this gap in regime 
design by providing regularly updated analysis on compliance issues, the relationship 
between identifying and addressing implementation challenges needs to be carefully 
considered. As discussed below, on the one hand it is important to understand the 
ability of the regimes to draw on the requisite expertise to support implementation. On 
the other, this capacity may only be relevant to the extent that there is political will 
within the regime to highlight shortcomings and enforce compliance. Research 
questions that address regime learning within and across the regimes therefore 
identify an important consideration for regime effectiveness. This adds a 
supplementary dimension to the hypothesis that regime effectiveness is shaped by the 
interrelationship between design features and the ability of regimes to generate and 
sustain political will through the implementation process. 
 
Regime consequences are understood in this thesis as an analytical category that is 
distinct from effectiveness. Whether the regimes create demonstrable spillover effects 
that influence other elements of IHL is particularly relevant. This raises a particularly 
important issue for the landmine regimes because the process of forming and 
implementing these regimes brings together a wide array of state and non-state actors 
motivated by a humanitarian agenda that may also include other IHL issues. It is 
therefore necessary to critically question assertions that the Ottawa Process represents 
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a „new diplomacy‟ in order to understand interaction effects – such as regime learning 
– generated by the regimes and their broader consequences.  
 
6.2.2 Key actors 
 
Implementation of a treaty regime, particularly when addressing a conventional 
weapon in widespread use, requires very different approaches to the norm 
entrepreneurship critical to regime formation. The relationship of mine action 
expertise to the diverse cluster of international, state and non-state actors involved in 
different phases of regime development can be linked to the study of epistemic 
communities. In particular, it is important to consider the extent to which landmine 
regime formation and implementation clusters represent a genuine epistemic 
community that brings specialist expertise to bear on regime challenges or a more 
amorphous grouping of actors drawn together through common regime interests. The 
backgrounds and experience of the actors involved in regime design already strongly 
influence the regime framework within which implementation takes place. It is thus 
important to focus research questions on the different stakeholders involved in 
landmine regime design. In what ways do mine action practitioners contribute to the 
design process? Are these actors more or less implicated in regime implementation? 
This thesis therefore explores the hypothesis that agency in the regime design phase 
can be highly influential in determining regime effectiveness.  
 
A related research question posits that the engagement and interactions of different 
constituencies strongly influences the quality of regime evolution. Beyond the 
individual skills sets deployed within these processes, the clustering of different actors 
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and how these patterns shift across phases of regime development is explored as one 
potential influencing factor for regime effectiveness. In the APMBC literature, the 
dynamics of the „committed state‟ and NSA cluster are considered as key to 
understanding the success of the Ottawa Process. However, a regime perspective 
raises more nuanced questions on the significance of agency across design and 
implementation phases. Specific research questions related to the interplay of mine 
action expertise (intellectual leadership) and the role of advocacy (entrepreneurial 
leadership) are therefore particularly relevant and need to be developed. Comparing 
the interactions of landmine regime stakeholders to epistemic communities may be 
particularly useful in elaborating a critical distinction between regime-focused 
expertise and less focused coalitions of interested actors. 
 
Further questions linked to agency focus on the practical consequences that issues of 
representation and ownership have for regime effectiveness. The different extents to 
which space is provided for developing world actors and their concerns would seem 
to represent a significant area of contrast between the two regimes. In particular, this 
generates a number of research questions relating to how the experience of mine 
affected states is reflected within the regimes. It also tests arguments citing the Ottawa 
Process as an exemplar of a „new diplomacy‟104 and perspectives that conflate narrow 
NGO coalitions supporting the APM ban with claims to legitimacy linked to global 
civil society. There is therefore a need to critically assess the assumption that „the 
formal right to speak is one with the practical ability to raise a voice.‟105 Returning to 
the issue of stakeholder clustering, how these roles differ across regimes or between 
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design and implementation phases can be particularly significant given that achieving 
mine action goals requires successful implementation in mine affected states that 
predominantly form part of the developing world. 
 
6.2.3 Normative considerations 
 
The concept of a „norm bandwaggon‟106 seems to capture the swiftly growing support 
that saw many states positively re-evaluating the costs and benefits of membership 
with others adhering to elements of the treaty even while remaining outside the 
regime. However, the effectiveness of norms in supporting regime formation must be 
distinguished from their influence on the qualitatively different challenges of 
implementation. Our second main hypothesis addresses this issue through exploring 
regime interplay and nesting dynamics of the landmine regime within the broader 
framework of IHL. This hypothesis leads to research questions that link the 
normatively loaded nature of an issue area situated within IHL with the practical mine 
action obligations placed on regime members. In particular, how does normative 
„pull‟ contribute to a tangible increase in political and material commitment to mine 
action? And, can regime effects be traced to one regime framework or to dynamics of 
regime interplay that ignore legalistic demarcations between the two regimes?  
 
These more specific questions add further dimensions to a wider, theoretically 
motivated question relating to the significance of a understanding the landmine 
regimes as nested within a broader regime defined by the norm against inhumane 
weapons. Some security regimes demonstrate a quality of regime resilience that 
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derives from their being nested within broader normative frameworks. While there are 
few evident links between the respective implementation processes, the nesting of 
APII and the APMBC within the wider framework of international efforts to regulate 
or ban the use of certain types of weapon raises the possibility of „deep‟ regime ties. 
Such linkages are not acknowledged by regime stakeholders. However, through 
drawing on our analysis of historical IHL antecedents from a regime perspective, 
considering the two regimes from the perspective of shared norms allows us to 
explore important potential synergies. This may offer an important correction to the 
rejectionist stance that underpins the influential advocacy of the ICBL and which 
continues to provide a barrier to cooperation across the regimes. This point raises a 
related set of research questions that address the relevance of advocacy in the 
implementation as opposed to negotiation phase of regime development. 
 
The influence of an anti-APM norm on the behaviour of non-regime members 
represents a conspicuous gap in the current literature. While states may be motivated 
to remain outside regimes for a number of political, economic or security reasons, 
normative push factors can still encourage regime-compliant behaviour. In the case of 
the US, it is important to consider whether, despite the criticism that continues to 
accompany their policy position as an „Ottawa denier,‟ non-membership of the 
APMBC actually does weaken the regime. Conversely, it is important to consider 
whether the dynamics of US non-membership have resulted in positive emulation 
effects such as increased mine action support or the need to take a more pronounced 
leadership role within the CCW. 
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This thesis explores the relevance of normative considerations in explaining how 
states balance incentives and disincentives – including both domestic and 
international concerns – to regime membership. Certainly, decisions to join the 
APMBC that came with political risk (UK membership in opposition to the US policy 
position) or material cost (several Central and Eastern European states for which 
landmine manufacture was an important part of their defence industrial base) 
highlights a „two-level game‟ and thus the need to deconstruct the different motives 
behind national positions. Parallels can be drawn between these issues and the 
decision-making dynamics that underpin the evolution of Hague Declaration 3 and the 
1925 Gas Protocol. Insights from these regimes can therefore contribute to research 
questions relating to how the regimes influence national calculations on the costs and 
benefits of regime membership and compliance. 
 
7.     A refined thesis structure and approach 
 
There are a number of important gaps in our understanding of the design, 
implementation and effectiveness of APII and the APMBC. In part, these gaps can be 
attributed to the complexity of the issues and the wide range of actors involved. An 
absence of systematic analysis in this field provides both a barrier and an opportunity 
to develop new insights into IHL more broadly and landmine treaties in particular, 
understood as regimes. Subsequent chapters build on the framework and insights 
introduced in Chapter 1 and refined in this chapter in order to develop a deeper 
analysis of the principles, norms, rules, procedures, issues and actors that have shaped 
the design and implementation of the landmine regimes. This research fills an 
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identified gap in the literature by enabling a more nuanced understanding of how the 
interplay of design and implementation influence regime effectiveness.  
 
Building on the foregoing analysis in this chapter, it is now useful to refine and re-
state the aims and objectives of the following chapters through drawing on the 
frameworks elaborated above. 
 
In order to provide contextual depth to our detailed analysis of APII and the APMBC, 
Chapter 3 seeks to apply our research framework to relevant historical IHL treaties. 
An initial analysis of both Hague Declaration 3 and the 1925 Gas Protocol highlight 
the need to consider how factors such as the visibility of an issue area and rules 
relating to participation in processes of regime design and implementation shape 
political will or practical support for regimes. On one level, insights from a regime 
perspective on these historical treaties enable us to measure claims to uniqueness 
made by supporters of the landmine regimes against historical antecedents that have 
not been considered to date in relation to APII and the APMBC. On a more theoretical 
level, given the recent pedigree of the landmine regimes, analysis of more mature 
regimes enables us to recognise normative dimensions that contribute to IHL regime 
effectiveness. Insights from regimes in other issue areas that point to the significance 
of nesting within wider normative constructs provide a nuanced set of issues that link 
Chapter 3 to subsequent chapters. In particular, despite the (deliberate) lack of 
interaction between the two landmine regimes, shared norms provide a means to 
consider how APII and the APMBC interact with each other as sub-regimes within a 
broader regime framework delineated by a norm against inhumane weapons. 
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Chapter 4 focuses on the formation of APII and the APMBC. Considering the 
different processes that led up to regime agreement is particularly important in order 
to understand the objectives and motivations that underpin regime dynamics. The 
profile of the two regime formation processes is thus important in relation to these 
considerations. Understanding the nature of landmine regime design is particularly 
important in order to explore the relationship between design factors and the quality 
of regime implementation. Determining how this process can be influenced within an 
established regime framework (APII as part of the CCW) in comparison with the „one 
off‟ APMBC is therefore important. Rules are shown to be particularly important 
because they determine both the actors that can contribute directly to regime 
formation and also dictate the flexibility that these actors are given to shape regime 
frameworks. Specific sets of actors are associated with each regime. It is particularly 
important to unpack the influence of different stakeholder groups and their roles – 
from advocacy to technical expertise – in order to carefully distnguish the 
engendering of political will from contributions to the actual regime design process. 
Distinguishing groups with an interest in the issue area from epistemic communities 
with contextual or technical knowledge provides an important means to clarify how 
regime design processes are shaped. 
 
Chapter 5 builds on insights developed in the preceding chapter to consider the 
implementation and effectiveness of the two landmine regimes. Analysis relating to 
design, agency and norms in the regime formation phase is recalled in order to 
determine how these considerations play out in implementation. The influence of 
practitioner communities and mine affected states in regime design can therefore be 
tested in relation to how regimes address complex, context-specific implementation 
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challenges. Unpacking these challenges in their political and technical dimensions 
through reconciling regime analysis with mine action best practice is essential. 
Carrots and sticks to support or enforce compliance and avoid defection are therefore 
particularly important. Related to this point, experience from the wider IHL discourse 
demonstrates that embedding international obligations in domestic law and practice 
represents an important consideration for treaty compliance.  
 
Different regimes highlight the importance of flexibility in order to address new and 
evolving challenges to the effectiveness of a regime. Such flexibility implies an 
ability for regimes to understand the need for course corrections as part of the 
implementation process. Given that such mechanisms form part of many effective 
regimes, the absence of strong verification and monitoring provisions within either 
landmine regime raises important questions on the ability of the regimes to be 
„evolutionary‟ with evident consequences for regime effectiveness. Systematically 
applying a twofold definition of effectiveness that encapsulates both compliance and 
impact is thus critical. This is particularly appropriate for Chapters 6 and 7 since 
humanitarian demining and stockpile destruction represent central means for the 
regimes to deliver against their humanitarian objectives. Enhanced resource provision 
and technical support are two ways to link the influence of the regimes to these 
activities. Given that the core obligations in these areas rest with mine affected regime 
members, political will at the national level (and the ability of the regimes to reinforce 
this quality) are key considerations of regime effectiveness. Since different actors 
support these activities outside of the regimes themselves, counter-factual approaches 
are also relevant to distinguish regime effects from the work of the mine action 
community more broadly. 
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The concluding chapter revisits the hypotheses that motivate this thesis and considers 
what new contributions to knowledge have been realised through the primary and 
secondary research questions explored through the various chapters. Research pay 
offs through applying the lens of regime theory to IHL are considered and new 
perspectives set out on the effectiveness of APII and the APMBC. The chapter 
concludes by situating the contribution to knowledge made by this thesis within a 
wider IHL research agenda and identifies potential areas that would merit further 
research. 
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Chapter 3 
Regimes Prohibiting the Use in War of Poison Gas and Dum Dum Bullets 
 
1. Introduction 
 
One if the main hypotheses explored in this thesis posits that landmine regime 
dynamics can only be properly understood as nested regimes, forming part of wider 
efforts under IHL to regulate the conduct of armed conflict. This chapter therefore 
contributes to the overall research aims of this thesis by exploring the significance of 
regime nesting within the issue area of IHL. It thus informs research questions 
introduced in Chapter 1 and refined in Chapter 2 by deepening our understanding of 
the extent to which regime characteristics are unique to the landmine issue and how 
far they draw on the experience of IHL antecedents. Moreover, although Hague 
Declaration 3 and the 1925 Gas Protocol have been researched from historical-legal 
perspectives, examining them through a regime theory lens constitutes a new 
contribution to knowledge through generating insights into an existing literature of 
these historical IHL regimes from a regime perspective. 
 
The 1925 Gas Protocol and Hague Declaration 3 seem to offer important parallels to 
the landmine regimes. Hague Declaration 3, like the APMBC, provides for a complete 
ban on a category of weapon while the 1925 Gas Protocol is closer to APII in its more 
nuanced restrictions-based approach. The ban on dum dum bullets is significant as the 
first codification of the customary international law principle prohibiting weapons 
causing unnecessary suffering
107
 and the only treaty-based prohibition on a 
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conventional weapon in widespread use until the APMBC nearly 100 years later. The 
1925 Gas Protocol can trace its roots to Hague Declaration 2 from the 1899 Peace 
Conference which prohibits the use of projectiles whose sole object is the diffusion of 
asphyxiating or deleterious gases.
108
 It provides a very early binding legal restraint on 
a weapon that had been widely condemned around the world.
109
 Analysis of these 
cases provide new insights to inform our analysis of the landmines regimes. This 
chapter therefore contributes to our first main hypothesis on regime 
design/implementation interplay by addressing secondary research questions relating 
to the significance of different approaches to regime rules and other design factors. 
 
A significant parallel between dum dum bullets and APMs may be found in the 
arguments deployed by those who debated this issue from military utility and 
humanitarian perspectives and how the weight given to these different approaches fed 
into regime provisions. Ultimately, a prohibition on dum dum bullets represents a 
clearly defined regime outcome whereas the design and subsequent implementation 
phases of the 1925 Gas Protocol have been marked by disagreements over scope and 
application. Moreover, both Hague Declaration 3 and the 1925 Gas Protocol were 
considered in relation to military targets. APII is also drafted in this light while the 
APMBC focuses directly on the impact of these weapons on affected civilian 
populations during hostilities and as a post-conflict challenge. Considering 
commonalities and distinctions between the relatively „new‟ landmine regimes and 
IHL antecedents enables us to better understand IHL regime effectiveness through 
addressing research questions on the interplay of technical and political considerations 
and the ability of the regimes to evolve and adapt through regime learning. 
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Normative considerations lie at the heart of IHL. However, the arms control expert 
Jozef Goldblat suggests that „all laws of war suffer from one common weakness: the 
rules of conduct established for belligerents in time of peace may not resist the 
pressure of military expedience generated in the course of hostilities, and the attempts 
to „humanise‟ war may sometimes prove futile.‟110 A corollary to this point is the 
argument that states only ban weapons which they have no intention of using.
111
 
Assessing the effectiveness of Hague Declaration 3 and the 1925 Gas Protocol by 
considering how far outcomes that can be attributed to them are consistent with the 
prevailing political will and national security requirements of the states involved 
informs two sets of secondary research questions. First, it enables us to better 
understand the influence of norms – in particular the concept of stigmatisation – in 
different phases of regime evolution. Second, it provides new insights to the two level 
dynamics of IHL regimes where international commitments need to be followed by 
national level implementation.  
 
Through applying the analytical framework of regime theory, this chapter aims to 
contribute to knowledge by examining in detail the design, implementation and 
effectiveness of Hague Declaration 3 and the 1925 Gas Protocol. It considers key 
features of the two regimes through building on the themes elaborated in previous 
chapters. Key issues are the interplay between design and implementation, key actors 
and normative considerations. Finally, this chapter highlights insights gained from a 
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more refined understanding of these two regimes that may be particularly relevent in 
developing our analysis of APII and the APMBC. 
 
2. The development of Hague Declaration 3 and the 1925 Gas Protocol 
 
This section considers the contextual factors that provide the background to Hague 
Declaration 3 and the 1925 Gas Protocol. It makes a new contribution to a well 
researched subject area by reframing these IHL treaties through regime analysis. This 
section thus identifies the dynamics behind regime formation processes and seeks to 
understand the interests and interactions of different actors. This provides the basis for 
our analysis of opportunities and limitations in addressing humanitarian concerns 
through developing regimes in these areas. 
 
2.1 Origins of the 1899 Hague Peace Conference 
 
The 1899 Hague Peace Conference was called by the Tsar of Russia with the overt 
goal of slowing the mounting cycle of military expenditure among the Powers. The 
initiative was characterized as a response to the „armed peace‟112 that characterized 
contemporary Europe with states investing ever-increasing amounts in new and 
improved armaments. The Tsar‟s manifesto condemned the system of „armaments a 
l’outrance transforming the armed peace into a crushing burden that weighs on all 
nations and if prolonged will lead inevitably to the very cataclysm which it is desired 
                                                 
112
 Hull, W.I. (1972) The Two Hague Conferences and their Contribution to International Law 
(Garland): p.52. 
99 
 
to avert.‟113 The point of departure for the conference thus reflected economic and 
„hard‟ security interests as well as humanitarian considerations.   
 
Opening on 18 May 1899, twenty-six predominantly European countries attended. 
None of the participating states had high expectations going into the conference. 
Indeed, many were cynical as to Russia‟s motives, well aware that, humanitarian 
goals notwithstanding, the Tsar‟s initiative had to be set next to the fact that Russia at 
that time had fallen significantly behind the other Powers in the contemporary arms 
race. The event, therefore, was characterized by what Inis Claude terms „multilateral 
insincerity.‟114 States‟ participation in the Russian initiative reflected the requirements 
of a two-level game: to do otherwise would be diplomatically embarrassing and run 
contrary to domestic and international public opinion. However, the underlying 
security, political and economic interests of participating states are key to 
understanding the process of regime development. 
 
2.2 The development of the prohibition on expanding bullets 
 
The conference was divided into three Commissions: on Armaments; on the Laws of 
War; and, on Arbitration, which in turn divided into sub-committees. The use of sub-
committees and chairmen as well as majority voting rather than unanimity was 
innovative for the time. This approach was to be adopted and further developed in 
future institutional procedures for international negotiations.
115
 However, the results 
of the 1899 Hague Conference reflected the minimalist expectations of the 
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participants. The conference produced: three Conventions on Arbitration, Laws and 
Customs of War on Land and Extension of the Geneva Rules to Maritime Warfare; 
three Declarations on Projectiles from Balloons, Asphyxiating Gases and Expanding 
Bullets; six „Wishes‟ for future endeavours and a Resolution recalling the desirability 
of limiting expenditures for armaments and new types of weapon. In concrete terms 
this was a realistic if much more limited return than aspired to by the Russians. 
 
Delegates were aware that although a failure to agree reductions in expenditures on 
armaments was always the likely result, nevertheless there would be significant public 
disappointment at such an outcome. Although the proposal put forward by 
Switzerland in the Sub-Commission to the First Commission to the Conference to 
prohibit „the use of projectiles which aggravate wounds and increase suffering, such, 
for example, as „dum dum‟ bullets‟116 was not on the original conference agenda, it 
was readily seized upon as an achievable objective after the failure of states to agree 
concrete limitations on the headline conference goals. Despite the underpinning 
realpolitik interests of many participating states, the need to demonstrate progress in 
addressing issues of humanitarian concern proved influential in terms of agenda 
setting and thus provided the opening for a focus on exploding bullets. 
 
Bullets that expand and flatten in the human body were first mass produced at a 
British Indian arsenal in Dum-Dum, near Calcutta,
117
 thus providing the more 
colloquial generic title of dum dum bullets for a shell which „had the capability of 
spreading out on entering the target body and of inflicting a much bigger wound than 
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did the normal hard-nosed high-velocity rifle bullet.‟118 Discussion in the relevant 
sub-Commission began by focusing on the design of dum dum bullets. A number of 
more or less specific formulations were put forward by delegates with the sub-
Commission finally adopting the following wording: 
 
The contracting Powers prohibit the use of bullets which expand or flatten easily 
in the human body, such as bullets with hard jackets, whose jacket does not 
entirely cover the core or has incisions in it.
119
    
 
When the proposition was put to the vote in the sub-Commission, nineteen out of 
twenty delegations present voted in favour and only Great Britain voted against.  
General Ardagh for Great Britain, in justifying his negative vote, put forward the 
unedifying argument that bullets with greater stopping power – such as dum dums – 
were required in battle against „savages‟ who continued to fight when wounded by 
smaller calibre rounds. This distinction was rejected by the sub-Commission and the 
final declaration, in the form of the original proposition, was accepted by twenty-two 
delegations with only the US and Great Britain voting against while Portugal 
abstained.
120
 The majority of states present were thus happy to form a coalition on the 
„right side‟ of this issue. Great Britain in effect compounded this norm bandwaggon 
dynamic by combining a policy position that was on the wrong side of a humanitarian 
issue with a message in delivering this position that was insensitive in the extreme. 
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2.3 Origins of the 1925 Gas Protocol 
 
Custom and usage stretching as far back as ancient times prohibits the use of poison 
in battle. Hague Declaration 2, one of the outputs of the 1899 Hague Peace 
Conference, was the first codification of this principle, prohibiting projectiles 
designed to diffuse asphyxiating or deleterious gases. However, gas warfare rose to 
the top of public and political agendas due to the widespread use of these weapons 
during World War I. Throughout the course of the war 6,000 tons of lachrymators and 
7,000 tons of respiratory irritant gases were used.
121
 John Keegan describes how „gas 
in a variety of forms, the more deadly asphyxiant phosgene, and the blistering 
„mustard‟, would continue in use throughout the war, and chlorine would kill 
thousands of Russian troops in German offensives west of Warsaw.‟122  The issue area 
of gas warfare therefore links a normative dimension that can be traced back to the 
earliest accounts of warfare with high levels of contemporary concern. This provides 
a potent mix that combines the same concerns over military-technological progress 
that infused the Hague negotiations with the psychological and physical legacies of 
„the war to end all wars‟. 
 
The Treaty of Versailles and the other treaties that delineated the end of World War I 
codified a ban on possession as well as use of these weapons by the defeated 
powers.
123
 These measures do not represent either a multilateral arms control or IHL 
regime but a series of conditions applied to the defeated powers which did not apply 
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to the victors. The 1925 Gas Protocol, negotiated over a period of under 8 weeks in 
1925, was a significant further development. The protocol, which provides for a 
general prohibition on „the use in war of asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases, and 
of all analogous liquids, materials or devices,‟ 124 therefore marks a clear break from 
„victor‟s justice‟ and a return to negotiations between states under international law.   
 
As an attempt to regulate the arms trade the 1925 International Conference for the 
Control of the International Trade in Arms, Munitions, and Implements of War, 
convened by the Council of the League of Nations from 4 May to 17 June 1925 was, 
like the first Hague Peace Conference, guided by economic and „hard‟ security 
imperatives. However, international regulation was no more feasible then than it had 
been in 1899. In another parallel with the Hague in 1899, the inclusion of poison gas 
on the conference agenda had not been planned but was added at the behest of one of 
the delegations – the United States – in order that the conference achieve (and be seen 
to achieve) a meaningful outcome in such a high-profile area of concern. The need to 
respond to domestic and international humanitarian constituencies was therefore also 
a significant factor. 
 
2.4  The development of the 1925 Gas Protocol 
 
The document initially considered by delegations in Geneva dealt solely with the 
trade in conventional weapons. The US representative proposed an amendment 
prohibiting the use in war of chemical weapons. The initial emphasis on „trade‟ rather 
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than a prohibition represents the balance sought by the US who wanted to be „the 
moral leader in the worldwide quest for security through disarmament‟ while also 
seeking „a modicum of insurance‟125 in case deterrence failed. These discussions 
highlight the underpinning security dynamics that had to be balanced with economic 
and humanitarian concerns as factors shaping regime design. Multiple interests 
presented participants with a version of the Prisoners Dilemma. The common good of 
achieving such a ban was conditioned by concern over the potential inability to react 
preventatively to the development of chemical weapons by another state.
126
    
 
The US proposed that these issues be devolved for discussion in technical 
committees. However two central problems emerged when they were considered in 
detail:   
 
 The difficulties posed by dual-use technologies became swiftly apparent. 
Expert opinion at the conference was unanimous that nearly all materials used 
in chemical weapons were to be found in non-military industrial products and 
processes. As Zanders notes, „the inability to distinguish unambiguously 
between chemicals used as warfare agents and those that have peaceful 
industrial purposes rendered any ban on their trade or transfer impractical 
because of the impossibility of verifying the end use of the recipient state.‟127 
 
 The principle of „equal treatment‟ among states, in the spirit of the Covenant 
of the League of Nations, was highlighted by many delegations as a guiding 
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principle for their deliberations. There was a recognition that a ban on trade 
was discriminatory, freezing and legitimizing the superiority of those states 
who already had an advanced chemical industry and would therefore be 
unaffected by the ban. 
 
Unable to find a compromise between prohibition and unrestricted use, the US 
withdrew the reference to „trade‟ in their proposed text. Instead, a complete 
prohibition was proposed on the use of poison gas in war. As in the Hague some 
twenty-five years before, technological development was an influential factor. The 
humanitarian effects of recently developed weapons provided a backdrop to 
discussions that left no doubt as to the „right side‟ of the gas warfare issue. Moreover, 
the challenge of distinguishing civilian from military use of chemicals, clearly 
demonstrated by technical expert communities, proved influential in moving 
negotiations beyond the focus on trade.
128
  
 
3. The interplay between design and implementation  
 
The purpose of this section is to consider the evolution of the Hague Declaration 3 
and 1925 Gas Protocol regimes. It contributes to the overall research objectives of this 
chapter by developing new insights into these two regimes that inform our 
understanding of continuity and change across different IHL regimes. The importance 
of regime design and its relationship to implementation is thus considered in relation 
to regime effectiveness. The influence of national security versus humanitarian 
considerations within the regimes is assessed. This section concludes by examining 
the relevance of these two regimes in the broader context of IHL regime evolution. 
106 
 
 
3.1 Relating regime design to implementation and effectiveness 
 
Hague Declaration 3 is binding between contracting parties in time of war. During 
negotiations, British and US delegates argued that the definition of expanding bullets 
provided in the declaration was too technically detailed. However, all the other 
delegations present recognised that the clarity of the prohibition was essential. A 
prohibition based on design characteristics was necessary to prevent states finding 
loopholes in their obligations through applying different interpretations if the ban had 
been linked to more general principles of IHL. The appropriateness of a design-based 
prohibition has been demonstrated by the fact that the declaration has proved 
successful in eliminating the manufacture and use of this type of ammunition for 
military purposes by states.  
 
Rapid acceptance on a political level and the absence of any known violations of the 
prohibition are evidence of the declaration‟s effectiveness.129 However, the wording 
of the declaration reflects the nature of firearms and ammunition at the end of the 
Nineteenth Century and the understanding of wound ballistics at that time. It has been 
argued that this wording is no longer adequate to achieve the regime‟s objectives 
„given the variety of ways in which bullets are now constructed, a modern 
understanding of wound ballistics and recognition that other factors such as bullet 
velocity are also responsible for the degree of injury and suffering from rifles and 
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handguns.‟130 By basing the prohibition on a technical characteristic, the regime has 
lacked the flexibility to adapt to reflect developments in firearms and ammunition 
since 1899.  
 
A related consideration of regime effectiveness links technological development to 
changing practice in the conduct of armed conflict. Evolving weapons technology has 
had profound effects on military strategy and tactics. The arguments put forward by 
Ardagh against the wording of the declaration relate to the use of single shot rifles at 
short range to stop a charging enemy. But the development of automatic weapons and 
the integration of infantry with armour and artillery on the modern battlefield make 
both these arguments and the regime itself less relevant in practice on the battlefield 
than in 1899. A technical definition has thus „frozen‟ the regime in binding it to 
contemporary technology and military practice. This does not limit the regime‟s 
effectiveness at the time but does constrain its ability to evolve and adapt. These 
considerations also provide compelling arguments to explain why the regime has not 
grown significantly over time beyond its initial membership.
131
 
 
The 1925 Gas Protocol regime also faces a number of challenges to regime 
effectiveness as a result of temporal considerations. The protocol restricts its non-use 
obligation to states parties that are at war. This means that its provisions do not apply 
in the case of the internal armed conflicts that have become increasingly prevalent in 
the years since the protocol entered into force. In fact, as Jozef Goldblat suggests, „it 
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might also be argued that the Protocol does not even cover those international 
conflicts in which the belligerents do not consider themselves to be formally at 
war.‟132 Moreover, it does not prevent research, manufacture, stockpiling, transfer or 
training in the use of these weapons.
133
 There are thus a number of loopholes that 
regime members may exploit that are consistent with regime rules but which 
undermine regime goals. The wording included in the protocol leaves considerable 
room for diverging interpretations of obligations. States have thus taken different 
positions on whether tear gas and other non-lethal gases fall within the protocol‟s 
scope.  
 
Regime compliance has been mixed. Examples of voluntary defection can be found in 
several cases. Egyptian forces were alleged to have used poison gas in the Yemen 
during the 1960s. This issue was discussed in the United Nations General Assembly 
(UNGA) on 5 December 1966 leading to a resolution calling for observance of the 
„principles and objectives‟ of the 1925 Gas Protocol.134 In 1982 the US government 
alleged the use of chemical weapons in Laos, Cambodia and Afghanistan by the 
Soviet Union and it allies. Both sides also used chemical weapons during the Iran-Iraq 
war. Iraq was also known to have used chemical weapons against its own Kurdish 
minority population with the attack on Halabja in Northern Iraq in March 1988 
gaining worldwide notoriety.
135
   
 
Different examples of regime defection demonstrate the importance of compliance 
verification as a component of effective regimes. While Hague Declaration 3 was 
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agreed without verification provisions, it may be argued that this is unnecessary since, 
in terms of manufactured production, the declaration has been almost universally 
implemented. However, in contrast to chemical weapons, which require significant 
technical and scientific skill to develop and deploy, expanding bullets represent a 
much simpler technology. Dum dum rounds can be easily improvised prior to battle 
through cutting an „X‟ into the tip of a regular small caliber round.136 The round then 
expands on impact causing similarly large wounds to rounds constructed for that 
purpose. This would seem to reinforce Goldblat‟s point that rules made in peacetime 
governing the conduct of hostilities may be disregarded in conflict situations, a view 
also expressed in 1899 by delegates who feared that the protocol‟s provisions might 
not withstand the strain of hostilities.
137
 Certainly it reinforces the importance of 
applying a twofold definition of effectiveness that looks beyond compliance to take 
into account whether overarching regime goals are realised. 
 
Similarly, the 1925 Gas Protocol does not contain any provisions for the monitoring 
or verification of treaty compliance. In order to address this lacuna, UNGA 
Resolution 37/98 of 13 December 1982 requested the Secretary General „to 
investigate, with the assistance of qualified experts, information that may be brought 
to his attention by any Member State concerning activities that may constitute a 
violation of the protocol or the relevant rules of customary international law.‟138 The 
resulting report on chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons, including 
provisional procedures, was presented by the Secretary General to the General 
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Assembly in 1984.
139
  A UN Mission investigating allegations of the use of chemical 
weapons in the Iran-Iraq war issued seven reports between March 1984 and August 
1988. On 21 March 1986 a United Nations Security Council Statement criticized Iraq 
for „use of chemical weapons, in clear violation of the Geneva Protocol of 1925‟ 
while on 26 August the Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 620 
condemning „the use of chemical weapons in the war between Iran and Iraq.‟140 
Further UN Missions in 1992 investigated alleged use of chemical weapons in 
Azerbaijan and Mozambique. The initiative developed in the UNGA went some way 
to addressing the absence of any mechanism to verify compliance among states 
parties.  
 
The various UN missions and resulting Security Council Resolutions demonstrate the 
mutually reinforcing relationship between the 1925 Gas Protocol regime and 
international institutions. The UN is fulfilling its central goal of safeguarding 
international peace and security by providing a de facto verification mechanism for 
the regime. The UN has the legitimacy to take this step because of the regime‟s 
existence, membership and credibility. These measures have been superseded by the 
much more detailed verification system established under the CWC with the creation 
of the Organisation for the Prevention of Chemical Weapons (OPCW). This 
phenomenon of overlapping and interlocking regimes with the same objective echoes 
the experience of regimes in other issue areas that gain strength through their 
evolutionary nature. In this case, situating individual regimes within a broader regime 
addressing chemical weapons offers greater chances for effectiveness over time. 
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Despite a lack of flexibility to incorporate change, the 1925 Gas Protocol has 
continued to attract new members. The large number of states bound by the 
protocol,
141
 various statements of the UNGA and the Security Council in support of 
its provisions, and the many references found in other IHL treaties, explain why the 
1925 Gas Protocol is widely regarded as forming part of customary international law. 
This question has been clouded by differing interpretations as well as the reservations 
applied by some states. However, Guelff and Roberts acknowledge that „at least the 
first use of lethal chemical and biological weapons is prohibited by customary 
international law. Less consensus exists on the status under customary international 
law of non-lethal chemical weapons.‟142     
 
3.2 Spillover effects  
 
The continued reference to both Hague Declaration 3 and the 1925 Gas Protocol in 
later treaties is a significant example of IHL gaining strength from the mutually 
reinforcing nature of its component treaties. Reference to both regimes in the Statute 
of the International Criminal Court (ICC), defining the use of expanding bullets and 
chemical weapons as war crimes, demonstrates that the two regimes remain relevant 
in IHL. The contemporary significance may be less evident in the case of Hague 
Declaration 3, which has been to an extent superceded by developments in weapons 
technology and military tactics. Temporal considerations relating to both technologial 
progress and changing military practice therefore provide important considerations for 
the landmine regimes. However, there is also continued reference to Hague 
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Declaration 3 in relation to weapons that some consider fall under the more general 
prescription on weapons that cause „unnecessary suffering‟ or „superfluous injury.‟ 
While on one level the regime may seem to have diminished currency, it remains 
relevant in the context of its spillover effects to related issue areas through its nesting 
within a broader IHL framework. 
 
The final declaration of the January 1989 Paris Conference on the Prohibition of 
Chemical Weapons,
143
 acknowledges the importance and continued validity of the 
1925 Gas Protocol. The declaration also stressed the need to conclude an international 
legal instrument on the prohibition of the development, production, stockpiling and 
use of chemical weapons.
144
 The resulting CWC was signed in 1993 and entered into 
force in 1997.
145
 It provides for a complete prohibition on chemical weapons with no 
possibility of „no first use‟ reservations and also applies to internal armed conflicts. 
The 1925 Gas Protocol‟s prohibition on the use of chemical and biological weapons 
has therefore been augmented by the broader prohibition on production and 
possession found in the chemical and biological weapons conventions. The mutually 
reinforcing nature of these treaties is demonstrated by the fact that several states 
withdrew reservations to the 1925 Gas Protocol following adherence to the Biological 
and Chemical Weapons Conventions. Moreover, the CWC contains preambular 
clauses and articles reaffirming the principles, objectives and obligations of the 
protocol. The 1925 Gas Protocol is thus an important antecedent to these broader and 
deeper measures. It provides for the international de-legitimisation of chemical 
weapons, an essential precursor to both practical disarmament measures and the 
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evolution of a norm against their use. In this sense, the broader regime established to 
address the threat from chemical weapons has adapted and evolved, demonstrating the 
regime‟s ability to „learn‟ over time as well as to exploit increased political will as a 
result of external events in order to better address the dangers posed by these 
weapons. 
 
Equally, Hague Declaration 3 can be situated within a broader regime framework 
aimed at restricting or prohibiting the use of weapons causing „superfluous injury‟ or 
„unnecessary suffering.‟ This is particularly important in relation to Hague 
Declaration 3 demonstration effects on later developed weapons. A draft protocol on 
small caliber weapon systems was submitted to the United Nations conference that led 
to the adoption of the CCW in 1980. In order to conform to the letter and spirit of 
Hague Declaration 3, a resolution was adopted encouraging states to conduct further 
research into new types of bullets, particularly those which turn or „tumble‟ once 
entering the human body.
146
 More recently, a draft protocol on small calibre weapon 
systems was presented at the 1995 CCW Review Conference calling for more testing 
on the effects of different rounds. Although this proposal, as with the earlier initiative, 
has not led to a new IHL regime, it retains a level of currency through its relationship 
to Hague Declaration 3. 
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Spillover effects relating to nuclear weapons can be linked to the 1925 Gas Protocol.  
It has been argued that the effects of nuclear weapons imply that their use is 
prohibited by the terms of the regime as well as by customary principles prohibiting 
the use of weapons causing unnecessary suffering. This position was rejected in the 
1996 Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) on the Legality of 
the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons. The intentional design of a weapon was 
determined to be the defining factor in whether a weapon be prohibited, rejecting the 
„effects‟ argument that the secondary asphyxiating and poisoning caused by nuclear 
weapons rendered them illegal. However, regardless of the outcome, it is significant 
that the regime contributed to a debate on nuclear weapons and IHL that needed to be 
addressed through a landmark ICJ judgement. 
 
The nexus between de-legitimisation and political will is particularly important in 
relation to the broader research questions posed in this thesis. Analysis of the 1925 
Gas Protocol demonstrates that if a weapon becomes „stigmatised‟ the powerful 
regime effects can also be exerted, including beyond regime membership. The 
association of specific regimes with customary principles of IHL contributes to a 
mutually reinforcing relationship where the existence of a regime strengthens the 
underpinning norm while also encouraging states to adopt regime-compliant 
behaviour. This relationship also works against regimes losing their relevance over 
time since long term regime goals can be re-considered again and again in different 
fora. 
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4. Key actors 
 
This section considers the roles of different stakeholder groups in the development of 
Hague Declaration 3 and the 1925 Gas Protocol. In order to support the wider 
research objectives of this chapter, particular emphasis is placed on the role of 
influential states (the „Great Powers‟) as well as the influence of civil society. In the 
case of the former, a relatively static membership and the absence of overt regime 
defection means that actors involved in regime design provide the focus for this 
section. Broader issues related to agency in international regimes, including the 
clustering of actors in different phases of regime development, are elaborated in order 
to provide a comparative perspective in relation to the landmine regimes. 
 
4.1 The Great Powers and the 1899 Hague Peace Conference 
 
The states attending the 1899 Hague Peace Conference were conscious of the need to 
play to the concerns of the Peace Movement without sacrificing the requirements of 
military necessity. Not long before the conference China and Japan, Turkey and 
Greece, Spain and the US, had all been at war. Tensions were raised in the Hague by 
the Dutch hosts, supporters of the Boers, who had demanded invitations for the 
Transvaal and Orange Free State despite a looming conflict with Great Britain. Barely 
masked realpolitik concerns under ostensible humanitarian imperatives are 
highlighted in a private communication in which the US stressed the need for an 
international court of arbitration to be seen to be created while reassuring the 
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Germans that „the purely voluntary character of the jurisdiction proposed….should be 
so clearly emphasized that the very last trace of any compulsion, moral or otherwise, 
upon any nation, be it great or small, should disappear.‟147 This highlights that while 
normative considerations and the public profile of the issue generated a significant 
convening power, an effective IHL regime was not the goal for many participating 
states.    
 
By contrast, since initiatives from the Tsars led to the convening of the 1868, 1874, 
1899 and 1907 peace conferences, Russia stood out, at least in the public eye, as the 
state most concerned with peace, disarmament and the laws of war. However, for the 
other Powers, this was a case of „the voice being so often the voice of justice and 
peace, the Realpolitik being forever suspect as that of unregenerate imperialist and 
militarist bear.‟148 Whatever the motives, Russia as the initiator was alone among the 
Powers to push for reductions in armaments. This is significant because despite the 
high levels of multilateral insincerity, providing a framework for negotiation exposed 
states to a high profile, two-level game intertwining domestic and international 
concerns that left open the possibility for states to be tied into a process leading to 
new international obligations. 
 
Germany, the „modern Sparta‟149 built by Chancellor Bismark, was the driving force 
of the contemporary arms race and it is perhaps no coincidence that the Tsar‟s call for 
a peace conference first came less than a month after Bismark‟s death on 30 July 
1898. However, Kaiser Wilhelm II (who had dismissed Bismark in 1890) greeted the 
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Tsar‟s initiative with disdain: „what will Krupp pay his workers with?‟150 Taking his 
cue from the Kaiser, German opposition to the notion of Europe being beset by the 
malaise of armed peace was clearly apparent in the role played by the German 
representation. Whereas all the Powers viewed the Russian proposals in more or less 
the same light, the Germans were less concerned about being cast in the role of 
conference spoilers. By contrast, the British Government recognized the balancing act 
required at The Hague. Unlike the Germans, being mindful of the 750 favourable 
resolutions received by the Foreign Office from public groups in the four months 
following the publication of the Tsar‟s manifesto,151 they did not want to be seen to be 
rejecting the conference and its humanitarian goals. The War Minister Lord 
Landsdowne noted in his instructions to Ardagh that „You have a very difficult hand 
to play. It is clear that the conference has availed itself with the avidity of at once 
achieving something in the interests of humanity and gibbeting us as the inhuman 
power of the age.‟152 
 
Ardagh attempted to justify the British position as the sole opposant to the declaration 
on dum dum bullets in the sub-Commission. His main argument was that „the use of 
these words describing technical details of construction will result in making the 
prohibition a little too general and absolute.‟153 Ardagh argued that recent conflicts 
had shown that the fully jacketed bullet of the British Lee-Metford rifle did not have 
the stopping power to put an enemy combatant hors de combat. The wounds caused 
by the dum dum bullet have this necessary effect „but their result is by no means 
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designed with the aim of inflicting useless suffering.‟154 He therefore argued for „a 
phraseology which shall leave aside technical details of construction and affirm the 
principles on which we are all agreed….that is to say, the prohibition of the use of 
bullets whose effect is to aggravate uselessly the sufferings of men placed hors de 
combat, or to render their death inevitable.‟155  
 
The US, while also opposed to the Russian proposals on armaments, was keen to 
distance itself from being seen to meddle in European affairs. Captain Mahan, their 
naval representative, argued during the conference that „the military and naval 
armaments of the US are at present so small, relatively to the extent of territory and to 
the number of the population, as well as in comparison with those of other nations, 
that their size can entail no additional burden of expense upon the latter, nor can even 
form a subject for profitable mutual discussion.‟156 However, on the specific issue of 
dum dum bullets, the US – about to use these rounds in the Philippines – subsequently 
supported the British position in arguing for a more general prohibition on bullets 
that, in effect, exceeded the limits needed for putting a combatant hors de combat.  
 
Ultimately, both the British and US proposals were rejected by the other delegations. 
The rationale was that a non-definition based prohibition would be too vague to be 
effective. While the British-US position was consistent in seeking to balance military 
necessity with humanitarian concerns, it was recognised among other participating 
states that such language would not be acceptable to the Peace Movement. This 
demonstrates the power of binding states within a process of regime formation that is 
particularly acute in the area of IHL. While such a prohibition was not on the table at 
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the beginning of the negotiating conference, the convening of the different states and 
the need to demonstrate progress meant that this was an acceptable solution for the 
majority of participants. This humanitarian onus was strengthened by the reality that 
only Great Britain and the US had an immediate military use for these rounds. It was 
therefore cost free for other states to (be seen to) take the moral high ground.  
 
4.2 Civil society and the 1899 Hague Peace Conference 
 
At the end of the Nineteenth Century, a recognized Peace Movement had emerged. 
However, the base of the movement was much broader, drawing many who made the 
link between industrial progress and peace. Captains of Industry therefore provided 
significant patronage, the best-known examples being Nobel‟s creation of the Peace 
Prize in 1897 and the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace publishing the 
Proceedings of the 1899 Hague This highlights a clustering of state and non-state 
actors motivated by common interests. This mutually reinforcing relationship offered 
a powerful combination of the convening power of a state with financial leverage and 
compelling advocacy for an effective regime. 
 
For the Peace Movement, the Tsar‟s initiative was seized on with great enthusiasm. In 
particular, the journalist William T. Stead, campaigned around Europe in favour of 
the Tsar‟s proposals and established a new weekly War on War to strengthen public 
demand for the peace conference.
157
 Sessions of the conference were closed, 
excluding the press and other observers not linked to official delegations. Stead, 
through exploiting his numerous personal connections, nevertheless published a daily 
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chronicle of the Conference in Dagblad, The Hague‟s leading newspaper. It was read 
by the majority of delegates, heavily quoted by other correspondents and relayed to 
home societies by supporters. The media therefore self-consciously provided a force 
multiplier effect for the humanitarian lobby. The Conference belatedly accepted 
transparency as a fait accompli and opened up to the press, thus both demonstrating 
the influence of civil society and further increasing the public scrutiny of delegates‟ 
endeavours. 
 
A range of observers present at the conference also had an influence on delegates‟ 
behaviour. Correspondents and representatives of the Peace Movement lobbied in 
favour of specific objectives and raised petitions around Europe and beyond. Despite 
the bellicosity of the official German position, a Committee of Reichstag Deputies, 
professors and writers descended on the Hague to support the Conference.
158
 Public 
attention therefore increased the pressure on delegates to achieve meaningful results. 
This was particularly evident in the pressure applied through the press for the 
establishment of a Permanent Court of Arbitration. Germany was the last of the 
Powers to resist the idea of arbitration but even they were eventually forced to agree 
to the proposal, in spite of the strong reservations of the Kaiser.  Their agreement to 
the proposal for the prohibition of expanding bullets must therefore be seen in this 
same context.  
 
The de facto opening up of the regime design process is an important shift. It 
demonstrates that strong public interest coupled with an effective advocacy campaign 
can bypass formal rules of procedure. The two level focus of international movement 
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and domestic constituencies is particularly significant. Although Germany would 
never have voluntarily agreed to a ban on dum dums, the negotiating environment, in 
particular the effect of channeling domestic advocacy, changed the calculus of costs 
and benefits in its favour. 
 
4.3 The Great Powers and the 1925 Gas Protocol 
 
The issue of poison gas presented a policy dilemma for US decision makers. In public 
the US delegation to the Geneva Conference clearly felt the onus of humanitarian 
considerations. Behind the public statements there were major splits within the 
delegation – as within the Administration – over policy on chemical warfare. The War 
Department was opposed to any prohibition other than on use against cities and non-
combatants. Although official statements did not reflect this position, the War and 
Navy Department representatives were vociferous in attempting to undermine the 
proposals of their own delegation.
159
 
 
While not evident in Geneva, where the US signed the protocol at the end of the 
conference, splits in the US position were to prove decisive when the focus switched 
to implementation and Senate consent for ratification was sought. Resistance from the 
War Department was compounded by a lack of coordination by pro-regime factions 
with the Senate or the chemical industry. Influential opponents in the military argued 
against adherence on the grounds of military preparedness. With the support of 
sympathetic Senators, resistance was reinforced by the fact that the War Department 
had not been consulted until after the US was committed to the regime. In contrast, 
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supporters in the US were conspicuously quiet. The protocol seemed to represent a 
broader restatement of the terms of the Washington Treaty which had been ratified 
without dissent. Lulled by this as well as by favourable reporting from the Foreign 
Relations Committee, „the peace groups forfeited the opportunity to influence the 
most significant debate on chemical warfare during the interwar period.‟160  
 
The Senate considered the 1925 Geneva Protocol on the basis of a calculus that 
reflected national security rather than humanitarian concerns. Ratification was 
rejected not because of any sense that gas warfare was desirable but because the 
perspective was adopted that gas weapons would probably be used in future conflicts 
and the US had to be prepared for that use. As Brown points out, rejection of the 
protocol (which the US eventually ratified only in 1975) marked an important shift in 
US policy with preparedness for gas warfare taking priority over international efforts 
towards prohibition.
161
 It thus represents a unilateralist approach that reflected the 
views of one strand of the US negotiating team. The absence of a bridge between 
international policy formulation and national policy adoption was therefore highly 
significant in shaping the long term US policy stance on this issue.  
 
Many states, including France and Great Britain, became parties to the 1925 Gas 
Protocol subject to the reservation that it is binding only as long as other states are 
bound by it. The protocol is therefore viewed by some adherents not as an absolute 
prohibition but as an obligation of „no first use.‟ These reservations clearly weaken 
the protocol. Yet it is important to acknowledge that such reservations were a small 
price to pay if they were the means by which states could adhere to the regime. On the 
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one hand, the primary motive behind the reservation by the Soviet Union, which 
became a state party in 1928, lay in the fact that two major potential enemies – Japan 
and the United States – had not ratified the protocol.162  On the other, the Soviet 
Union reserved the right to use gas against non-signatories (hence Soviet use of gas in 
Afghanistan during the 1980s was not technically illegal). Reservations to regime 
membership therefore provided a means to stabilise relations between states but also 
came with associated humanitarian costs. 
 
In the years preceding the development of the regime, European powers had an 
ambiguous approach to chemical weapons.  France in 1921 had allegedly provided 
Spanish Morocco with a filling capacity for chemical weapons. State of the art 
chemical agents were subsequently also provided by Germany, in violation of the 
Versailles Treaty. Great Britain and France turned a blind eye to this collaboration 
because of their own interests in shaping the outcome of the Morocco rising and as a 
result control of the Straits of Gibraltar. The Geneva conference took place in the  
midst of the uprising and the Spanish made widespread use of chemical bombs.
163
 
Resistance to a ban on trade in chemical weapons by certain European powers would 
therefore seem to be a logical consequence of national security interests rather than 
the practical difficulties of implementing such a prohibition.
164
  
 
The 1925 Gas Protocol failed to bind the US because it was not sufficiently embedded 
within the broader framework of IHL. The lack of normative push factors meant that 
the US policy position did not come with costs at domestic or international levels. 
                                                                                                                                            
160
 Brown (1968): p.106). 
161
 Brown (1968): pp.108-9). 
162
 Hammond, J.W. (1999) Poison Gas : Myths Versus Reality (Greenwood Press): p.21. 
163
 Zanders (1996): p.41. 
124 
 
Similarly, the reservations tabled by some regime members highlight at best a 
conditional commitment to a prohibition on chemical gas. While constraining the 
behavior of regime members, the mixed implementation history of some states parties 
demonstrates that this regime followed an arms control calculus and that this weapon 
had not yet been stigmatised. However, the policies of the European powers were to 
evolve very differently to that of the United States. In part, this can be attributed to 
factors exogenous to the regime. The rise of totalitarian governments coupled with 
technological advances in air power presented a threat within Europe that, for 
geopolitical reasons, the US did not face.
165
 Thus, while the US position hardened in 
favour of chemical warfare readiness, following signature of the 1925 Geneva 
Protocol the European Powers increasingly supported a complete prohibition on 
chemical weapons including support for control of domestic production and trade as 
well as verification. In contrast to the US, regime membership thus provided a 
mechanism in which humanitarian concerns and broader security policy priorities 
aligned themselves. 
 
4.4 Civil Society and the 1925 Gas Protocol 
 
Opponents of chemical warfare realized that gas weapons possessed „the twin appeals 
of being new and unique in its effects on man.‟166 For the International Red Cross 
(IRC) poison gas represented a vivid symbol of the horrors of war. The Final 
Resolution of the 1925 IRC Conference declared the objective of the IRC and its 
national societies as „not then merely a question of making a scientific and practical 
study of the best means of assisting the victims of gas; it is above all a question of 
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undertaking moral propaganda against the use of gas, and thereby also a moral 
propaganda against war itself.‟167  
 
Civil society advocacy in support of the 1925 Gas Protocol is consistent with the 
trends linking peace to technology that characterise the earlier Hague conferences.  
The regime is also notable as a case where domestic civil society actors mobilised to 
militate against treaty ratification. A one year gap between signature of the treaty and 
its reporting out of Congress on 26 June 1926, coupled with a lack of supporting 
activity by the State Department, provided space for those groups opposed to 
ratification. In particular, veterans associations in the United States, notably the 
American Legion, used their considerable influence to oppose ratification. 
Significantly, the absence of convincing counter-arguments enabled this well-
organised component of civil society to be effectively mobilised by the War 
Department and other proponents of chemical warfare preparedness to support their 
position. 
 
The development of international regimes focusing on global challenges as a 
recognised mechanism to promote humanitarian issues in the interim between 1899-
1925 is significant. The emerging role of the IRC as a proponent of „moral 
propaganda‟ against these weapons is a new development. Public opinion was not 
unified in its opposition to chemical weapons while national security interests 
presented persuasive counter-arguments to some states. The emergence of early IHL 
regimes thus provided a means to force states to consider the humanitarian 
implications of this weapon. However, at this point the influence of the humanitarian 
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lobby is too diffuse to radically change the cost-benefit calculus for many to fully 
adopt regime provisions in relation to chemical gas. 
 
5. Normative considerations 
 
This section considers the role of norms in the development of Hague Declaration 3 
and the 1925 Gas Protocol. It first considers the humanitarian imperative behind the 
two regimes and how far these considerations influenced states in moving beyond a 
national security based approach to regime membership. This section then assesses 
how normative considerations impact on regime effectiveness. 
 
5.1 Humanitarian push or national security pull? 
 
In the case of expanding bullets, states were giving up nothing that was central to their 
national security interests. Over time, it is also arguable that chemical weapons have 
been of diminishing strategic value in the face of improved defensive and protective 
equipment as well as the emergence of other weapons. Moreover, the threat posed by 
their use as a weapon of terror by both state and non-state actors has facilitated regime 
development.
168
 The paradox to the US position in relation to the 1925 Gas Protocol 
is that the demand for gas warfare readiness was not matched by a viable capability to 
employ chemical weapons. No new gas masks had been made since 1921, no toxic 
shells had been filled since 1922, chemical weapon war reserves were in perpetual 
deficit and by 1924 chemical warfare training was not even included in the War 
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Department Training Regulations.
169
 Although the reasons behind US rejection of the 
protocol were complex, the shift from regime design to implementation led to interest 
groups expending significant political capital – both at home and abroad – to 
safeguard a capability that could not be used.  
 
The helpful role of the UK in clarifying the linguistic difference between the English 
and French-language versions of the 1925 Gas Protocol text makes all the more 
conspicuous their subsequent policy volte-face. In 1970 the British Foreign Secretary 
announced that the UK considered CS
170
 and other such tear gases to be outside the 
scope of the protocol, arguing that CS is not harmful to man and distinguishing 
between it and those lachrymogens existing in 1930. This contrasted with repeated 
statements following ratification. The British policy shift was prompted by a proposal 
from UN Secretary General U. Thant, submitted in 1969 as a draft UNGA 
Resolution,
171
 which stated that the 1925 Gas Protocol „applies to the use in war of all 
chemical, bacteriological and biological agents (including tear gas and other harassing 
agents) which now exist or which may be developed in the future.‟172 UK troops had 
recently used CS in Northern Ireland for the first time, perhaps influencing Britain‟s 
abstention and the Foreign Secretary‟s subsequent „clarification‟ in the House of 
Commons. The British action was doubly harmful as a unilateral reinterpretation of 
regime obligations and a blow to Britain‟s credibility as a proponent of arms control 
and disarmament. 
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The US, both as a non-party when the issue was discussed in 1930 and on their 
eventual ratification on 22 January 1975, made clear their understanding that the 
scope of the 1925 Gas Protocol did not extend to control agents and chemical 
herbicides. The Nixon Administration, when it asked the Senate to consent to US 
ratification on 25 November 1969, also announced the „no first use‟ of lethal chemical 
weapons and a complete renunciation of all biological weapons. The Senate resisted 
efforts by Secretary of State William P. Rogers to permit retaliatory use of chemical 
weapons, thus moving away from the policy that had prevented ratification fifty years 
previously. But the exclusion of non-lethal chemical weapons remained and these 
weapons were used extensively in Vietnam. A balance can therefore be discerned 
with regime membership becoming more acceptable in line with developing 
humanitarian norms against the use of chemical weapons.  
 
The „network of reservations‟173 which marked the 1925 Gas Protocol regime, mostly 
centred around the principle of „reciprocity,‟ certainly undermine its effectiveness.  
Reservations by the US – technically a signatory in 1925 if not an adherent until fifty 
years later – as well as Russia cast doubt on whether the protocol had actually banned 
the use of chemical weapons. It is therefore relevant to recognise the importance of 
which states include reservations. That these positions are held by Great Powers gives 
them a weight that is more persuasive than in the case of smaller states.  
 
Multiple reservations and interpretations seem to suggest that, at least in the case of 
chemical weapons, national security „pull‟ was the driving factor in states‟ approaches 
to implementing their international obligations. Moreover, that the UK signed up to 
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Hague Declaration 3 only after concluding a colonial war in which these rounds were 
used and that the US has never signed the declaration, demonstrate that national 
security trumped humanitarian considerations. The absence of international 
condemnation following Japanese use of chemical weapons in China before and 
during World War II also suggests that the focus on these weapons generated during 
the regime design phase lapsed in implementation. States applied a calculus that 
weighed humanitarian with national security concerns. There was no norm 
bandwaggon that radically influenced this equation in favour of regime compliant 
behaviour. 
 
On the other hand, without humanitarian „push‟ it is questionable whether states 
would have made it to the negotiating table. The emerging norm against these 
weapons promoted by civil society was fundamental to the convening of the 1899 
Hague Peace Conference in the same way that the IRC‟s moral propaganda proved 
critical to convening the Geneva negotiations in 1925. Despite evident multilateral 
insincerity, states were still obliged to convene and to form regimes in order to 
demonstrate their humanitarian credentials to domestic and international 
constituencies. The pressure applied by civil society, including through innovative use 
of print media, was evident in the buildup to the conferences, functioning in „real 
time‟ through exerting pressure on national negotiators. Both these cases illustrate 
Richard Putnam‟s analysis of national positions stemming from a two-level 
calculation that balances domestic with international considerations. Certainly the 
contradictions in the US position on chemical weapons bear this out. While they led 
efforts to seek a ban on trade during negotiations, this translated into an outright ban 
which was supported in Geneva but could not be realised when taken back to the 
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capital. The complexity of the issues involved is also highlighted by the British case: 
domestic pressure played a significant part in pushing the UK to sign the 1925 Gas 
Protocol but it was also domestic security concerns that lay behind their 
reinterpretation of those obligations to exclude CS gas forty-five years later. 
 
Both Hague Declaration 3 and the 1925 Gas Protocol are agreements born of their 
times. While dum dum bullets had been designed for use in colonial wars, no African 
nations were represented in the Hague.
174
 However, the late decision to make the 
conference sessions „open‟ allowed for a degree of transparency to the decision-
making process and permitted a broader audience to voice their opinions. In terms of 
implementation, although Hague Declaration 3 has been widely observed, it is likely, 
as discussed above, that „improvised‟ expanding bullets remain in use in developing 
world conflicts where IHL may be less rigorously observed than in interventions by 
western armed forces. By rejecting initial proposals against the trade in chemical 
weapons, delegates in Geneva recognized the implementation challenges such 
proposals posed for non gas-producing (i.e. less developed) states. This demonstrates 
evolution from 1899 in that, invoking the principles of the League of Nations, 
Southern countries had a voice in the negotiations and were able to influence the 
shape of the proposals. However, in terms of breaches of the protocol, the use of 
chemical weapons by the Italians in Abyssinia or alleged use by the Soviet Union in 
Southeast Asia make clear that the developing world has born the brunt of these 
weapons while the response of the developed world has been muted. 
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5.2 Norms and regime effectiveness 
 
The legal restraint of the 1925 Gas Protocol focused public and political attention on 
the issue, thereby reinforcing the stigmatisation of chemical weapons among civilians.  
Brown, comparing the first and second World Wars, points out that „for the first time 
since the advent of the nation at arms a major weapon employed in one conflict was 
not carried forward to be used in a subsequent conflict.‟175 He argues that codification 
had the effect of reinforcing other restraints, strengthening public and military fear of 
chemical warfare and providing an excuse for a lack of military preparedness in this 
area.
176
 Thus while the concerns of powerful constituencies ensured that the US did 
not join the regime, the norm against the use of poison gas in war that was magnified 
through the regime ensured that such a capability would not be used. 
 
For different reasons, the 1925 Gas Protocol played a significant role in Germany‟s 
non-use of chemical weapons during World War II. The prohibition, in reinforcing the 
specific arms control terms of the Versailles Treaty, cost the Germans ten years of  
research and development into these weapons. Despite German scientists making a 
major breakthrough in the development of nerve agents, a lack of confidence 
engendered by the prohibition and its effects contributed to their forfeiting the use of 
this weapon.
177
 It is therefore important to recognise that stigmatisation is not the only 
aspect of the regime that supports implementation. Its normative weight also 
reinforced prescriptive measures found in other agreements in inhibiting technological 
progress in this area of warfare. Considering the perspectives of both the US and 
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Germany, the development of a norm against the use of chemical weapons was clearly 
instrumental in the non-use of these weapons in World War II. 
 
While it is evident that the regime contributed to the emergence of an internationally 
recognised norm against the use of chemical weapons, the norm has not been 
universally effective. Italy as a State Party used poison gas in 1935-36 during its 
invasion of Abyssinia
178
 despite public opinion being roused against chemical 
weapons by the international news media. During the conflict the ICRC received 
numerous complaints, confirmed by ICRC delegates on the ground, on the use of 
chemical weapons by Italian forces. The response of the President of the Italian Red 
Cross was that the 1925 Geneva Protocol did not preclude the use of gas in reprisal 
for the ill-treatment of Italian prisoners of war. The ICRC categorically rejected this 
position, re-emphasising the absolute prohibition on the use of chemical weapons in 
the protocol. Indeed, the argument of the Italian Red Cross which sought to legitimise 
this act through the justification under international law to engage in „reprisals‟ does 
not ring true.
179
 However, the conduct of the Italians suggests that neither the norm 
agains the use of gas nor the legal prohibition were significantly robust at that stage 
when measured against national interests and a much weaker developing world enemy 
that could not retaliate militarily. 
 
As a category of weapon representing a threat to individual combatants, the normative 
dimension of the ban on expanding bullets is less apparent than in the case of gas 
                                                 
178
 Italian forces invaded Abyssinia (now Ethiopia) on 2 October 1935, completing the conquest and 
annexing the country by March 1936.  See: ICRC „Abyssinian War (1935-1936)‟; available at: 
http://www.icrc.org/Web/Eng/siteeng0.nsf/iwpList74/A0B2CAE68823612241256C8700332B7B  
179
 Reprisals are a term of legal art referring to acts which although illegal by themselves may be 
permissable as a deterrent in response to illegal acts by an enemy. Best, G., (1997) War and aw since 
1945 (Clarendon Press): p.192. 
133 
 
warfare.  However, the humanitarian push provided by the Peace Movement was an 
important factor in bringing states to the table and the public attention placed on the 
conference increased the pressure on delegates to achieve tangible results. On a 
normative level, Ken Rutherford argues that peer pressure to emulate other states was 
also a powerful mechanism in encouraging states to adopt the results of the Hague 
conference.
180
 In this respect, the norm against expanding bullets proved important in 
the negotiation of a ban which, once agreed, was widely implemented. The Italian 
example above recalls that IHL regimes face their most significant tests during 
implementation. However, the rejection by other delegations of the British position as 
„contrary to the humanitarian spirit‟181 demonstrates an important statement of 
solidarity when the developing world was not well represented in the Hague. Indeed, 
despite their rejection of the ban, the regime‟s moral force clearly influenced British 
behaviour. It was decided not to use these rounds during the Boer War and dum dums 
sent in error to South Africa were swiftly recalled.
182
 
 
Disagreement over the criteria for the unacceptability of dum dum bullets is 
unsurprising because technological progress had outpaced the evolution of IHL. The 
1868 St Petersburg Declaration and subsequent codifications that prohibit weapons 
that cause „superfluous injury‟ or „unnecessary suffering‟ did not established objective 
criteria to measure this term or its counterbalance „military necessity.‟ This highlights 
an important issue for the landmine regimes. General principles of IHL can be 
interpreted very differently in their application to specific weapons. Stigmatisation, 
where existing, provides a means to move beyond this ambiguity. 
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6. Implications for landmine regimes 
 
Insights developed from our analysis of the design, implementation and effectiveness 
of Hague Declaration 3 and the 1925 Gas Protocol raise significant issues for the two 
landmine regimes. This chapter reinforces our hypothesis that regime interplay and 
nesting dynamics are important to our understanding of regime effectiveness in this 
issue area. Considering the formation and implementation of these regimes over time 
demonstrates the powerful dynamics generated by individual regimes within a broader 
IHL regime addressing weapons causing „unnecessary suffering‟ or „superfluous 
injury.‟ In this broader context, these two historical regimes have proved effective in 
raising the political costs of continued use, providing „a solid moral and political basis 
for criticizing other states‟ ownership or use of these weapons.‟183 However, 
challenges to the implementation of both regimes also point to the difficulty of 
operationalising general principles of IHL with respect to specific weapons that 
reinforce the need to critically examine the relationship between design and 
implementation factors in the landmine regimes. 
 
Design factors are shown to be particularly significant. This chapter identifies 
weaknesses in the 1925 Gas Protocol regime framework as a result of reservations as 
well as the absence of a formal verification mechanism. These gaps and lacunae 
reflect the compromises necessary at the time to form an international regime. 
Conversely, the subsequent creation of the OPCW demonstrates flexibility in order to 
                                                 
183
 Rutherford (1999): p.41. 
135 
 
address problems that may have been left unresolved in the regime design process or 
only become apparent over time. Conditional obligations and verification challenges 
must therefore be considered in light of differing approaches within the two landmine 
regimes. APII is characterised by a number of reservations while, in the absence of a 
formal verification mechanism, the APMBC has been supported through the 
development of an unconventional civil society based approach to compliance 
monitoring outside of the regime proper. How landmine regime frameworks address 
these implementation challenges thus represent important considerations in relation to 
regime effectiveness. 
 
Compliance has been almost complete in the case of Hague Declaration 3. For the 
1925 Gas Protocol, if there has been voluntary defection, actual and suspected use of 
chemical weapons has been detected and attracted significant international 
opprobrium. Applying a regime approach provides a more nuanced picture of regime 
effectiveness. The lack of flexibility within the Hague Declaration 3 regime, the 
consequent inability to deal with „improvised‟ dum dums and its lack of application to 
new munitions with similar effects are highly relevant considerations for landmine 
regimes. Given that the use of landmines in developing world conflicts has evolved 
dramatically from the concept of static „minefields‟ applied in earlier conflicts, our 
analysis points to significant risks of diminishing relevance if regimes do not find 
ways to learn in order to respond to changing behaviour or technological advance.  
 
This chapter explores the influential roles of different NSAs in IHL regimes. The IRC 
focused its „moral propaganda‟ in support of the regimes in order to further the 
development of IHL while the peace and internationalist movements understood 
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negotiations as a means to influence state behaviour at particular points in history: the 
armed peace of the 1890s and the „never again‟ zeitgeist that followed World War I. 
Even when barred from the negotiations, civil society actors developed novel 
approaches in order to influence the negotiations. In particular, the focus of national 
and international media was deliberately exploited at different times to ensure that 
national delegations felt under strong pressure to achieve demonstrable results. 
However, it is equally relevant to acknowledge the effective role civil society may 
play in undermining regimes. The important role of domestic lobby groups in the US 
decision not to ratify the 1925 Gas Protocol provides a counter-intuitive example of 
civil society influencing national decision-making. These insights are particularly 
important in order to critically examine claims to uniqueness found within the existing 
literature on the Ottawa Process. 
 
This chapter demonstrates that „multilateral insincerity‟ does not preclude regimes 
influencing the behaviour of participating states in important ways. Once involved in 
a process of regime development there is an obligation to show progress that is 
magnified by the humanitarian nature of the issue area. The normative weight of the 
IHL subject matter was clearly influential in bringing the major Powers of the day to 
the negotiating table as well as fostering civil society support for the regime formation 
process. The impact of stigmatisation can be found in regime effects beyond the 
membership of the regimes. The US did not ratify the 1925 Gas Protocol for many 
years but this chapter argues that, as a result of the associated stigma, their use was 
never a possibility in the intervening period. It is equally significant that the emerging 
norm against these weapons did not engender a paradigm shift in how states 
calculated the costs and benefits of regime membership. Despite their obligations, a 
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number of states voluntarily defected from regime commitments on the use of 
chemical gas. Moreover, the UK and the US were confronted by compelling 
arguments to ban dum dum bullets on humanitarian grounds but did not join the 
regime because of military interests. This nuanced understanding of the influence of 
normative considerations across regime design and implementation phases enables us 
to further refine our approach to research questions for landmine regimes in this area. 
 
Analysing Hague Declaration 3 and the 1925 Gas Protocol as regimes provides new 
insights into their design, implementation and effectiveness. Distinctions as well as 
common features of IHL regimes provide both context and an important comparative 
dimension to support our subsequent critical analysis of the landmine regimes. 
Important new insights are shown on the costs and benefits of distinct regime 
approaches from the simplicity of a „ban‟ to the more complex regulatory design 
provide important new insights. Our focus on stakeholder clustering dynamics is 
shown to be important, made evident by the force multiplier effect of civil society 
when combined with supportive states in earlier IHL regimes. This chapter also 
provides a nuanced analysis of the relationship of norms to regime effectiveness. The 
importance of embedding specific issues within the larger construct of inhumane 
weapons is highlighted as are countervailing national security pull factors that can 
dilute the effectiveness of this norm. The following chapters build on these insights 
drawn from earlier IHL regimes to focus on key questions of landmine regime design, 
implementation and effectiveness. 
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Chapter 4   
The Emergence and Design of the Landmine Regimes 
 
1. Introduction 
 
This chapter considers the emergence and design of APII to the CCW (and Protocol II 
from which it derived) and the APMBC. The latter is portrayed by advocates and 
some commentators as the flagship of a new „fast track‟ model for IHL. This is 
contrasted with the „old fashioned‟ approach found in the CCW, generating less 
definitive provisions, involving a narrower range of stakeholders and producing less 
significant results over a much more drawn out time period. If both the APII and 
APMBC regimes have their partisans, our understanding of the two landmine regimes 
is conditioned by their contrasting profiles and the limitations of the existing literature 
rather than their effectiveness in addressing the global challenge of landmines. A 
central hypothesis explored in this thesis is that the dynamics across design and 
implementation phases are highly significant to regime effectiveness. This chapter 
therefore contributes to the overall aim of this thesis by critically assessing prevalent 
regime narratives through the optic of regime theory in order to generate new insights 
into processes of landmine regime formation.  
 
In the case of APII, the „closed‟ nature of the process and its low public profile has 
resulted in a limited literature on the emergence and design of the treaty regime. As 
was acknowledged by one US negotiator in 1980, while verbatim accounts exist for 
the plenary sessions, „the real negotiations took place in unrecorded private 
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discussions and in the many sessions of the three working groups.‟184 In contrast, the 
Ottawa Process is commonly characterized as highly participatory and has generated 
an extensive body of writing. However, very little material poses critical questions to 
the regime or its origins. Bringing together relevant insights from IHL and mine 
action practitioner literatures from a regime analysis perspective enables us to address 
a number of important research questions that relate to landmine regime formation. In 
particular, research questions explored in this chapter address the extent to which 
regime obligations take into account the technical and political challenges associated 
with this issue area.  
 
From a design perspective, this chapter applies our analysis of regime effectiveness 
dynamics to the landmine regimes by analyzing how regime obligations relate to key 
mine action objectives. Research questions that consider the extent to which the 
regimes, individually and collectively, address the core problems they were set up to 
meet, and whether they provoke wider consequences unforeseen by those involved in 
establishing the regimes are thus particularly significant. This focus also provides 
initial insights into the costs to regime effectiveness of disjunctions between regime 
and mine action priorities that are further elaborated in subsequent chapters. 
 
An underpinning humanitarian imperative situates the landmine regimes within the 
broader normative framework of IHL: Protocol II sets an important standard as the 
first codification of IHL specifically regulating landmines;
185
 the APMBC provides 
for the first formal ban on a conventional weapon to be adopted by the international 
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community since the 1899 Hague Declaration on dum dum bullets.
186
 This chapter 
thus builds on insights developed in Chapter 3 through considering regime nesting 
and interplay dynamics in the landmine regime formation phase. Analysing the 
landmine regimes in relation to other weapons that cause unnecessary suffering or 
superfluous injury allows us to critically question claims in the existing literature that 
these regimes represent a new departure in the practice of IHL. This approach also 
addresses research questions that seek to identify how far support in the regime 
formation phase derives from a quality of regime nesting that draws on deeper IHL 
trends encouraging stakeholders to stay on the „right side‟ of a compelling 
humanitarian issue. 
 
Within the processes of regime formation, this chapter considers how the involvement 
and clustering of different stakeholders in processes of regime formation influences 
regime effectiveness. Chapter 3 demonstrates that a combination of subject area 
expertise and the ability to exert influence through advocacy are key considerations in 
certain IHL regimes. To address the dangers posed by landmines in (predominantly) 
developing countries, this points to the need for landmine regimes to recognise the 
concerns of mine action practitioners as well as affected national stakeholders. 
Addressing the roles of key implementation constituencies in the regime formation 
phase represents an important element in addressing our main hypothesis on the 
relationship between design and implementation for regime effectiveness. This raises  
a number of related secondary research questions explored in this chapter on the  
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influence of different stakeholder groups and the significance of different types of  
leadership on regime formation processes.  
 
Analysing how far landmine regime design reflects mine action knowledge and 
requirements represents a key research objective of this chapter. This chapter begins 
by critically assessing the historical origins and processes leading to the formation of 
the two landmine regimes. Systematically applying the research framework elaborated 
in Chapter 2, it then analyses the roles of different actors in shaping regime design. 
The relevance of norms to landmine regime emergence and formation is considered, 
situating this analysis within the broader corpus of IHL. Finally, this chapter sets out 
key insights emerging from our analysis of processes of landmine regime formation 
and their relationship to questions of implementation and effectiveness addressed in 
subsequent chapters. 
 
2. Understanding landmine regime formation 
 
While driven by the same humanitarian imperative, APII and the APMBC include 
different regime rules, engage contrasting approaches and involve different 
stakeholder groups. This section therefore considers the significance of these factors 
to the origins and development of the two regimes.  
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2.1 Origins of the CCW and APMBC regimes 
 
The ICRC began preparing Draft Rules
187
 from the early 1950s for the protection of 
civilians from weapons, including landmines, deemed to have uncontrollable effects. 
Beginning in the mid 1960s, the use in Indochina of tear gases and other weapons 
perceived to be excessively injurious or to have indiscriminate effects led to a number 
of resolutions within the UNGA well as studies commissioned by the Secretary 
General on the effects of various weapons.
188
 In 1971 and 1972 the ICRC convened 
Conferences of Government Experts to consider proposals for prohibitions or 
restrictions on certain conventional weapons. These conferences, informed by studies 
commissioned at the behest of the Swedish government in which military and medical 
experts studied recently developed weapons, produced a report that proposed 
language for several anti-personnel weapon bans.  
 
Growing concern among a number of states over the use of certain anti-personnel 
weapons in contemporary conflicts led the ICRC in 1973 to establish a working group 
of experts which met in Lucerne in September 1974 then in Lugano in January 1976. 
As a result of these meetings, consensus emerged around proposals relating to 
undetectable fragments, incendiary weapons, restrictions and recording requirements 
for remotely-deliverable mines.
189
  Discussions continued in an ad hoc committee on 
conventional weapons formed as part of a Diplomatic Conference on the 
Reaffirmation and Development of International Humanitarian Law Applicable in 
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Armed Conflicts (CDDH) held in Geneva in 1976 and 1977. The CDDH was 
convened by the Swiss government, as the depository of the Geneva Conventions, in 
order to prepare for the negotiation of the Additional Protocols to the Geneva 
Conventions.  This linkage is significant because it bound the issue of arms control to 
the further development of IHL.
190
 The CDDH could not reach agreement on the 
types of weapon to be included, whether prohibitions or restrictions should be 
pursued, or if battlefield use or the protection of civilians should be the focus. 
Positions were broadly divided between clusters of neutral and developing states on 
the one hand and „militarily-significant‟ states191 on the other: 
 
Neutral/Developing States   Militarily-significant States 
 
Sweden, Norway, Switzerland,                      USA, larger NATO Members, 
Yugoslavia, Egypt, Mexico   USSR, larger Warsaw Pact members 
 
The concluding session of the CDDH recommended that these issues be addressed in 
a UN framework. As a result, after preparatory meetings in 1978-79, which used as 
their basis the texts prepared in the CDDH ad hoc Committee, the CCW conference 
was held in 1979-80.  
 
These early initiatives are significant because they firmly situate progress on the 
landmine issue within the broader normative framework of IHL. As a single issue, 
landmines had not gained sufficient momentum to initiate a process of regime 
formation. However, a regime was able to form within the CCW because it was 
embedded in a broader set of contemporary IHL issues of concern. The mutually 
reinforcing relationship between like-minded states, NSAs involved in IHL and expert 
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communities show how normative considerations are closely intertwined with 
technical expertise on the effects of weapons. It is also significant to note that in the 
decades preceding the emergence of the landmine regimes a clustering of concerned 
states with NSAs possessing expert knowledge is coalescing around this issue area. 
The transition from working group meetings to CDDH to the CCW points to an 
important causal relationship in moving from issue emergence to regime formation 
between the crystallisation of issues to be addressed and the nature of the discussion 
forum. 
 
2.2  ‘Interlocking and overlapping’: APII and APMBC regime formation 
 
The CCW regime was established in 1980 with three protocols: Protocol I on non-
detectable fragments; Protocol II relating to mines, booby-traps and other devices; 
and, Protocol III on incendiary weapons. During the 1980s the CCW gained few new 
adherents and had a low international profile. This changed near the end of the decade 
as the issue of blinding laser weapons was highlighted through a series of ICRC-
initiated experts‟ meetings between 1989-1991. At the same time the humanitarian 
cost of landmines was gaining increasing international prominence. Both these factors 
resulted in a renewal of interest in the CCW.
192
 Consequently, in 1993, France, 
supported by a number of other states, requested a CCW review conference. There 
followed a period lasting twenty-seven months which led from expert group meetings 
to the final conference session in May 1996. Increasing engagement in the process 
was reflected by a rise in the number of states parties to the original Protocol II in the 
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run up to the conference, including a number of militarily significant states such as 
the United States.  
 
Additional Protocol IV on blinding laser weapons was agreed relatively easily. This 
ban was particularly significant because, for the first time since the 1868 St. 
Petersburg Declaration on exploding bullets, a weapon had been banned before ever 
being deployed in battle. This demonstrates a link between the CCW and the broader 
regime within the framework of IHL addressing inhumane weapons. On the 
landmines issue, two distinct sets of interests led to a more challenging negotiating 
process: supporters of a total prohibition on APMs or a strengthening of Protocol II‟s 
restrictions. Between these two positions a number of states supported a ban in 
principle but recognized that such an outcome would not be achieved in consensus-
based CCW negotiations. Accordingly, tortuous negotiations saw the deadline for 
concluding the review conference twice pushed back from October 1995 to January 
1996 and then to a final session held from 22 April to 3 May before agreement on 
APII was reached.  
 
The 1979-80 CCW negotiations had been broadly split between what Roach terms the 
„prohibitionists‟ and the „realists.‟193 In the 1995-96 negotiations the same basic 
positions applied with prohibitionists unable to meet their goal due to entrenched 
opposition within a consensus-based regime framework. The US played a proactive 
role in the negotiations, keen to demonstrate leadership on the issue but with the same 
underlying approach that the forum could be „managed‟ in line with US policy 
objectives. This is significant because while knowledge and concern over the issue of 
                                                 
193
 Roach (1984): p.14. 
146 
 
landmines had evolved significantly in the 15 years between CCW conferences, 
regime rules constrained the progress that could be achieved to „more of the same‟ 
technical restrictions. While reassuring for US security interests, this did not placate 
those that wished to address the humanitarian costs of these weapons. Chairman of the 
review conference Johan Molander acknowledged this link between regime rules and 
the outcome of the negotiations by stating that results reflected as much as could be 
achieved on the basis of consensus.
194
  
 
While the APII outcome was a tactical victory for those that sought to limit their 
liability to restrictions on landmines it represented a strategic error, by making clear 
that the only way to achieve the goal of a ban was via a distinct regime framework. 
The measured CCW approach jarred with the recognition of a humanitarian crisis 
caused by APMs and thus made transparent the tension between arms control and IHL 
imperatives. The ICRC in particular made a direct linkage between the nine year 
period allowed for implementation of APII‟s detectability and self-destruction 
provisions and the cost in human terms of mines already in the ground or that would 
be laid during that period.
195
 This mirrors similar complaints raised in 1980 at the 
insistence by certain states of setting a high number of ratifications as the trigger for 
entry into force – effectively a delaying tactic to prevent early review of the 
convention.
196
 The limited results of the review conference were condemned as a 
failure by the ICBL
197
 and this message was effectively projected by the international 
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news media in its reporting of the conference. The leitmotif of the Ottawa Process, 
coined by ICBL Coordinator Jody Williams, stemmed from these partial results and 
was unambiguous: „no exceptions, no reservations, no loopholes.‟198    
 
The need for additional momentum was also felt on the state level. Canada convened 
a meeting of pro-ban states, international organisations and NGOs in Ottawa between 
3-5 October 1996. During the conference‟s closing address, spurred by a perception 
that progress risked being wasted by divergent national positions, Canadian Foreign 
Minister Lloyd Axworthy made a surprise announcement asking states to return to 
Ottawa by the end of 1997 to sign a treaty banning APMs. This statement drew 
support from the ICRC, ICBL as well as the UN Secretary General but caused 
consternation among many states as a radical breach of established diplomatic 
practice. At this stage only some 50 governments had publicly declared themselves in 
favor of a ban so the approach is notable for the political risk taken by Canada. The 
Ottawa meeting thus represents the real starting point for the regime formation 
process.  
 
The Austrian Government circulated a first draft treaty, drawing on disarmament law 
– notably the CWC199 – only a few weeks after the Ottawa conference. They then 
hosted a meeting in Vienna between 12-14 February 1997 to exchange views on the 
draft treaty. The meeting was attended by representatives of 111 governments with 
the ICRC providing a lead on the key issues of substance. A revised text was issued 
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on 14 March 1997 which was to remain relatively unchanged throughout the process. 
A subsequent meeting in Bonn between 24-25 April focused specifically on the issue 
of verification. A total of 121 governments participated in this meeting, which was 
followed between 24-27 June by an event hosted by the Belgian Government. The 
Brussels conference was attended by 156 states and adopted a declaration forwarding 
the third Austrian draft to the diplomatic conference scheduled in Oslo in September. 
Perhaps even more significantly, such extensive support only nine months after the 
Ottawa conference provides strong evidence of a norm bandwagon effect in relation 
to this issue. 97 states signed the Brussels Declaration endorsing the central elements 
of the ban treaty and reaffirming their commitment to sign such a document in Ottawa 
before the end of the year. Thus, many states had shown their hand before the start of 
the negotiating conference, allowing the core group to focus on the uncommitted. 
 
This government-focused process was complemented through initiatives led by the 
ICRC and ICBL to sustain momentum by organising workshops and coordinating 
advocacy efforts across the globe. NGO-driven conferences and events in mine-
affected states provided a powerful push factor for states to embrace the anti-APM 
norm. In March 1997, the Tokyo Conference on Anti-Personnel Landmines, hosted by 
the Japanese Government, was attended by 27 States, the EU and 10 international 
organisations. Other national and international conferences took place in East, Central 
and South Asia, Australia, New Zealand and throughout Europe. Press conferences 
were deliberately held jointly with pro-ban states to underline the collaborative nature 
of the process.
200
 In the same way, comments were sought from the ICBL on the 
treaty drafts and the ICBL was a participant in each of the conferences in the 
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„governmental‟ strand of the process. Following the Oslo negotiating conference a 
further round of demarches, lobbying at the 1997 UN General Assembly and NGO-
sponsored media activities were geared to encouraging wavering states to sign the 
treaty in Oslo.  
 
The parallel state and civil society driven strands of this process demonstrate a 
number of important characteristics from a regime perspective. A key aspect is the 
momentum provided by the short deadline until the negotiating conference which 
meant that discussions were never allowed to be bogged down in technical detail. 
That technical issues were considered a secondary concern to the political imperative 
to be associated with this process is evident in the rapidly increasing political 
commitment to the Ottawa Process. This is shown both numerically but more 
significantly by the willingness of so many states to commit to the Brussels 
Declaration just a few months after the Ottawa conference. 
 
The Oslo Diplomatic Conference took place between 1-18 September, concluding 
with the adoption of the treaty. 90 states were registered as full participants, 32 
attended as observers as did representatives of the ICRC, various UN agencies and 
hundreds of NGOs. The main sticking point in agreeing the treaty proved to be a 
package of five „non-negotiable‟ changes required by the US delegation. When initial 
lobbying met with failure these were eventually whittled down to three.  
 
Initial US position Fallback US position 
 
1. Strengthened verification provisions  
 
1. Eliminate Korean mines within 9 yrs 
                                                                                                                                            
200
 Williams, J. and Goose, S., „The International Campaign to Ban Landmines‟;  in Cameron,  Lawson 
and Tomlin (1998): p.36. 
150 
 
2. Exemption for the Korean peninsula  
3. Unrestricted right of withdrawal 
4. 9 year period for entry into force  
5. Exemption for AHD placed near AVMs                  
2. Right to withdraw during conflict 
3. Exemption for AHD placed near       
    AVMs. 
 
An exemption for anti-handling devices (AHD) combined with anti-vehicle mines 
(AVM) was intended to save US „smart‟ mine systems in which the central weapons 
targeting vehicles were protected by APMs. However, it was widely recognised that 
this was an attempt to reclassify these weapons since they had already been defined as 
APMs during the APII negotiations. This is significant in demonstrating the interplay 
between the regime formation processes. A move to dilute the APMBC regime was 
undermined due to parallel negotiations in the other landmine regime framework. 
 
In the end, fierce lobbying by the US was resisted by the majority of states – backed 
up by the ICBL – who refused to dilute a straightforward ban as the price for US 
signature. A 24-hour delay requested by the US on the final day of negotiations saw 
President Clinton and various senior Administration officials lobby unsuccessfully to 
gain support for the US position. The nature of the process had drawn out the „red 
line‟ issues for the US and effectively isolated the delegation from the rest of the 
negotiating conference. Failing to gain support for these changes the US proposals 
were eventually withdrawn, paving the way for the conclusion of the conference and 
the adoption of the treaty. Subsequently, 122 States signed the ban treaty in Ottawa 
between 2-4 December 1997.
201
     
 
The existing literature positions the APMBC as a self-sufficient response to the 
inadequate outcome of the APII negotiations. However, considering the formation of 
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APII and the APMBC from a regime perspective clarifies the interlocking and 
overlapping nature of the two regimes. The perceived inadequacies of APII in the 
eyes of major international actors such as the UN provided a strong argument to find 
other means to move forward this agenda. This perception was magnified by the work 
of civil society actors that had not been given space within the CCW process and 
therefore networked in order to generate more effective lobbying through the Ottawa 
Process. APII did exert a pull factor on states through the onus to adhere to any 
regime addressing landmines. However, compromise between military utility and 
humanitarian concerns was not enough to demonstrate responsible international 
conduct given the visibility of the emerging pro-ban agenda. In tandem, the lack of 
political space for civil society within the CCW framework meant that there was no 
„safety valve‟ for their concerns. This gave both a legitimate platform and a raison 
d‟etre for the ICBL and the Canadians to promote an alternative track. 
 
2.3 Linking regime design to effectiveness 
 
While both regimes pursue the same headline objective, the means, actors involved 
and regime rules are distinct. Similarities and distinctions between the two regimes 
are illustrated in the table below:  
APII APMBC 
 
 Reduce human suffering 
 Military-technical approach 
 Lengthy regime formation 
 State-centred, low-profile 
 Military/officials negotiating 
 Consensus voting 
 Technical Restrictions 
 No developing world buy-in 
 
 Reduce human suffering 
 Humanitarian imperative 
 Rapid process 
 Open to all, high-profile 
 Mine action experts 
 2/3 majority 
 Ban on APMs 
 North-South consensus 
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The APMBC negotiations were founded on principles of openness and majority 
decision-making. This approach was reflected in the range of expertise within the 
negotiations and the flexibility of the rules of procedure for the conference, requiring 
a two-thirds majority for decision making. In contrast, the narrow, state-based 
eligibility criterion for participation meant that, within a consensus-bound framework, 
the CCW discourse was shaped by national military experts and negotiators from an 
arms control and disarmament background. How these different considerations impact 
on the effectiveness of APII and the APMBC are considered in the following sections. 
 
2.3.1   Effectiveness and the APII restrictions based approach 
 
The point of departure for the negotiation of Protocol II was that landmines are 
necessary defensive weapons whose use needs to be restricted in order to minimize 
risks to civilians. This emphasis on technical criteria as opposed to humanitarian 
impact is a direct consequence of the background and expertise of the negotiators. In 
the absence of any evidence to the contrary from representatives of mine affected 
states or mine action practitioners, the longevity and nature of the post-conflict 
landmine threat or its socio-economic consequences were not discussed.
202
 
Specifically, the restrictions and prohibitions found in Protocol II and APII fail to take 
into account the indefinite time period during which the weapons can represent a 
threat. The temporal nature of the hazard after the cessation of hostilities as a mine 
action issue and consequently the overall cost in humanitarian terms of the use of 
these weapons was not an issue. 
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Protocol II and APII, like any negotiated treaty, reflect a number of compromises 
found in the permissive language which qualifies the various obligations. Under 
Protocol II, parties to a conflict must „endeavour to ensure‟ that non-pre-planned 
minefields are recorded
203
 while the seemingly stronger obligation requiring recording 
of all „pre-planned‟ minefields204 is rendered irrelevant by the lack of such planning in 
the laying of the majority of the world‟s landmines. Indeed, „minefields‟ implies the 
laying of mines to recognized military patterns for specific tactical reasons; this does 
not conform to the „nuisance‟ mine use employed by state and non-state forces in 
many developing world conflicts. This terminology is particularly revealing because it 
demonstrates that the regime and its stakeholders were neither informed by nor 
focused on the realities of contemporary landmine use. The input of developing 
countries can, however, be discerned: forbidding the use of animals or their carcasses 
as booby traps in Article 6 of the protocol stems from the concerns of Mongolia for 
their civilian populations of nomadic herders.
205
 However, this remains a point of 
detail rather than any robust attempt to obligate states to take responsibility for the 
post-conflict consequences of their military actions. 
 
An important element of regime effectiveness is the relationship between design 
principles and implementation. Article 9 of APII requires that, following the cessation 
of hostilities, former parties to the conflict shall „endeavour to reach agreement‟ on 
the provision of information to facilitate mine clearance, a provision that has been 
referred to as „the most questionable variant of the rules of warfare, whose true 
purpose is not to „safeguard the minimum standard of civilisation‟ but rather to „cover 
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up the inability or unwillingness to achieve this object.‟‟206 There is no requirement 
for parties to a conflict to clear the mines they laid, nor is specific guidance given for 
the safeguarding of civilians. Moreover, if states parties are obliged to disseminate 
these provisions to their armed forces, translation into field manuals and standard 
operating procedures is not mandated nor are penal sanctions provided for against 
individuals.  
 
A clear indication of the ineffectiveness of Protocol II was the widespread use of 
APMs in the 1980s. If Protocol II saw very few new ratifications in the 1980s this is 
because militarily significant states did not want to be bound by its provisions while 
others felt it not worth ratifying.
207
 APII addressed many of the concerns surrounding 
the original protocol by extending its scope to non-international armed conflicts, 
strengthening restrictions on the use of APMs, banning undetectable APMs, 
prohibiting anti-sensing devices as well as placing tighter restrictions and obligations 
on mine laying. Implementation obligations were also tightened with an obligation on 
states to prevent violations, to impose penal sanctions on individual violators and to 
distribute relevant military instructions to their armed forces. The increase in 
membership of APII and its application to mines other than APMs, notably AVMs 
and booby traps, is also significant because at that time it was the only IHL that 
specifically regulated these weapons. 
 
Our research framework that considers regime design in relation to practitioner mine 
action expertise exposes costs that were not apparent within the process because this  
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practitioner perspective was not available to regime designers. Moreover, analyzing 
the specificities of the issue area demonstrates important design caveats in relating 
normative considerations to implementation challenges. Thus, technical adjustments 
to the manufacture of future weapons, even when derived from important IHL norms, 
are of questionable value when the major threat posed to civilians (and the military) 
from landmines already in the ground is unrecognised. 
 
2.3.2    The APMBC ‘ban’ and mine action effectiveness 
 
The origins of the Ottawa Process in field-based organisations with practical 
experience of landmines provides a notable contrast with the CCW approach. In this 
respect, the problems posed from a mine action perspective by the restrictions-based 
APII approach would seem to be addressed by the APMBC: the treaty requires states 
parties to destroy or ensure the destruction of all APMs under their jurisdiction or 
control. However, this approach jars with the acknowledged goal of mine action to 
reduce the threat posed by mines so that individuals and communities can live in a 
safe environment. While this chapter shows that the clarity of the message that 
underpins the Ottawa Process was a decisive factor in regime formation, potential 
tensions between maximalist APMBC regime goals and the more nuanced calculus of 
mine action prioritisation also casts into relief a tension between expert communities 
and advocacy NGOs that continues to play out in regime implementation. Chapter 5 
builds on this insight by analysing how far potential contradictions between the logic 
of enforcing a ban and the objectives of mine action have consequences for regime 
effectiveness. 
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A recognized gap in APMBC regime design is the absence of an effective verification 
mechanism. States were unwilling to sign up to stringent compliance monitoring 
provisions. The regime establishes annual reporting requirements in which technical 
data is provided by states parties. Fact-finding missions (FFMs) initiated by the UN 
Secretary General – modeled along the lines of various arms control and disarmament 
regimes – are also provided for should any state party be suspected of a breach. 
Article 8 describing the process for FFMs is the longest in the treaty and provides 
significant details on the steps for initiating such a mission. However, no practical 
modalities are established for the implementation of this provision which therefore 
leaves ambiguous how this process would play out in practice. This ambiguity is 
significant because it de-links the political will evident in the regime formation phase 
from subsequent implementation. On the one hand there is limited formal verification 
while on the other States Parties are obliged to take the diplomatically uncomfortable 
step of pointing the finger at other states suspected of breaches. The absence of any 
FFMs from March 1999 to date raises a major research question for the 
implementation phase elated to the ability of the APMBC to both understand and 
address non-compliance by regime members. 
 
3. The interplay of state and non-state actors in landmine regime formation  
 
While recognising that issues are interdependent, a central hypothesis explored 
through this thesis is that it is equally important to acknowledge the interdependence 
of different actors in order to better understand the dynamics of regime formation. 
The hypothesis is explored that clarifying the clusters of state, sub-state and 
international actors, with distinct or overlapping regime interests, is particularly 
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relevant to understanding the development of the landmine regimes. Research on 
environmental regimes points to a strong, positive relationship between the 
involvement of NSAs and regime effectiveness,
208
 raising significant questions for 
APII and the APMBC given their contrasting approaches to issues of participation. 
This section therefore builds on work in the broader regime theory discourse to 
develop new insights into questions of agency and the significance of stakeholder 
clustering within the landmine regimes.  
 
3.1 States 
 
As international legal bodies the formal membership of the landmine regimes is 
comprised of states. The provisions that delineate them are binding on states so 
implementation is gauged on the level of participation and adherence to regime rules. 
The genesis of APII and the APMBC are strongly influenced by the interests, 
priorities and commitments of different states. In order to analyse the roles played by 
these actors across the two regime formation processes, these actors are considered 
under the categories of militarily significant states, middle powers and developing 
nations. 
 
3.1.1 Militarily significant states, regime membership and effectiveness 
 
Militarily significant states can be distinguished between „hard‟ and „soft‟ positions.  
Hardliners such as Russia, China, India and Pakistan initially viewed all attempts to 
regulate conventional weapons with suspicion while the US, UK and other major 
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NATO powers adopted a „military pragmatist‟ stance that emphasized arguments of 
military utility at the expense of humanitarian considerations and thus put a break on 
more radical proposals. Over time, greater recognition became evident within 
militarily significant states that non-detectable, long-lived APMs were widely used by 
developing states as well as non-state actors and posed a threat to their own forces. 
This represents a clear shift in perception that emphasised the military interest in IHL 
rather than understanding its purpose as solely to protect civilians in developing 
countries.  
 
The election of left-of-centre governments in France and the UK proved a significant 
factor in provoking a shift in these countries‟ policies. On 21 May 1997 the Labour 
Government pledged the total destruction of British APMs by 2005 and gave full 
backing to the Ottawa Process.
209
 France expressed similar support and reversed its 
earlier insistence on an „exceptional use‟ clause in the treaty. These shifts by two 
major European powers are important in themselves, demonstrating a clear shift from 
a military-pragmatist stance to a political acceptance of the anti-APM norm. They 
also had a spillover effect in influencing other European states that did not necessarily 
fit comfortably within the pro-ban camp. Italy agreed that by 1999 or on signature of 
the treaty it would support outlawing the use and production of APMs and 
immediately prohibited their operational use by Italian forces.  
 
Non-supporters of the APMBC in Europe included states with compelling national 
security concerns such as Finland
210
 and Turkey, or Yugoslavia, recently involved in 
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an armed conflict. Beyond Europe, China, Cuba, Egypt, India, Iran, Iraq, Israel, North 
Korea, South Korea, Pakistan, Russia and Syria are some of the major states that did 
not participate in Oslo. In all these cases, national security concerns, in many cases 
compounded by authoritarian systems of government that were particularly allergic to 
the unconventional civil-society driven nature of the process, were the overriding 
argument against participation in the Ottawa Process.  However, it is significant that 
although reluctant to endorse a ban, Russia and China did promote a new 
intensification of mine action activities and an export moratorium on APMs to 
coincide with the formation of the APMBC. This points to an emulation effect that 
drove these states to support certain APMBC regime commitments – including 
important mine action obligations – while remaining outside of the regime and its 
overarching imperative to prohibit APMs. 
 
Understanding the US role and influence in the two landmine regimes is particularly 
important in order to clarify the relationship between regime membership and goals. 
The US during the 1970s was described by one of its own negotiators at the 1980 
CCW Conference as „not particularly desirous of concluding a weapons agreement 
and neither promoted nor opposed the multilateral negotiating process.‟211 At the 1974 
Lucerne Conference the military pragmatists dominated, spearheaded by the US 
delegation, which comprised a weapons systems analyst, two military surgeons, 
military officers, Pentagon and State Department officials.
212
 Technical data was used 
to downplay the humanitarian impact of weapons, in some cases debunking statistics 
while refusing to provide „classified‟ information to back up their arguments.213 The 
1976 Lugano Conference followed a similar pattern with evidence produced by the 
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US and others to demonstrate that weapons such as napalm and flechettes did not 
cause superfluous injury. Despite such disingenuous tactics, the conference concluded 
with a general agreement on the need for measures which became the three initial 
protocols to the CCW. 
 
Once the CCW process became concrete, the US „soft‟ military pragmatist position 
shifted in order to influence the outcome of the negotiations. This agenda was 
reflected in particular by the much criticized long entry into force and amendment 
provisions which represented a specific US negotiating goal. The US delegation‟s 
report on the conference was candid on their objectives: 
 
These provisions should give Western countries ample time to ratify before amendments can be 
considered, and should limit the ability of radical governments to press for an endless series of 
conferences to expand the current restrictions.
214
 
 
The US agreed an export moratorium on APMs in October 1992, subsequently 
extended by three years with the unanimous support of the US Senate. This was a 
significant step in that the moratorium applied equally to NATO allies. Moreover, in 
another move that provoked a significant emulation effect, it was the US that first 
raised this issue in the UNGA where Senator Patrick Leahy introduced resolutions in 
1993 and 1994 calling respectively for a moratorium on exports and the eventual 
elimination of APMs. The US leading role in setting the agenda for the 1995-96 CCW 
review conference should therefore be considered in light of these earlier 
commitments.  
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The Clinton Administration‟s announcement on 17 January 1997 that it would 
observe a permanent ban on the export and transfer of APMs should be understood as 
a response to the Ottawa Process. Internal divisions on an APM ban demonstrate close 
parallels to domestic debates on the 1925 Gas Protocol analysed in Chapter 3. Despite 
support from within both government and domestic civil society, the US resisted the 
Ottawa Process, influenced by the reluctance of the military and its political 
supporters to give up this capability. The US therefore pursued the competing strategy 
to initiate negotiations within the Conference on Disarmament (CD) on a treaty 
banning the use, production, transfer and stockpiling of APMs. This approach, 
although supported by a number of states, was widely criticised because the CD, like 
the CCW, operates on the basis of consensus. In particular, there was a perceived 
danger that hardline mine producers and users such as China and Russia might 
hamper the negotiation process. However, the arguments proved moot as the CD, 
riven by wider institutional problems, failed to include the landmines issue on its 1997 
agenda.
215
   
 
The extant literature positions the CCW as the natural home of militarily significant 
states while the APMBC draws in a much broader range of members. However, a 
more nuanced analysis demonstrates a strong interplay between the different regimes. 
Categories thus proved to be fluid with shifting positions caused by the regime 
formation processes and regime effects seen even in the behaviour of non-regime 
members. The ability to shift entrenched „hard‟ military pragmatist positions within 
the CCW provides a central argument for the validity of the CCW track.  Ultimately, 
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many hard line states shifted their positions through a combination of political 
pressure, acknowledgement of the benefits to civilians of the proposed amendments, 
and recognition that, given the internal nature of many contemporary conflicts, the 
protocol would be meaningless without such an expansion in scope. This has 
significant consequences that are relevant for mine action which have not been 
identified in the extant literature. While the CCW does not include mine action 
stakeholders it does influence the conduct of producers and users. The behaviour of 
these actors directly impacts on the potential future mined areas to be cleared through 
humanitarian demining.  
 
3.1.2 Representation and reality in the roles of middle powers 
 
The role of small and medium sized states – middle powers – is depicted in the 
literature as central to the success of the Ottawa Process.
216
 Canada went out on a 
precarious diplomatic limb in calling for the negotiation of a ban treaty at a time when 
declared support remained limited. Canada was also proactive in forging a partnership 
with the ICBL and other non-state actors participating in the process. The decision on 
Axworthy‟s famous announcement was made during the conference itself based on 
Canadian officials‟ assessment of the momentum that could be tapped by such a step. 
Following the conference, Canada had to expend a great deal of political capital in  
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unruffling diplomatic feathers, persuading states of the feasibility of the target that 
had been set and forming the core group of like-minded states. 
 
This initial APMBC core group was made up of eleven members: Austria, Belgium, 
Canada, Denmark, Ireland, Mexico, Norway, Switzerland, South Africa, Germany 
and The Philippines. The group regularly strategised, shared information and 
coordinated their activities. Like Canada, other members maintained strong links with 
national and international NGOs and other stakeholders. Members of the group 
assumed different roles. South Africa, Mexico and The Philippines worked as 
regional champions while the Netherlands and Ireland adeptly used their EU 
Presidencies to exert influence. Austria assumed responsibility for developing the 
draft treaty text, while Germany, Belgium and Switzerland hosted important 
preparatory meetings. Moreover, while Canada and the European members were 
reluctant to undermine the CD as an institution by questioning the inclusion of 
landmines on its agenda, Mexico was less inhibited. The core group of pro-ban states 
was influential because, as Hubert points out, „states are themselves formidable 
advocates and may well be taken more seriously than non-state actors by other 
states.‟217  Moreover, the cross-regional representation of the coalition undercut 
traditional UN negotiating blocks by including members of the EU and G77. 
 
In the CCW, Sweden, historically a significant player in the disarmament field and in 
this case spurred on by strong domestic criticism of the Vietnam war, was the first 
state to publicly call for the need to address the legal and humanitarian aspects of the 
                                                 
217
 Hubert (2000): p. xiii. 
164 
 
use of a range of conventional weapons.
218
 It was the Swedish Government that 
convened military and medical experts to study the effects of certain weapons from 
the perspective of IHL. Considerable momentum for the Lucerne and Lugano 
conferences came from Sweden, supported by a number of other states as well as the 
ICRC. Their 1973 report offered language for prohibitions or restrictions on anti-
personnel weapons including small caliber high velocity projectiles, fragmentation 
warheads, flechettes, landmines, booby traps and incendiaries.
219
  
 
The interplay between the two regimes and their situation within the broader field of 
IHL is demonstrated by the fact that the seeds of the cooperation that underpinned the 
Ottawa Process were laid within the CCW process. A proposal tabled at Lucerne by 
Sweden, Egypt, Mexico, Norway, Sudan, Switzerland and Yugoslavia that included 
text on landmines was rejected by the militarily significant states. Three of these 
states were to form part of the initial core group of like-minded states that drove the 
Ottawa Process. In the margins of the January 1996 CCW session, eight pro-ban 
States (Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Ireland, Mexico, Norway and 
Switzerland) met with the ICBL to discuss future strategy.
220
 Further meetings of this 
group led to the Canadian offer to host the first Ottawa conference. Thus, elements of 
research and political will on an issue that was identified as important from an IHL 
perspective as early as the 1970s gained traction within the Ottawa Process over 25 
years later. 
 
 
                                                 
218
 Roach (1984): p.11. 
219
 Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Conventional Weapons. Their Deployment and Effects from a 
Humanitarian Aspect: Recommendations for the Modernisation of International Law, A Swedish 
Working Group Study (1973) 
165 
 
3.1.3 Developing nations, participation and ownership 
 
Given the focus on the technical characteristics of weapons, little emphasis was 
placed in the Lucerne or Lugano meetings on the experience of mine affected states. 
Making a point that was to be taken up to great effect twenty years later in the Ottawa 
Process, Prokosch points out that „the Lucerne Conference might have felt itself under 
more pressure to move toward banning the new weapons if representatives of the 
countries where they had been used had said more about their terrible effects.‟221 This 
is however at least an ambivalent point since one strand of reasoning among 
developing states supported the use of landmines for their equalizing effects against 
well armed aggressors, while also emphasising their relatively low cost. A similar 
argument was deployed over the use of booby traps, resulting in a compromise 
definition in Protocol II which only prohibits „perfidious‟ booby traps.222 This is 
significant because it demonstrates that compromises in treaty language are not just a 
reflection of the interests of militarily significant states but also of different 
developing world concerns. 
 
The extensive use of landmines against civilian populations during the civil wars not 
covered by Protocol II in Angola, Mozambique and Afghanistan (although the 
conflict was international in character it was treated as internal by the Soviet Union) 
gave little incentive for ratification by developing states in the 1980s and early 1990s. 
Although APII addressed this lacuna, the problem, as expressed by the ICRC before 
the UNGA following its agreement, was that „poorly trained or equipped forces may 
be unwilling or unable to abide by a complex set of rules or pay an increased price for 
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self-destructing mines.‟223 The absence of input from mine affected states or the 
developing world more broadly was thus a major criticism of the CCW process. 
Moreover, one of the key arguments against using the CD as the venue for 
negotiations on landmines was that, if the major producers and users of landmines 
were present, the majority of mine affected states were excluded from this body.  
 
In contrast, the needs of developing states are at the heart of the humanitarian 
rationale underpinning the Ottawa Process. The process therefore advocated an 
inclusive approach focused on building support in regions affected by mines. The 
selection of the South African, Jacob Selebi, as Chairman of the Oslo negotiating 
conference was symbolically as well as practically significant. The media campaign 
led by the ICBL and ICRC highlighted the impact of mines on a human level, 
particularly through vivid depictions of mine victims. Indeed, many survivors were 
brought to the various meetings to bear witness to injuries caused by APMs. Ban 
campaigns in the South were an integral part of the Ottawa Process. NGO-driven 
meetings in Mozambique and South Africa focused attention on the landmine crisis in 
Africa and garnered widespread state support for a ban in that region. The case of the 
Cambodia campaign is also instructive. The campaign was launched in 1994 and in 
June 1995 hosted the 3
rd
 International ICBL Campaign conference in Phnom Penh, 
the first landmine conference to be held in a mine affected country. The conference 
was attended by over 450 participants from more than 40 countries and provided a 
model for other national campaigns and signature drives.
224
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The ICBL promoted regional support for the ban through the creation of „mine free 
zones.‟ The States of Central America were followed by the Caribbean Community 
(CARICOM) in committing themselves to no further use, production, trade or 
stockpiling of APMs. Southern Africa proved a particularly coherent regional bloc 
while the then Organisation of African Unity (OAU) and the Organisation of 
American States (OAS) also played an important role in mobilising support for the 
ban. This regional solidarity from the developing world bore fruit at Oslo. Central 
American and African States provided cohesive support for a strong and effective 
legal instrument, avoiding the emergence of damaging North-South policy splits.  
 
The commitment of the global South – particularly mine affected states – lent 
credibility to the Ottawa Process that was absent from the CCW. However, the extant 
literature does not emphasise that the treaty drafting process prior to the Oslo 
negotiating conference was led by the core group of states and the ICBL steering 
committee. Given that, as discussed above, the treaty text was not significantly 
amended during the negotiations, this provides an alternative perspective on 
developing world input to the development of the treaty to that maintained in the 
accepted narrative. Yet the absence of a verification mechanism coupled with a lack 
of substantive „buy in‟ to the specifics of regime design raises important questions 
considered in Chapter 5 for all APMBC regime members on levels of commitment to 
regime implementation engendered during the regime formation phase. 
 
3.2 Non state actors: the ICRC-ICBL nexus 
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Within the CCW framework, civil society actors faced challenges of both access and 
influence. The neutral, impartial status of the ICRC transcended this limitation, giving 
it a unique position to act as „honest broker‟ in facilitating inter-state negotiations. In 
contrast, the transnational NGO coalition that came together to form the ICBL is seen 
as the centerpiece of the Ottawa Process. Contrary to the ICRC, the ICBL was able to 
directly criticize governments through its advocacy. Thus, although the ICBL is 
prominent as the civil society vehicle that drove forward the Ottawa Process, 
interactions between a range of state and non-state actors were instrumental to the 
substantive moves towards a ban on APMs, even if the role of the ICRC may be less 
visible within the literature.  
 
The strength of the ICBL lay in its structure, combining a small international staff 
which provided direction and coordinated policy on behalf of hundreds of local 
organisations around the world. Price notes that „the most basic effect of civil society, 
then, has been the transnational dissemination of information about the scope of 
landmine use and its effects, thereby helping to define the use of AP landmines as not 
only a problem but as a global crisis.‟225 The ban movement grew because a ban 
seemed a logical solution to an obvious humanitarian disaster. Effective lobbying was 
central to this process, combining engagement with political leaders and government 
officials with public awareness campaigns. It is important to distinguish between the 
ICBL steering committee – which provided strategic direction to the campaign – and 
the broad based coalition that formed national campaigns and made the link to grass 
roots activists. The steering committee, initially with no formal structure, budget or 
secretariat, set out strategy for the various meetings and targeted priority regions and 
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countries for capacity building efforts. Membership of the committee was to expand 
and significant individuals were included on an ad hoc basis.
226
 The NGOs that made 
up the rump of the campaign – reaching up to 1,200 NGOs in 60 countries227 – were 
cohesive although disagreements were apparent between organizations preoccupied 
with lobbying governments and those more focused on mine action.  
 
The ICRC‟s role is commonly downplayed in favour of the NGO coalition of the 
ICBL and the Canadian contribution. This can be attributed to a combination of the 
deliberately „modest‟ profile of the organisation and the near monopoly held by the 
ICBL and Canada on the Ottawa Process literature. However, while the ICBL 
coordinated with the core group of like-minded states and engaged many developing 
states, the ICRC, through its credibility and expertise, could also engage effectively 
with militarily significant states. This role was critical in building trust in an IHL 
regime formation process that lacked both precedents and safety valves in the form of 
compromises gained as through a process of consensus decision-making. 
 
At the first CCW negotiating conference, the ICRC followed the current, supporting 
proposals on restrictions, believing that those who advocated banning weapons were 
unrealistic.
228
 At the 1995/96 review conference the ICRC was again invited to act as 
„expert observer.‟ This status meant the ICRC could speak, submit proposals (they 
provided two working papers) and distribute documentation.
229
 The role of the ICRC 
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was therefore significant because the organisation combined influence with subject 
area expertise. The credibility and expertise of the ICRC was critical in shifting the 
perceptions of states as well as in contributing legal expertise that helped to situate the 
regimes within the broader context of IHL. The organisation subsequently initiated 
expert conferences and published studies on the effects of APMs, providing a bridge 
between the mine action community and other stakeholders such as militaries, 
government officials and NGO advocates.
230
 Arguments relating to military necessity, 
which underpin the CCW process, were addressed head-on by the ICRC. The 
organisation commissioned an analysis on the „Military Use and Effectiveness of 
Anti-Personnel Mines‟ by a retired senior British military officer with a background 
in combat engineering, weapons research and subsequently humanitarian demining.
231
 
This study critically assesses the military effectiveness of APMs and struck a chord 
among military and non-military audiences by highlighting a major gap between 
questionable military gains and the terrible humanitarian impact of their use.  
 
The ICRC, together with the ICBL, was responsible for the concerted international 
campaign to stigmatise the use of APMs. As another example of the „without 
precedent‟ fallacy, it is inaccurate, as some commentators have claimed, that this was 
the ICRC‟s first ever such campaign. As shown in Chapter 3, similar efforts by the 
organisation successfully contributed to the stigmatisation of chemical weapons 
following World War I. However, the convergence of this campaign with other efforts 
and the possibilities offered by modern communications technology ensured that the 
anti-APM campaign had a global impact within a very short timeframe. The non-
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adversarial approach of the ICRC is thus significant because it offered an approach 
and expertise different to that brought by the ICBL. As the acknowledged „guardian‟ 
of IHL, the ICRC made contributions throughout the drafting process on key elements 
of the treaty. In particular, the ICRC emphasised the need for unambiguous 
definitions and universality if the treaty was to be successful.   
 
The ICBL was given a campaign headquarters and meeting rooms – provided through 
the influence of ICBL member Norwegian Peoples Aid – located directly opposite the 
negotiating hall. This physical location facilitated the direct link between NSAs and 
state actors that distinguishes the two regime formation processes. The ICBL held 
official observer status on the same terms as observer governments. They were 
present at all sessions and could make oral interventions at any point although they 
could not vote or formally propose treaty text. Underlining a central plank of the 
Ottawa narrative, Williams and Goose claim that „this is the first occasion on which 
NGOs were given official status in international negotiations of a disarmament/arms 
control or humanitarian law treaty.‟232 However, as demonstrated in Chapter 3, while 
the APMBC regime framework certainly allowed for wider participation than the 
CCW, this was not an unprecedented initiative but in fact marked a return to a 
traditional approach to the development of IHL in which civil society plays an active 
role. While the novelty of the approach is an important element of the APMBC 
„brand,‟ this perspective downplays a long history of humanitarian advocacy by both 
state and non-state actors.  
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The two strands of the Ottawa Process were reinforced by a number of events, 
activities and opportunities seized by a range of supportive individuals and 
institutions. Support within the UN system for a ban on APMs came from the highest 
political level. UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali became increasingly 
explicit in his support for a ban, first in the 1992 Agenda for Peace and subsequently 
in his foreword to the Proceedings of a 1995 symposium on landmines.
233
 The 
legitimacy of the process was reinforced by the landmark December 1996 UNGA 
Resolution 51/45S calling on states „to pursue vigorously an effective, legally binding 
international agreement to ban the use, stockpiling, production and transfer of anti-
personnel landmines with a view to completing the negotiations as soon as 
possible.‟234 Other significant factors included the World Bank in August 1997 
agreeing to fund mine clearance activities for the first time in its history. The timing 
of these supportive moves by different international organizations is significant. They 
contribute to the sense of momentum surrounding the Ottawa Process while also 
lending credibility to this unconventional approach to IHL regime formation. 
 
3.3 Stakeholder clustering and regime effectiveness 
 
In contrast to previous CCW practice, at the insistence of the Chinese delegation
235
 
NGOs were not even granted observer status in the APII negotiations. Attendance was 
limited to states with the ICRC and UN agencies invited as special cases.
236
 
Organisations with extensive practical experience were thus excluded. The 
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homogeneous nature of the experts involved in APII regime design, with little 
questioning of the logic that these weapons were militarily useful without being 
indiscriminate was a decisive consideration in delimiting the language and scope of 
the protocol. The absence of broader stakeholder groups from the process of APII 
regime formation limited possibilities for regime learning.  
 
However, the absence of civil society from the CCW negotiations, does not infer that 
they had no influence on the process. The French government‟s request to initiate a 
CCW review conference had been the result of a lobbying campaign by the French 
NGO Handicap International. Moreover, over 100 experts from 70 NGOs attended the 
conference to monitor the negotiations and lobby in the margins.
237
 NGO members 
also gained access to national policy processes and to the negotiations themselves 
through being invited to form part of official delegations. The Canadian NGO Mines 
Action Canada had strong links with the division of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
responsible for the negotiations and in the cases of both Australia and Canada 
members of NGOs formed part of official delegations.
238
 Even with the restricted 
CCW rules of procedure, recognition of the benefits of NGO expertise allowed some 
organisations to influence proceedings as part of national delegations. 
 
If there may have been overlaps in the makeup of national negotiating teams for APII 
and the APMBC, the phenomenon of regime learning through participation in 
APMBC regime formation is unique. Although diplomats, officials, military officers 
and lawyers brought their own expertise – and were more or less the same figures 
involved in the APII negotiations – exposure to the effects of landmines through the 
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first hand evidence of mine victims and humanitarian assistance workers as well as 
the nature of the work as described by mine action practitioners, led to better 
understanding of the magnitude of the problem and the kinds of measures needed to 
address the issue. This influence on actors responsible for shaping policy at national 
level and constituting the national negotiating teams is significant and is not 
acknowledged in the existing literature. 
 
The link forged between the ICBL and like-minded states proved an effective 
influencing mechanism. It is also important to recognize that pressure was effectively 
applied both to western and developing nations and that many states were prepared – 
or pushed – only six months after agreeing APII to move much further in signing up 
to a ban on APMs. In this period, the highly visible campaign to raise awareness on 
the humanitarian cost of these weapons had generated sufficient traction within a 
more open process of regime formation to enable such an outcome. This link was 
reinforced to a much greater extent than in APII through a number of states including 
ICBL members in their delegations. As Rutherford points out, „in some cases that 
meant that some countries essentially handed their policy and negotiating apparatus to 
activists; in other cases the government had its own line, usually sympathetic but not 
identical to the NGO position, but allowed the NGO inside access to the negotiations.‟ 
 
The clustering of actors within the Ottawa Process was determined by self-selection: 
if you agreed with the goal of a complete ban on APMs you could join. This approach 
had the unintended consequence of leading to self-interested participation by spoilers 
in the regime formation process. As it became apparent during the course of 1997 that 
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the CD approach was failing to erode support for the Ottawa Process, the US on 18 
August announced its intention to participate fully at the Oslo negotiating conference. 
Although, in principle, embracing the Brussels Declaration indicated US support for a 
complete ban on APMs, this move in practice allowed the US to apply pressure on 
participants in order to influence their position. However, at the Brussels meeting, 
strong arm lobbying tactics by the US delegation, inviting other delegations to their 
hotel to press their position, was effectively countered by the ICBL briefing 
delegations going in and de-briefing them coming out. 
 
Looking beyond the open model for participation, a clear division of labour can be 
discerned within the APMBC approach. In the run up to the Oslo negotiating 
conference, NGO activities in states with a tradition of civil society activism were 
combined with state-driven efforts to prepare for the negotiating conference. These 
were interlinked and coordinated with different organisations playing to their 
strengths. On a political level, the diverse cluster of actors in the Ottawa strand 
encouraged and pressured states beyond „the committed‟ to join the regime. The 
practitioner experience within this cluster proved particularly effective in countering 
more minimalist positions that sought a nuanced outcome rather than an outright ban 
on APMs. The absence of such a diverse design cluster meant that APII could not 
transcend the knowledge base of its existing membership. A related cost of the narrow 
APII constituency was that it became easy for the APMBC cluster, with its strong 
advocacy base, to influence the political landscape through painting the other regime 
as a failure. 
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3.4  Leadership 
 
Both regime formation processes are characterised by influential clusters, intertwining 
states and NSAs. Oran Young‟s distinction between structural, intellectual and 
entrepreneurial leadership provides a useful way to cast into relief influential actors 
in landmine regime formation
239
 and to recognize similarities and distinctions 
between APII and APMBC regime formation. While the optic of leadership attributes 
influence to individual actors, the clustering of different leadership roles within and 
across stakeholder groups, it is argued, is critical to understanding these processes. 
 
Structural leadership was provided in the Ottawa Process by Canada. While the 
Canadians were supported by the like-minded group, their structural leadership role is 
undisputed given the political risks uniquely taken by Axworthy and his officials as 
well as their initiative in partnering openly with the ICBL. Canada was also the only 
actor that could both bring other states into the like-minded group and mitigate, in 
concert with other states, the efforts by spoilers to derail or divert momentum from 
the Ottawa Process. Structural leadership in the APII framework was provided by the 
US although this role was pursued with the clear goal of preserving the status quo and 
promoting only incremental change. They were the spoiler in the APMBC process 
while at the same time seeking to demonstrate leadership in the international 
community on the landmine issue. Despite the efforts of the US to shape the outcome 
of the negotiating conference away from a complete ban, their intervention, somewhat 
counter-intuitively, actually proved helpful in achieving this result. The major 
changes sought by the US – and the heavy-handed way they went about achieving 
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them – offered a stark „with us or against us‟ choice to states. In the absence of this 
dynamic, the negotiating conference may well have become bogged down in 
discussions over points of detail. However, contrary to expectations, given the 
sensitive issues under discussion and the rapid nature of the process, the draft treaty 
actually became stronger rather than weaker through the course of the negotiations.
240
 
 
If the intellectual content of the Ottawa Process was drawn from a number of sources 
– notably mine action practitioners and mine affected states – intellectual leadership 
came from the ICRC. The organisation‟s structure and credibility was instrumental in 
converting many states to commit to an unconventional process of regime formation. 
A major distinction between the two regimes lies in the area of intellectual leadership. 
In the APMBC context this leadership was grounded in both IHL and mine action 
expertise. Beyond the ICRC, the capacities that were available to shape the APII 
regime were based on arms control and disarmament experience. This narrow vision, 
reinforced by constraining regime rules, did not permit for a focus on the realities of 
contemporary landmine use, their impact, and measures to address them. 
 
Entrepreneurial leadership in the Ottawa Process was provided by the steering 
committee of the ICBL. It is particularly significant that this group moved beyond a 
„classical‟ advocacy position of criticizing the behaviour of governments to 
coordinating a two-level campaign that effectively combined collaboration with like-
minded states and a massive mobilization of national and international civil society 
organisations. Such an approach meant that different NGOs found reasons to support 
the campaign within their own core mandates: human rights or IHL, developmental, 
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medical or public health perspectives; the process offered something for all these 
interest groups. National level ICBL priorities of raising public awareness and 
pressuring governments would then shift as closer cooperation was established with 
certain governments. By contrast, the formation of APII is characterised by an 
absence of entrepreneurial leadership. Within a CCW regime framework that had 
been established for fifteen years, no actor was willing or able to broker deals that 
would lead to transformational change. The strict rules governing participation of 
non-state actors obviated opportunities for such a role while encouraging these groups 
to seek creative, far reaching alternatives within the alternative Ottawa Process. 
 
Analysis of stakeholder cluster within and across APII and the APMBC provides 
important new insights to landmine regime formation. The significance of the 
„committed state‟ and NSA cluster to the APMBC is confirmed. However, a deeper 
analysis demonstrates that the intellectual leadership role of the ICRC was highly 
effective, if less visible in the literature, in building support beyond those already 
committed to the process. Agency dynamics across the two regimes also refine our 
understanding of important qualities of rigidity and flexibility in regime rules. APII 
regime rules that excluded civil society proved ineffective in practice, as was the case 
with the negotiation of the 1925 Gas Protocol. On the other hand, while self-selection 
by the like-minded was a defining characteristic of the Ottawa Process, decision-
making was in fact highly coordinated and controlled within a much narrower group 
of actors. These insights thus add new layers to our understanding of regime 
formation but also point to challenging issues of implementation and effectiveness 
developed in Chapter 5. In particular, narrow intellectual leadership in the case of the 
APMBC and an apparently open process that displays tight control of decision 
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making by its entrepreneurial leadership, raise important questions on the ability of 
expert communities and mine affected states to influence implementation processes in 
both regimes. 
 
4. The influence of norms on regime formation 
 
The humanitarian objectives that underpin both APII and the APMBC means that 
understanding the influence of norms on processes of regime formation is particularly 
important. This strong normative content raises important research questions 
discussed in this section on the impact of norms in moving from issue emergence to 
regime formation. Supporters of the respective landmine regime frameworks tend to 
underline the distinctions between the two approaches. However, this section also 
considers common normative underpinnings that may demonstrate significant if less 
visible linkages between the regimes as well as in their nesting within the broader 
normative framework of IHL.  
 
4.1  Regime nesting  
 
The roots of specific measures to restrict the use of landmines within IHL can be 
traced back to initiatives begun in the 1950s. Both regimes draw on two customary 
principles of IHL that underpin the Geneva Conventions and which can be found in 
the earliest expressions of the laws of war: the prohibition on the use of weapons that 
are indiscriminate or which cause unnecessary suffering or superfluous injury.
241
 
Taking a longer term perspective is therefore important to contextualise the 
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development of the two landmine regimes in relation to this historical perspective. 
The ICRC is thus significant in playing the role of a „norm carrier‟ that enhances the 
integrity of both regimes by situating them through their involvement within the 
broader framework of IHL. 
 
The „umbrella‟ CCW treaty explicitly situates the landmine issue within a broader 
normative context that includes prohibitions or restrictions on a range of weapons that 
cause unnecessary suffering or superfluous injury. The APII regime is therefore an 
example of a concrete advance in IHL based on principles enshrined in the CCW such 
as responsibility for clearance, provision of technical information and protection of 
civilians. If the principles of indiscriminacy, superfluous injury and unnecessary 
suffering which underpin the CCW provide an important link to the broader corpus of 
IHL, they are of limited utility in their application to specific weapons. IHL does not 
provide a clear definition of the scope and application of these terms; as Kalshoven 
points out, these principles „are not particularly suited to serve as yardsticks for the 
legality of a weapon.‟242 Thus even if provisions are derived from important IHL 
norms, this does not itself provide a basis for regime effectiveness. Consequently, this 
poses significant questions for the implementation phase as to the effectiveness of 
APII according to a definition that goes beyond the implementation of regime 
provisions to encompass the fulfillment of regime goals. 
 
Beyond the broader normative framework of IHL, the APMBC is significant as the 
embodiment of an emerging norm stigmatising the use of APMs. The APMBC 
represents a specific acknowledgement that landmines are not an acceptable weapon 
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of war. In the absence of criteria for the acceptability of landmines, a ban offers the 
only solution that clearly falls within the standard of customary IHL. The emergence 
of a campaign to ban APMs and its support by national governments is intrinsically 
linked to the perceived failure of the CCW, from a humanitarian perspective, to 
adequately meet this standard. According to Price, „acceptance by states that there 
was a crisis implied that action was necessary and the failure of past approaches 
narrowed the range of acceptable responses.‟243 Once states internalised the fact that 
there was a humanitarian emergency – at the same time that the CCW had failed to 
adequately address it – the argument to achieve a complete ban was reinforced. This 
demonstrates a mutually reinforcing dynamic between the perceived failure of the 
APII process to address the humanitarian costs of these weapons and the increasingly 
compelling stigmatization narrative of the Ottawa Process. Indeed, the technical 
nature of the APII negotiations and its widely perceived failure to address 
humanitarian concerns conferred a morally ambiguous status on its supporters while 
serving to boost the norm-building dimension of the Ottawa Process given its focus 
on the humanitarian impact of APMs. 
 
The perceived failure of APII to address the humanitarian impact of APMs had a 
tangible effect in boosting support among states for the APMBC. The UK and France 
are the most conspicuous examples of militarily significant states that regarded APMs 
as a useful military capability but, despite the additional consideration of heavy 
pressure from the US, signed up to the ban. These cases thus highlight the highly 
political nature of the regime formation process. Following Price‟s model of the two-
level game, internal and external pressures combined to tip the calculus for many 
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states beyond the core APMBC constituency in favour of joining the regime. 
Common to domestic and international discourses was the need to be seen to be on 
the right side of a high profile humanitarian issue. Certainly, in the case of the 
APMBC, the rapid progress from identifying the need for a „mine ban‟ treaty to 
forming the regime seems to fit the description of Finnemore and Sikkink‟s  „norm 
cascade‟244 with many states feeling obliged to follow the example of others in joining 
the regime as „the right thing to do.‟ 
 
The Ottawa Process isolates APMs as a weapon that is both unacceptable and which 
could be addressed by way of a ban. The campaign derived its strength by 
maintaining a single focus on this humanitarian imperative that would have been 
dispersed had this goal been diluted. The message of the Ottawa Process was 
therefore closely linked to its normative „pull.‟ Ken Anderson, former Director of the 
Arms Division at Human Rights Watch, notes that „this utter moral and political 
clarity was an integral part of the campaign in reaching various publics.‟245  Efforts by 
the Landmine Survivors Network (LSN) to include wording to assist victims in the 
draft treaty text was regarded by some ICBL members as a distraction from the 
overall goal of a ban. LSN was criticised for not going through the steering committee 
in pursuing its goal.
246
 While language was eventually included, this was largely due 
to the targeted efforts of LSN, the ICRC and Handicap International rather than as an 
ICBL campaign goal. However, this example raises an important distinction between 
humanitarianism and humanitarian norms as a regime formation mechanism. The 
cold-eyed realism of the ICBL leadership was demonstrated by its reluctance to 
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include victim assistance provisions in the draft treaty text, despite compelling 
humanitarian arguments, because this might be opposed by certain states and 
therefore complicate the negotiating process. The norm entrepreneurship guiding the 
campaign was therefore not idealistic. It recognised both the utility of the anti-APM 
norm in compelling as many states as possible to join a regime centred around a ban 
on APMs as well as the countervailing costs of expanding the regime‟s scope and 
blurring this key message. 
 
The timing of related initiatives was helpful in reinforcing the normative weight of the 
Ottawa Process. The landmark 1996 UNGA Resolution as well as the evident support 
for the ban movement by both famous figures and ordinary people in their thousands 
from all corners of the world generated momentum and contributed to a norm cascade 
that positively influenced the orientation of states towards the Ottawa Process. The 
tragic death of Diana, Princess of Wales in a car accident just before the Oslo 
conference greatly increased media attention on delegates due to her high profile 
support for a ban.
247
 Finally, the awarding of the Nobel Peace Prize jointly to the 
ICBL and its coordinator Jody Williams in October 1997 gave a boost to the drive for 
signatures between the conclusion of the negotiating conference and the subsequent 
signing ceremony in Ottawa. In particular, Japanese Foreign Minister Obuchi 
recognized the awarding of the Nobel prize as a significant factor in reconsidering 
Japanese policy to sign up to the APMBC.
248
 
 
For Price, the commitment of mine affected states to the ban process signifies that 
„unlike some international norms such as those embodied in human rights 
                                                 
247
 Williams and Goose in Cameron, Lawson and Tomlin (1998): p.43. 
184 
 
instruments, the treaty has support where it is needed most – in countries where the 
pernicious effects of the now-deviant practice have been most prevalent.‟249 One 
related consequence of the APMBC regime formation process was the forging of links 
between governmental and civil society actors in the South. In the case of South 
Africa, Noel Stott, a member of the South African Campaign to Ban Landmines, 
describes the importance of „critical solidarity‟ with the discourse of the South 
African government influenced by an internationalist concern to signal the country‟s 
return to the international community by embracing this humanitarian norm.
250
 This 
provides a parallel with EU applicant states that were keen to be seen to embrace the 
anti-APM norm, even though for some landmine production remained a significant 
economic activity at the time. In both these cases the anti-APM norm gained support 
through tapping into a broader normative imperative to demonstrate responsible 
international behaviour. 
 
Analysis of norms in regime formation lends considerable weight to the hypothesis 
that the nesting of APII and the APMBC within a wider IHL regime has a number of 
significant consequences. The characteristic of moral clarity led to a revised calculus 
for APMBC membership based on humanitarian rather than security or economic 
criteria. It also extended beyond IHL to encompass norms relating to state legitimacy 
by drawing on the need for states undergoing various forms of transition to 
demonstrate good international conduct. This point is also significant in highlighting a 
potential cleavage within the Ottawa core group As made evident by different 
attitudes to the inclusion of victim assistance provisions, while the mission of the 
ICRC is to promote humanitarian goals, the ICRC uses this humanitarian imperative 
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to achieve its policy goals. This fundamental divergence may have consequences for 
implementation. 
 
5. Conclusions 
 
This chapter contributes to our overall research aims through a systematic analysis of 
the multi-actor (involving international, state and non-state actors) and multi-level 
(reflecting the interplay of domestic and international concerns) processes that led to 
the development of APII and the APMBC. Investigating our two main hypotheses is 
intended to add to our knowledge of complex, fluctuating transnational dynamics that 
shape the design, implementation and effectiveness of the landmine regimes. This 
concluding section identifies new insights and contributions to knowledge through 
examining relevant research questions in relation to landmine regime formation 
processes. 
 
Our analysis contributes to developing our main hypothesis on landmine regime 
nesting and interplay through demonstrating the significance of regime nesting to the 
emergence of APII. The regime demonstrates the progress states were prepared to 
make in 1995/96 on the restrictions they had previously agreed in 1980. However, it 
also represents a chain of argumentation within the field of IHL that was launched as 
early as the 1950s. In contrast, even if this thesis demonstrates important parallels to 
the wider IHL discourse that are not taken into account in the extant literature, the 
dynamic behind the Ottawa Process is distinct from conventional processes of IHL 
regime development in several important ways. The intensely political nature of the 
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APMBC regime formation process is shown by the fluidity of positions for many 
states in the face of a combination of domestic and international pressure to be on the 
„right side‟ of the issue through joining the regime. Finnemore and Sikkink‟s concept 
of a „norm bandwaggon‟ as a spur to regime formation251 provides a particularly 
useful concept to better understand reasons behind the different APII and APMBC 
trajectories from issue emergence to regime formation. In contrast to the former, 
many states involved in the Ottawa Process were compelled to revisit the political 
calculus for regime membership according to humanitarian rather than security or 
economic criteria.  
 
This chapter provide important insights that demonstrate the significance of 
stakeholder clustering dynamics for landmine regime formation. The active 
engagement of representatives from mine affected states and mine action practitioner 
communities was particularly significant in terms of the process and substance of 
APMBC regime formation. The former, mobilised both at state level and through 
national civil society organisations, gave the campaign its global character and 
contributed significantly to its legitimacy. Mine action expertise was particularly 
influential in providing substantive inputs that effectively countered dissenting 
arguments in favour of the continued use of APMs. In contrast, the absence of these 
stakeholder groups in APII regime design points to an important disjunction between 
the development of the regime its the ability to draw on the knowledge of mine action 
expert communities. Contributions from practitioners and mine affected states thus 
constitute key variables in accounting for differences between APII and APMBC 
regime design.  
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Important secondary research questions consider how different approaches to regime 
design influence landmine regime effectiveness. Contrary to a characteristic of 
successful regimes in other issue areas, inflexibility in refusing to dilute the core ban 
on APMs has been decisive in maximising political support for the APMBC. Rather 
than seeking compromise solutions, the integrity of the anti-APM message was thus a 
key factor in shaping state behaviour. This chapter demonstrates that the absence of 
flexibility in terms of participation and the consensus decision-making criterion 
within the CCW – while providing a level of confidence for militarily significant 
states to engage in the regime – also has costs for regime effectiveness. If civil society 
actors are neglected, they are also conflated by the regime. Our analysis points to gaps 
in intellectual and entreprenneurial leadership that may constrain regime learning if 
carried into the implementation phase. In contrast, the Ottawa Process benefited from 
a unique combination of structural, intellectual and entrepreneurial leadership which 
strongly influenced the political dynamics of the regime formation process. Thus, the 
influence of norms represents a key distinction between the two regimes. APII 
attracted a nucleus of participating states while the Ottawa Process transcended such a 
fixed grouping by exploiting „push‟ and „pull‟ dynamics that drew on the strength of 
the anti-APM norm to gain the support of a broad constituency of states. 
 
This chapter shows how the juxtaposition of the APMBC with APII was a highly 
successful tactic in promoting the Ottawa brand. However, both the massive early 
support for the APMBC regime and the lack of amendments to the draft treaty during 
the negotiating conference contribute insights on the interplay of political and 
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technical considerations for regime effectiveness. These dynamics suggest that states 
may not have paid sufficient attention to the implications of their obligations. Our 
analysis of the US role – APMBC „spoiler‟ but single largest global mine action donor 
– contributes to addressing our research question on the need to understand the level 
of synergiy between regime and mine action objectives. This highlights that APMBC 
membership is not a pre requisite for playing a positive international role in mine 
action. Research questions related to assuming the costs of membership and the 
potential disjunction between regime and mine action goals thus present key foci for 
Chapter 5. 
 
This chapter develops new insights into landmine regime formation processes. The 
roles played by different stakeholder groups and the limitations imposed by regime 
rules represent key considerations in understanding the relationship between design, 
implementation and effectiveness across the APII and APMBC regimes. While both 
regimes draw on a common normative framework as IHL treaties, the different ways 
that the regime formation processes draw on these norms represents a key 
distinguishing feature. Chapter 5 builds on our analysis of the emergence and design 
of the landmine regimes in order to apply these insights to the implementation and 
effectiveness of APII and the APMBC. 
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Chapter 5 
Implementation and Effectiveness of the Landmine Regimes 
 
1. Introduction 
 
APII entered into force on 3 December 1998 and was followed by the APMBC on 1 
March 1999. In both cases, sufficient time has passed since regime formation and 
entry into force to construct a meaningful analysis of the implementation and 
effectiveness of the two regimes. Building on insights into regime formation 
processes developed in Chapter 4, this chapter contributes to overall thesis objectives 
through exploring our main hypothesis that ties landmine regime effectiveness to the 
relationship between design and implementation factors. This chapter therefore 
considers how different aspects of regime design play out in implementation.  
 
In order to inform our second main hypothesis on regime nesting and interplay 
dynamics, consideration of regime and mine action discourses within a single 
analytical framework is critical. Resource mobilisation, donor coordination and 
concrete contributions to the various „pillars‟252 of mine action all, in qualitatively 
different ways, represent mine action related objectives of the two regimes. Linking 
analysis of the regimes as IHL instruments with their relationship to various 
functional sectors of mine action permits us to further elaborate how effectively the 
regimes reflect mine action concerns and priorities. This chapter analyses efforts 
within regime implementation processes to support mine action – where stakeholders 
and approaches overlap, intersect or duplicate – in order to deepen our knowledge of 
190 
 
the effectiveness of the two regimes. This analysis is directly linked to Chapters 6 and 
7 which focus specifically on effectiveness in relation to humanitarian demining and 
stockpile destruction. 
 
Gaps in the existing literature highlight a very limited understanding of the quality of 
landmine regime implementation; regime compliance is frequently conflated with 
effectiveness. As in the regime formation phase, implementation is characterised by a 
lack of source material in the case of APII and a plethora of often uncritical narratives 
on the APMBC. There is a significant parallel literature developed by practitioners on 
approaches, good practice and lessons learned in the field of mine action. However, 
work on regime implementation and mine action research have not been drawn 
together with the consequence that meaningful findings on the effectiveness of the 
regimes have failed to emerge. As Filippino and Paterson note: 
 
The gap between social scientists and practitioners is unclear. For example, the human toll exacted by 
landmines and UXO was the principal impetus behind the international movement to ban landmines. 
But what do we know about the contributions made by clearance, marking and mine awareness to a 
reduction in the number of deaths and disabilities? We know very little, at least in quantitative terms.
253
 
 
This chapter therefore addresses research questions that seek to understand potential 
disjunctions between landmine regime implementation and mine action payoffs. This 
contributes to a transversal research objective that attempts to identify the extent to 
which the regimes are making a difference in efforts to alleviate the humanitarian 
impact of these weapons. Addressing regime effectiveness in its humanitarian 
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dimension also builds on Chapter 3‟s focus on historical IHL case studies, permitting 
a more nuanced comparative analysis of the challenges of implementing APII and the 
APMBC and how far this process draws on regime nesting dynamics within a wider 
IHL context. Finally, the complex technical and political requirements of 
implementing mine action related commitments at the national level provides an 
important contribution to research questions related to the significance of learning for 
regime effectiveness. 
 
This chapter builds on Chapter 4 by considering the significance of actors involved in 
regime formation to the landmine regime implementation processes. Particular 
emphasis is placed on stakeholder clustering and the existence of constant or 
fluctuating clusters of actors across design and implementation phases. The 
relationship between policy, agenda setting and programming roles as well as the 
influence of mine action practitioners and mine affected states in these areas are key 
considerations. Some actors, such as the ICBL in the context of the APMBC, are 
wholly situated within the regime. Others have been significantly assimilated into the 
implementation processes. A much broader category of state and non-state actors 
contribute to implementation either across the two regimes or favouring one over the 
other. In order to take into account all actors that play a part in regime 
implementation, it is therefore essential to analyse the roles played by actors outside 
the regimes senso stricto, including non-members as well as groups not directly 
addressed by the treaties.  
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This chapter further elaborates our examination of landmine regime design, 
implementation and effectiveness through analysing the implementation and 
effectiveness of APII and the APMBC. The nature and utility of formal and informal 
regime implementation mechanisms is assessed and challenges of voluntary and 
involuntary defection are considered. Regime effectiveness is then analysed under the 
headings of resources, political will and humanitarian impact. This chapter concludes 
by setting out key insights on the implementation and effectiveness of the landmine 
regimes from a mine action perspective. This analysis is further developed in the 
subsequent chapters through focussing in greater depth on humanitarian demining and 
stockpile destruction. 
 
2. Understanding landmine regime implementation 
 
This section systematically analyses landmine regime implementation. Our approach 
considers how far regime rules are realistic and shaped by a clear understanding of the 
measures required to implement them. Verification mechanisms provide an important 
means for regimes to understand implementation processes and recognise the need to 
adapt in order to become more effective. This section assesses the role of formal and 
informal mechanisms established by the regime in order to support implementation. It 
then analyses key actors in regime implementation, in particular the impact of 
stakeholder clustering and how this relates to the regime design phase.  
 
 
 
 
193 
 
2.1 Relating compliance to design: formal monitoring and verification  
 
Both regimes hold annual meetings and require reporting from regime members to 
demonstrate progress on implementation issues. The APMBC framework has 
established a programme of regular intersessional meetings. Within the CCW 
framework, an experts group has a comparable mandate although on a much smaller 
scale. Outside of the formal regime framework various state and non-state actors have 
developed means to support regime implementation. One significant example is the 
Implementation Support Unit (ISU) created by the GICHD. Another is the Landmine 
Monitor, an annual publication coordinated by the ICBL, which represents the most 
significant compliance monitoring mechanism under the APMBC. The landmine 
regimes include a number of formal verification mechanisms summarised below: 
 
Implementation 
Mechanism 
APII APMBC 
Meetings of Regime Members Annual Annual 
Work Programme Yes Yes 
Review Conference As agreed by majority Every 5 years 
Reporting Annual Annual 
Secretariat No
254
 Yes 
Compliance monitoring No  Yes 
 
There is no formal body responsible for compliance monitoring within either 
landmine regime. This responsibility rests firmly with individual states parties. In 
both APII and the APMBC, regime members are accountable through annual reports. 
Reporting is thus intended to provide a catalyst for action within the regimes to 
address implementation challenges. Regime members must submit detailed 
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information on progress in meeting mine action related implementation goals. Article 
13 of APII requires reporting on mine clearance, national implementing legislation, 
updates on technical information exchange and other cooperation as well as details of 
landmine production, stockpiling and use. In the case of the APMBC, self-reporting 
by states according to the requirements of Article 7 represents the key APMBC 
monitoring mechanism. Providing information on the location of mined areas in order 
to support humanitarian demining activities forms part of this obligation. 
 
Annual meetings of states parties to the APMBC provide a forum for discussion on 
implementation issues. These are complemented by a programme of intersessional 
meetings attended by states (regime members and non-members), the UN, ICRC, 
ICBL and others. The intersessional work programme was established in 1999 with 
individual „Standing Committees‟ on victim assistance and socio-economic 
reintegration, mine clearance, MRE and mine action technologies, stockpile 
destruction, and the general status and operation of the treaty. Intersessional meetings 
have become a major forum to discuss implementation of treaty obligations. 
However, they were reduced in frequency in 2005 following a decision at the first 
APMBC Review Conference.
255
 Despite an approach that links implementation to the 
various mine action pillars, they have been regarded by many mine action 
practitioners as more significant for awareness-raising among the diplomatic 
community than for bringing tangible benefits to mine action.  
 
Due to pressure generated through APMBC intersessional meetings as well as via the 
ICBL and Landmine Monitor, the level of Article 7 reporting has increased since the 
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treaty entered into force.
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 Statistics show a year on year increase in reporting 
between 2001-2007. However, a more insightful indication of the commitment of 
states parties lies in the statistics for regime members providing annual updates to 
these reports. The compliance rate for 2007 is 59% under this criterion, representing a 
trend of declining responses that has grown each year since 2003. Moreover, of the 59 
states parties not providing annual updates in 2007, fewer than 5 came from the 
developed world.
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 This provides an indication that transparency and accountability 
are weakest in those states most affected by landmines. 
 
The APII framework is notable since reporting on compliance measures is not linked 
to a monitoring mechanism. In contrast, the APMBC provides for FFMs in order to 
investigate allegations of non-compliance. However, the modalities found in the treaty 
for these missions are lifted almost verbatim from the text of the CWC. As discussed 
in Chapter 4, the regime design process did not result in significant changes to an 
initial treaty draft that leant heavily on antecedents such as the CWC. Verification 
provisions do not therefore focus on the specific characteristics of APMs. A lack of 
practitioner input in this aspect of the design phase thus has direct consequences on 
the effectiveness of the regime approach to verification. In particular, the regime fails 
to take into account the reality that while large scale mine use may be easily 
identifiable, not least as a result of the particular nature of the injuries provoked by 
these weapons, landmine stockpiles can be relatively easily hidden. A significant 
challenge to verifying compliance is therefore unaddressed.  
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The regime has not put practical measures in place to give „teeth‟ to its verification 
mechanism. Within the UN system, no standing secretariat has been established nor 
has provision been made for the conduct of such missions. Moreover, the regime does 
not have established procedures in place should an FFM be requested. Despite an 
extensive intersessional work programme, the Article 8 mechanism has thus been 
characterised as „modest‟ from a disarmament perspective.258 Beyond a lack of 
practitioner influence on regime design, the lack of emphasis on verification may be 
explained by an evident reluctance among regime members to „break from the pack‟ 
in political terms. An FFM would be initiated on the basis of an accusation of non-
compliance by one state party against another. However, regime members have 
shown no willingness since entry into force of the regime to apply this mechanism. 
The ICBL maintains that „a mechanism or body is needed to facilitate attempts to 
address compliance concerns short of formally invoking Article 8.‟259 In contrast, 
many states, including core group members, oppose such new mechanisms on the 
basis that regime members should „be prepared to respond to all serious allegations of 
non-compliance within the core provisions of Article 1.‟260  
 
FFMs provide a specific example of a broader tension within the APMBC regime 
between member states seeking to maintain authority over the implementation process 
and the efforts of civil society to proactively enforce compliance. Implementation thus 
presents distinct challenges of political will to those evident in the regime formation 
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phase. Despite evidence of implementation problems highlighted through compliance 
monitoring, the regime‟s verification mechanism has not been engaged. The regime 
has failed to lower the political transaction costs of addressing overtly the sensitive 
issue of defection.  
 
Tensions between states parties and other regime stakeholders are less evident in the 
APII regime which has no effective compliance monitoring provisions. Adopting 
compliance monitoring procedures for APII along the lines of Article 8 of the 
APMBC has been raised as both practically useful and a means to facilitate 
implementation at the national level.
261
 It would potentially build synergies and 
provide for economies of scale between the two regimes. However, while offering 
evident returns in terms of supporting implementation, the political barrier to 
implementing compliance monitoring provisions would be even higher than in the 
APMBC. Within a regime framework governed by consensus, including states parties 
whose rejection of the APMBC demonstrates a high concern for national security 
issues, agreement on measures for more intrusive verification is unrealistic.  
 
2.2 Filling the gaps: informal compliance monitoring 
 
Formal implementation mechanisms including review conferences, annual meetings 
of states parties and intersessional work programmes are intended to permit the flow 
of relevant information and highlight where implementation support should be 
focused or redirected. The provision of accurate and timely information thus forms an 
important nexus between a common requirement for the regimes and a means to 
                                                                                                                                            
260
 „Austrian Intervention during the Standing Committee on the General Status and Operation of the 
while Convention‟, Statement by a representative of the Government of Austria, Geneva, 31 May 2002. 
198 
 
support the five pillars of mine action. On different levels, both regimes seek to 
enhance knowledge and information flows at national and international levels on 
landmines and their effects in order to improve the work of mine action policy makers 
and practitioners. While not envisaged in the design of either regime, informal civil 
society monitoring and verification has become an integral part of the APMBC 
regime implementation process and has also generated important effects on APII 
implementation.  
 
Landmine Monitor describes its role as „an attempt by civil society to hold 
governments accountable to the obligations they have taken on with respect to anti-
personnel mines.‟262 Since 1999, its annual reports have provided the major source of 
information on APMBC compliance issues. It comprises a global reporting network, a 
central database and the annual publication. Beyond national reports, the publication 
includes updates on new signatories, areas of special concern and new developments. 
Analysis is drawn from a wide network of in-country researchers, augmented by 
external experts. By its own admission, the quality of the data in Landmine Monitor 
has been variable with discrepancies from country to country depending on individual 
researchers although there has been a marked improvement over time. 15 donor 
governments, the European Commission and the United Nations
263
 provide funding 
that allows for the research, publication and wide dissemination of the report. This 
support allows for wide penetration of the report‟s findings: the publication is 
distributed at no cost to government officials and policy makers and is fully accessible 
online.  
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This civil society driven initiative fills an evident gap in the treaty framework. 
Information brought together within Landmine Monitor has proved useful in 
permitting mine action donors to identify and support states at risk of involuntary 
defection. It is also significant that governments recognise the need for this 
mechanism and are prepared to support it with resources. This support base has been 
constant despite the fact that entries have been critical of aspects of national 
compliance by the concerned donors. This points to an important advantage of 
informal verification; it is easier to highlight sensitive implementation issues through 
this mechanism than through invoking the formal apparatus of the regime. 
 
Landmine Monitor offers a norms as opposed to sanctions-based approach to 
compliance monitoring. Naming and shaming has led to clarifications within the 
framework of the regime and provided advance warning where regime members 
appear unlikely to meet obligations. Increased levels of transparency through this 
informal mechanism has therefore generated a level of political pressure within the 
regime that has not been realised through formal regime mechanisms. However, there 
is an important conduit between formal and informal implementation support 
processes. The ICBL provides oral and written input to intersessional Standing 
Committee meetings and annual states parties meetings. Consequently, whereas states 
are reluctant to criticise other states, the ICBL draws on the analysis generated by 
Landmine Monitor as an empirical basis for targeted advocacy. The task of focusing 
attention on states parties that risk failing to meet compliance deadlines is thus not a 
sensitive state-to-state transaction.  
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As in the Ottawa strand, both states and multilateral organisations could play an 
important role in facilitating implementation of APII at national level. However, 
informal implementation support mechanisms have not been replicated in the APII 
regime in order to supplement formal regime mechanisms. More broadly, civil society 
has not been permitted space to contribute to regime implementation so gaps in 
regime design, such as the absence of verification measures, are not directly addressed 
by informal means. However, although barred from direct participation in the regime 
by CCW rules of procedure, the ICBL also participates in the work of the APII group 
of governmental experts. It is important to recognise that Landmine Monitor does 
exert an influence on APII regime implementation. Through highlighting APII 
compliance issues to a wider international audience, this has resulted in a positive 
knock-on effect by encouraging greater transparency within the framework of the 
regime. There is also significant scope for civil society to promote universalisation, 
offering an important complement to the APMBC given resistance to the regime in 
some regions. These entry points for civil society engagement in the closed APII 
implementation process demonstrate that – as in regime formation – formal rules are 
not effective in preventing civil society from playing a proactive role in 
implementation.  
 
2.3 Key regime actors 
 
This sub-section addresses important research questions that seek to understand the  
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roles of different actors in landmine regime implementation. The roles of mine action 
practitioners and mine affected states are considered in order to critically assess both 
the knowledge base of implementers and the ownership of the process by those most 
directly affected by landmines. Building on our analysis in the previous chapter, how 
different actors interact in the implementation phase is analysed in order to further 
elaborate the hypothesis that stakeholder clustering is a key element in refining our 
understanding of landmine regime effectiveness. 
 
2.3.1 Expertise, ownership and regime implementation 
 
From a mine action perspective, APMBC regime design was strongly influenced by 
the critical input of mine action practitioners and experience drawn from various mine 
affected states. On the other hand, the APII regime relied on design input from arms 
control and disarmament experts but includes in its membership many significant 
landmine users and producers. It is important to acknowledge these very different 
influences in considering how, explicitly and implicitly, the regimes engage with and 
address mine action concerns in their implementation. If broad participation was 
influential during regime formation in providing legitimacy and expertise to the 
process, substantive commitment becomes even more essential in the implementation 
phase. In supporting mine action, the most important implementation actors are 
stakeholders from mine affected countries. While largely ignored in the context of 
APII, these actors are made directly responsible for APMBC regime implementation. 
 
The APMBC has proved flexible in incorporating new mechanisms to support regime 
implementation. Creating a secretariat was not initially foreseen based on the 
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argument that resources „should be committed to the field where they were most 
needed.‟264 However, the logic behind such a capacity became evident as requests 
from regime members for support became increasingly frequent. At the meeting of 
states parties held in Managua in 2001 an offer from the GICHD to host a secretariat – 
the ISU – to facilitate the implementation process was accepted. The ISU became 
operational in June 2002, works directly with the co-Chairs and co-Rapporteurs of the 
intersessional committees, facilitates meetings of states parties, contributes to 
strategic thinking and along with the „Sponsorship Group‟ of interested states parties 
seeks full participation of mine affected states. 
 
Through housing the ISU, the GICHD has assumed the de facto secretariat function 
for the APMBC. Given that the majority of GICHD staff are technical experts 
involved in mine action research and operational activities, co-location offers 
potentially important synergies through regime learning. This represents an important 
evolution from an organisation supporting mine action through studies, evaluation 
work and operational assistance to becoming an integral part of the regime. At the 3
rd
 
CCW Review Conference in November 2006, the GICHD was given responsibility 
for a new CCW sponsorship programme, paralleling its role under the APMBC. 
While many actors within each regime have shown resistance to cooperation, this 
combining of secretariat roles represents a structural first step towards developing 
greater synergies and cost benefits. 
 
The ICBL benefits from NGO status while being fully integrated within the APMBC 
regime. It has a unique place in the (semi-autobiographical) APMBC genesis story. 
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However, the transition from regime formation to implementation has placed new 
challenges on the organisation, requiring a partial transition away from its advocacy 
roots. Advocacy remains a priority, both in supporting universalisation and in its 
opposition to the APII regime. But a central challenge, epitomised by its 
responsibility for Landmine Monitor, has been the shift from activism to a research 
orientation. This difficult transition is exemplified by Landmine Monitor since „the 
political activism that drove the campaign from its early beginnings is not necessarily 
compatible with the research and documentation demanded by a monitoring effort.‟265 
The composition of the Landmine Monitor network is significant. By giving a voice 
to local actors, analysis is grounded in domestic circumstances. However the lack of 
research experience in the ICBL leadership as well as its national organisations is 
evident. This ongoing tension is reflected in the quality of some of the contributions. 
Although based on the existing activist network, there has therefore been a conscious 
shift to developing a network of in-country researchers. 
 
The partial shift of the ICBL from entreprenneurial leadership to seeking to play an 
intellectual leadership role is significant. It demonstrates a tension in the 
implementation process. As elaborated below, practitioner expertise is not effectively 
captured within the regime. Important consequeces can be identified for regime 
effectivenessgiven the highly influential role of the ICBL in APMBC regime 
implementation. First, implementation challenges related to mine action are not 
addressed. Relatedly, there is an evident tendency to „revert to type‟ and engage in 
advocacy targeting non-members rather than focusing on regime challenges beyond 
universalisation. 
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2.3.2 Stakeholder clustering in regime implementation 
 
Chapter 4 demonstrates the significance of stakeholder clustering to the two processes 
of landmine regime formation, emphasising the range of influential sub-state and 
international actors that play a decisive role in shaping their effectiveness. How these 
actors are linked within and across regimes raises important questions if, as argued by 
Harald Muller, the behaviour of actors is more likely to be influenced where regimes 
and their participants are „networked.‟266 This concept is particularly relevant in the 
context of mine action where decisions taken at an international level seek to achieve 
an impact on the level of communities and individuals. It also recognises that 
alongside states a wide range of international as well as sub-state actors play a major 
part in implementing the regimes‟ provisions. This is significant because the 
involvement (or non-involvement) of different actors can provoke consequences 
beyond the objectives they were set up to achieve. This may result from altering 
actors‟ perceptions of each other or deepening understanding of a particular issue with 
consequences that reach into broader policy areas. In particular, the concept of regime 
networking seems appropriate to the Ottawa Process given that it is identified with 
globalising trends through its linkage of an international campaign bringing 
governments, advocates and mine action experts closer together with the ability to 
give a voice to local mine action campaigners around the world. 
 
The co-chairing and co-rappporteuring approach to the APMBC intersessional 
meetings provides a mechanism to cluster actors by seeking to ensure that both donors 
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and affected states are engaged in implementation. A sponsorship programme made 
possible by voluntary contributions has enabled representatives of states parties 
needing financial assistance to attend and participate in various APMBC meetings.
267
 
However, there is an important distinction that is not acknowledged within the regime 
between giving a voice to different groups and offering them a genuine role in 
decision making. As Beier points out „the Achilles heel of the more optimistic 
renderings of global civil society lies in the apparent assumption that the formal right 
to speak is one with the practical ability to raise a voice.‟268 It is equally important to 
consider how implementation clusters offer opportunities for heightened cooperation, 
coordination, the development of synergies and for critical reflection on effectiveness. 
In this respect, Brinkert acknowledges a potentially counter-productive divergence 
between states parties focus on realising the underpinning humanitarian goals of the 
regime and the ICBL‟s priorities on compliance, the conduct of non-signatories, and 
applicability of the treaty to other weapons.
269
 
 
The distinction between representation and influence is highlighted in the APII 
regime. Echoing the APMBC approach, the 2005 meeting of CCW states parties 
decided on the principle of „equitable geographical rotation‟ among regional groups 
when selecting the Presidency for future review conferences.
270
 Although an 
important principle, limited developing world participation in the regime means that 
this is more symbolic than representative of a genuinely participative approach. 
Indeed, at the 3
rd
 CCW Review Conference between 7-17 November 2006, the 
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President was French and of the ten Vice-Presidents, none came from severely mine 
affected countries.
271
 This weakness was at least recognised in the final conference 
report, which emphasised the need to seek broader participation from mine-affected 
states.  
 
In a nod to the Ottawa Process, it was agreed to develop a sponsorship programme to 
allow representatives from developing countries to attend CCW meetings. However, 
there is only a tenuous relationship between regime provisions and work to reduce the 
threat to civilians posed by these weapons in mine affected countries. The practical 
benefits of such a programme are therefore questionable in relation to the restrictions-
based approach of the regime. An important conclusion is that the effectiveness of 
emulation effects in implementation is strongly conditioned by design factors. Despite 
the seeming importance of demonstrating broad ownership of the implementation 
process, mine affected states are not a key target group for APII regime 
implementation regardless of efforts to increase their presence in this cluster. It is also 
significant that specialist mine action organisations have been denied full admission 
to successive meetings of APII states parties, representing a loss of potential 
expertise. In the case of the 2001 Review Conference, while specialist NGOs 
provided expertise in informal discussions and at three committee meetings, they were 
excluded from the negotiations and on the objection of one state party were even 
excluded from meetings of the preparatory committee for the conference.
272
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In order to develop a more nuanced understanding of the landmine regime 
implementation cluster, it is important to consider Price‟s distinction between the 
transnational coalition coalescing around the issue of a landmine ban from an 
epistemic community: 
 
Because the organizers are not experts to whom governments turn for knowledge in times of 
uncertainty but rather are better seen as moral entrepreneurs….their influence derives less from the 
independent effects of authoritative claims of scientific knowledge than from their ability to 
successfully engage the policy process and engage in moral proselytising through persuasion.
273
 
 
The distinction between experts and entrepreneurs is significant because achieving the 
humanitarian goals of the APMBC requires that the moral entrepreneurship which 
drove regime formation be combined with lessons drawn from a community of 
practice grounded in mine action experience. There is a nascent networking of 
expertise in humanitarian demining that, if harnessed, would constitute a genuine 
epistemic community. One example is the IMAS Review Board established to oversee 
the review process for the international mine action standards (IMAS). Chaired by 
UNMAS, its membership includes technical representatives of donors, commercial 
demining companies, national representatives of mine-affected states, national and 
international NGOs and individual specialists.
274
 The UN has played a significant role 
in bringing together mine action stakeholders into a „network of networks‟ through its 
Electronic Mine Information Network (E-MINE) that attempts to link relevant UN 
bodies, academic institutions, commercial companies, international NGOs and 
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international organisations.
275
 Online discussion networks more specific to technical 
aspects of mine action have developed where mine action professionals share 
knowledge and deal with problems faced in their day-to-day work.
276
 
 
However, an epistemic community only exists if its knowledge is operationalised. 
UNMAS has attempted to enhance the relationship between its mine action work and 
APMBC implementation through creating the post of treaty implementation officer in 
2001. This position has increased transparency and information-sharing on UN mine 
action programmes, resulting in a clearer picture of national APMBC implementation 
measures and their impact. UNMAS has also been involved in advocacy efforts on 
behalf of the regime in Asia and the Middle East and prepared a template to support 
national planning processes. The role of UNMAS is as a convening mechanism for 
other mine action stakeholders. While there is value in outreach activities to various 
constituencies that result in increased transparency, there is no mechanism for 
expertise from the mine action practitioner community to feed directly into the regime 
implementation process. lacuna has not been identified in the extant regime literature. 
 
This section presents a number of important findings for landmine regime 
implementation. In particular, while acknowledging mechanisms and actors 
highlighted in the existing literature involved in implementation within and across the 
two regimes, the lack of both tools and capacity to address implementation challenges 
are identified as an important deficiency. The absence of formal verification 
mechanisms inhibits regime learning. The inability to include such provisions tailored 
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to mine action requirements represents a weakness in the design phase that is 
compounded by the absence of practitioner experience within the implementation 
cluster. Our analysis of leadership roles within the APMBC regime also identifies the 
challenge that significant responsibility rests with one entity – the ICBL – whose 
characteristic as an entreprenneurial leader poses particular dilemmas in the 
implementation phase. I demonstrate that issues of leadership in regime 
implementation are highly relevant in conjunction with the absence of formal 
verification mechanisms. Year on year decreases in levels of annual reporting 
suggests that the political will instrumental to the regime formation phase is now 
declining without any response from the regime. The absence of FFMs despite 
evidence of non-compliance from civil society monitoring further reinforces the 
finding that political will a qualitatively different challenge in implementation. 
 
3. Analysing landmine regime effectiveness 
 
This section addresses the effectiveness of the two landmine regimes in relation to 
mine action. It applies a framework for regime effectiveness that incorporates 
resource, political will and humanitarian dimensions. It builds on new insights into 
landmine regime implementation developed in section 3 by focusing on 
implementation challenges are from the perspective of voluntary and involuntary 
defection. More nuanced insights are developed through differentiating levels of 
compliance from the effectiveness of the regimes in addressing the challenges they 
are intended to meet. This section thus contributes to answering primary research 
qustions on whether compliance with regime rules actually produces the desired result 
of reducing the suffering to individuals and communities caused by these weapons.  
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3.1 Voluntary and involuntary defection  
 
Even where regime rules are unambiguous, implementation challenges may be 
particularly acute for states that lack the human, material or technological resources to 
fulfil regime obligations. Regimes must therefore address the risk of what Richard 
Puttnam terms „involuntary defection‟277 where commitments are not met despite the 
requisite political will and clarity over obligations. If regimes are unresponsive to the 
risk of involuntary defection then effectiveness will be undermined through failing to 
recognise the limitations of its members to meet their obligations or to channel 
assistance from other actors. States joining regimes for political reasons may also 
voluntarily defect from obligations when they are unwilling to implement regime 
commitments in practice. Certainly, Chapter 4 highlights a norm cascade in the 
regime formation phase that, if providing a strong push factor in favour of APMBC 
membership, also had the consequence of underplaying the costs of regime 
obligations. This risk would seem to be particularly elevated in the case of mine 
action which combines high costs and the use of advanced technologies with the 
location of the work in predominantly developing states. How regime members are 
assisted by other stakeholders in a position to do so, as required under both treaty 
regimes, is thus particularly important since mine affected states are particularly 
vulnerable to involuntary defection. 
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By failing to integrate obligations into domestic law, regimes lose the strength given 
by what Muller terms „legal and constitutional reflexivity.‟278 Consequently, if 
obligations are not translated to national level laws and government policies then 
prospects for successful implementation are low. A study on the development of 
national mine action legislation
279
 by the GICHD which examined 17 mine affected 
states highlights a number of significant potential benefits from the development of 
such legislation. These include improved coordination within government and with 
international actors, better accreditation procedures as well as increased transparency 
and accountability. Significant benefits demonstrated in the case of Afghanistan have 
included reinforced coordination between mine action and other development sectors; 
greater control over mine action actors; improved accreditation and safety, improved 
transparency and coordination; and, better accountability to donors. Conversely, 
failure to embed regime commitments in domestic laws and structures erodes donor 
confidence, undermines mine action programmes and has negative consequences at 
the national level through public scrutiny.  
 
Colombia is the only APMBC state party to date that has consolidated a single 
instrument for national mine action legislation, incorporating all aspects of APMBC 
implementation. South Africa represents an important example of a state party 
voluntarily exceeding its obligations by providing in its national implementing 
legislation for the appointment of domestic inspectors to conduct verification 
activities and facilitate international FFMs.
280
 More broadly, only 49 of 152 states 
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parties passed new domestic laws to implement the provisions of the APMBC.
 281
 
This implies a willingness by certain states to join without addressing the practical 
consequences of regime membership at the national level. The GICHD study found 
that the main reason for states developing such legislation was to fulfil the terms of 
APMBC membership and that in some cases these measures were directly linked to 
implementation requirements under the treaty.
282
 There is thus an implicit regime 
conditionality that exerts an influence on some members in this area. However, the 
link has not been made between the mine action work that highlights the importance 
of legislation to mine action effectiveness and the potential for the regime to support 
this goal. Given the number of states parties that have not integrated obligations into 
domestic law, this suggests that supporting domestic implementation frameworks 
should be an acknowledged priority for the APMBC regime.
283
  
 
The APMBC obliges mine affected regime members to „make every effort‟ (Article 5) 
to identify and clear mined areas. The regime is therefore consistent with the IMAS in 
placing responsibility on states for clearing mines within their own territory.
284
 
However, states emerging from conflict commonly lack the capacity to manage their 
mine action activities, or there may be a political vacuum in a country or region. The 
risk of involuntary defection is therefore particularly elevated. The provision under 
Article 6 for states „in a position to do so‟ to provide resources for mine clearance is 
thus crucial. Given the absence of capacity in many developing states affected by 
landmines, the assistance of donors is a constant feature of mine action. This support 
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by the mine action community includes providing appropriate assistance to mine 
affected states, sustaining the commitment of donors, building capacity among local 
actors and better linking mine action to related security and development issues. The 
Article 6 commitment is particularly significant due to the clustering effect of the 
APMBC regime. The regime brings together both donors and mine affected states 
offering opportunities to pool resources and target support in a „joined up‟ manner.   
 
In many mine affected states, responsibility for mine action planning and operations is 
devolved to the UN. Local capacity building is recognised by the mine action 
community as a central goal in order to hand responsibility for mine action back as 
soon as possible to the legitimate national authorities. Capacity building in mine 
action is understood as set out in the extant UN policy as:  
 
A state‟s ability and willingness to develop and articulate mine action policy and direction. It is also 
about a state‟s ability to plan, coordinate, manage and sustain a mine action programme that is 
accountable, cost-effective and able to address the humanitarian and socio-economic implications of 
landmine contamination, and to provide appropriate legislation.
285 
 
There is a potential contradiction between the support of third countries and the 
principle of national ownership enshrined within the regimes. While mine action 
capacity building can provide a model for re-establishing good governance the inverse 
is also true. The influx of foreign investment can cause tensions and attract the corrupt 
and self-interested. Mine action programming, as with other externally supported 
peacebuilding efforts, thus suffers from the „Samaritan‟s Dilemma.‟ As Maslen notes, 
„the generosity of donors can make it less likely that the recipients exert the necessary 
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efforts to help themselves.‟286 This concern reflects the need for a critical assessment 
of the actual rather than intended capacity building effects of externally sponsored and 
implemented mine action activities and the role of the two regimes in these efforts. 
Significant gaps remain in the area of national capacity to govern mine action. In 
particular, there is a tension between the responsibility placed by the APMBC on 
states parties and the reality that mine affected states may not be capable of assuming 
responsibility for setting policy, overseeing and managing mine action at the national 
level.  
 
There is an emerging recognition that capacity building of mine action actors at the 
local level can only be optimised within the framework of an effective national mine 
action strategy.
287
 However, Per Nergaard, Head of the Mine Action Unit at NPA, 
highlights the absence of national plans that support the implementation of the core 
Article 5 obligation of mine-affected states to clear mined areas within ten years as 
something that „needs the immediate attention of all States Parties to the Convention 
to fundamentally correct these things now.‟288 UNMAS coordinated an initiative to 
assist mine affected countries implement Article 5 requirements through supporting 
priority setting at the national level, developing a template for mine action planning in 
the period 2005-2009, and reporting on progress at statutory regime meetings. As a 
substantive contribution to the Nairobi Summit, UNMAS also coordinated an 
initiative to assist mine affected countries in developing national plans related to APM 
destruction. This initiative focused on priority setting and budget requirements in 
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more than 20 countries between national stakeholders and relevant UN field staff.
289
 
Progress in these areas is reported regularly at intersessional meetings and has been 
useful in demonstrating different mine action challenges in specific contexts.  
 
While there is thus much more to be done in building national capacity to support 
mine action, in practice, the APMBC regime has done little to encourage external 
actors to embed capacity building in their demining assistance. One challenge to 
capacity building has been a preference by donors for home-grown organisations and 
in-kind contributions – such as staff and equipment – when these have not been the 
most appropriate solutions to a given national or local mine action context. This gap is 
tacitly recognised in the 2005 Zagreb Progress Report on achieving the aims of the 
Nairobi Action Plan which, rather than identifying the achievements of the regime in 
this area, states that „the United Nations has assisted a number of States Parties in 
establishing national plans and in making these plans publicly available on its E-
MINE website.‟290 The regime provides a platform to showcase UN efforts in this 
area. Beyond this, the APMBC does not make a substantive contribution to mine 
action capacity building.  
 
There is clearly a fine line between involuntary defection from regime obligations and 
wilful failure to implement national commitments. This picture is further complicated 
by the political imperatives that may drive states to deny that they have failed to meet 
international obligations. Real or alleged treaty violations among APMBC members 
have been relatively few in number. Angola admitted continuing to use APMs while a 
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signatory although not yet a full state party.
291
 In the case of APII, Russia in 
Chechnya and Pakistan in its border dispute with India have used landmines without 
marking, fencing or monitoring them in accordance with the protocol.
292
 The US has 
also incorporated Soviet-era minefields into its perimeter defences in Afghanistan. As 
in the case of India and Pakistan‟s use of APMs in border areas, there has been no 
information provided in their annual reports on measures taken to mark and monitor 
these minefields or protect civilians. Moreover, the state owned Pakistani Ordnance 
Factories (POF) allegedly offered APMs for sale to an undercover British television 
journalist via an attaché to their embassy in London. The offer, followed up with a 
faxed quotation from POF, thus contravenes Pakistani and British domestic legislation 
as well as the APII prohibition on transfers.
293
 
 
Dislocation between regime implementation process and mine action challenges 
represents an important weakness in the way the regime approaches implementation. 
This reinforces our hypothesis that linking the IHL discourse of the regime with mine 
action knowledge and expertise is critical to regime effectiveness. This linkage is 
currently unacknowledged in the landmines literature. The difference between 
emphasis on national ownership as the hallmark of the Ottawa Process and a lack of 
focus within the APMBC on national capacity building to help operationalise 
commitments is particularly stark. Our analysis shows that  voluntary defection by 
states parties from the obligation not to use landmines (or to do so only under certain 
conditions) is rare. However, this places additional emphasis on the need to address 
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mine action challenges. Regime effectiveness in these areas is considered in the rest 
of this section. 
 
3.2 Resources 
 
An area where the raised profile of the landmine issue is recognised as making a 
demonstrable impact is on resource mobilisation. Between 1997-2005, annual donor 
funding for mine action rose from $139 million to $376 million. In a conspicuous 
example, following adherence to the APMBC, the UK‟s Department for International 
Development (DfID) committed to double its funding for humanitarian demining 
from £5-10 million per year in the period 1998-2001.
294
 By 2005 this figure reached 
£11.8 million per annum. The link between increased funding and the APMBC is 
made clear by an explicit conditionality, intended to promote universalisation, stating 
that „DfID will not provide direct support for governments‟ mine action programmes 
in countries that ignore the growing international condemnation of APLs, and 
continue to use these weapons.‟295  
 
Additional resources for mine action in other than monetary terms is significant if less 
visible as a regime effect. Although the project is not directly linked to the APMBC, 
Switzerland‟s willingness to commit several million francs to the development and 
implementation of the Information System for Mine Action (IMSMA) by the GICHD, 
currently operational in over 30 mine action programmes,
296
 reflects a policy decision 
to support mine action as a priority over other humanitarian activities. Indeed, the 
creation of the GICHD itself represents a major new commitment to mine action. The 
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timing of these related initiatives, launched respectively in 1998 and 1999, links the 
decisions to the raised profile of the issue as a result of the Ottawa Process.  
 
Support for mine action from multilateral development donors can also be tied to the 
Ottawa Process. In August 1997 the World Bank agreed for the first time to fund mine 
action, emphasising that the centrepiece of its support was for humanitarian demining. 
Although the Bank stresses that it has no role in treaties and conventions that relate to 
member states, there is an implicit membership conditionality in its support for 
humanitarian demining:  
 
The Bank stands ready to support implementation of obligations imposed under the 
treaty by any member state that requests it…..Although the Bank does not refer 
specifically to the Ottawa Convention in its guidelines, it stresses that any legal 
agreement for a project involving landmine clearance must include a covenant under 
which the government undertakes not to lay new mines anywhere in the country that 
would undermine the execution or development objectives of the project.
297
  
 
There is a subtle difference between DfID‟s allusion to the need to respect 
international condemnation of APMs and the Bank‟s emphasis on a national 
covenant against landmine use that reflects the distinction between treaty obligations 
and their domestic implementation. However, World Bank mine action funding 
requirements shares with DfID an important regime-driven conditionality linking 
support to either regime membership or the fulfillment of regime goals.  
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In November 1997, the European Commission earmarked Euro 15 million for 
research into new technologies to identify and destroy APMs.
298
 As with the World 
Bank, DfID and Switzerland, the timing of this announcement, at the culmination of 
the APMBC regime formation phase, further illustrates the strong pressures within the 
international community to show solidarity with the APMBC and its goals at the time 
of the regime‟s creation. Since entry into force of the APMBC, the European 
Commission and EU Member States have collectively contributed nearly EURO 700 
million to mine action with further support for 2005-2007 estimated at EURO 140 
million.
299
 These resources and the regime based conditionalities that condition their 
dispersement demonstrate an important regime effect in influencing the priorities of 
bilateral and multilateral mine action supporters. 
 
Resource allocation for mine action in the implementation period also demonstrates 
that the APMBC regime has generated significant interaction effects. Without being a 
target of regime advocacy efforts, the profile of the issue has encouraged new actors 
beyond the traditional development donor community to contribute to mine action. 
Support by the European Football Association (UEFA) for ICRC mine action work
300
 
and manufacturing company Daewoo‟s donation to the Slovenian-based International 
Trust Fund for Mine Action
301
 show the pull of the anti-APM norm reaching sporting 
and commercial sectors with no previous engagement in mine action. The regime 
effect of a norm cascade evident in the regime formation phase with states feeling 
obliged to be on the „right side‟ of the issue is thus apparent in the area of resource 
generation during implementation. Building on the profile of the issue during regime 
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formation, the reach of the anti-APM norm extends beyond states to the private sector 
in the regime implementation phase. These unconventional new mine action donors 
offer a convincing response to counterfactual questions on resource generation. Given 
their complete lack of engagement with this issue area prior to the high profile Ottawa 
Process, this new funding can only be attributed to an APMBC regime effect. 
 
It is important to acknowledge that increased mine action funding since the beginning 
of the Ottawa Process has not been drawn solely from members and supporters of the 
APMBC. Nine states that have not joined the regime contributed over $425 million 
from 1997-2002 to support mine action in third countries.
302
 In particular, the issue of 
resources provides an important correction to criticism of the US for failing to join the 
APMBC. While not an APMBC member, the US has not only pursued the regime‟s 
disarmament objectives (the US has not using APMs in combat since Kuwait in 1991) 
but also its mine action objectives as the biggest single donor in this field.
 303
 Between 
1993-2005, the US has contributed over $1 billion in mine action funding.
304
 
Although US funding has spiked since 2003 due to support for mine action in Iraq and 
Afghanistan, the US has been involved since the early days of mine action in the late 
1980s. Significantly, from 1995-97, US mine action funding remained constant while 
sharp rises were seen in 1998, 1999 and 2000, coinciding with the entry into force and 
initial APMBC implementation phase. The timing of these funding increases points to 
an important regime effect beyond the membership of the APMBC regime. The 
visible success of a regime with strong and highly visible humanitarian credentials has 
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provoked an emulation effect, inducing the US to demonstrate the necessary level of 
political commitment to the issue. Contributing increased resources to mine action 
provides an indirect means to address criticism generated as a result of declining to 
join the regime. 
 
Support for the APMBC demonstrates that APII remains the poor relation in terms of 
profile, marketing and outreach. While actors involved in the Ottawa Process make 
conspicuous efforts to promote the APMBC brand and its universalisation, little 
comparable effort can be discerned within the CCW framework. In contrast, increased 
support for mine action among bilateral actors can be directly attributed to the Ottawa 
Process. The generation of additional resources for mine action thus provides one 
measure of the effectiveness of the APMBC regime. The regime has influenced multi- 
as well as bilateral donors to invest heavily in a humanitarian issue area that otherwise 
would not have attracted such elevated levels of funding. That this additional support 
has come from non-traditional mine action donors and even states that explicitly reject 
the APM ban as a national policy decision demonstrates the underlying normative 
strength of the regime and the emulation effects created by this process. Increased or 
sustained funding levels – well after political interest in the APMBC has peaked – 
therefore provide a positive indicator for regime effectiveness.  
 
3.3 Political will 
 
Political will has been demonstrated to be a critical criterion for effective regimes in 
different issue areas, particularly in „hard cases‟ – such as the landmines issue – 
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where security concerns may form a significant part of the calculus.
305
 Achievability 
of regime goals and the related danger of defection is thus an important 
consideration.
306
 In the regime formation phase, targeted advocacy by states, the 
ICBL and the ICRC raised the profile of the landmine issue and facilitated the 
development of national interest groups in different regions. Political will to 
encourage regime membership was therefore generated at both international and 
national levels. In implementation, with compliance monitoring a devolved rather 
than formal regime commitment, a common division of labour has evolved at the 
national level with civil society fulfilling an oversight function and the state providing 
operational support to mine action both within national programmes and through 
assistance to other states in a broader regional or international framework. On one 
level this provides the regime with different sources supporting implementation at 
state and sub-state levels. However, at national level it raises important questions 
related to the effectiveness of informal oversight as a means to generate sufficient 
political will to ensure regime compliance. 
 
In mine affected states, political will is a pre requisite to deliver on costly compliance 
obligations. Related to this point, international support for mine action presents a risk 
that funds are diverted from their intended purpose. Corruption therefore represents 
significant mine action challenge that finds a clear nexus with regime effectiveness. 
Diversion of funds, self-interested selection of clearance tasks and „land-grabbing‟ 
have long been associated with certain demining programmes and therefore represent 
a test of regime members‟ political will to implement mine action related regime 
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obligations. But the issue is rarely taken up by civil management and oversight bodies 
or civil society at national and local levels. Corruption may affect donor support as 
was the case in Cambodia in 1999 where allegations of financial impropriety, 
corruption and mismanagement led to the withholding of significant donor 
contributions.
307
The APMBC addresses both these concerns by imposing a 
conditionality on national actors by linking mine action assistance to moves towards 
regime membership. However, this major challenge to mine action effectiveness has 
not been taken up as an implementation issue within the framework of the APMBC. 
As demonstrated in Chapter 4, Cambodia played an important role in the genesis of 
the regime and retains an influential role in the intersessional work programme. These 
factors mitigate against the regime addressing a politically sensitive issue that 
qualifies the success of the implementation process. 
 
Knowledge of the specific nature and location of the landmine threat can be 
particularly challenging to obtain in intra-state conflicts conducted by one or more 
armed non-state armed actors (ANSAs). Such groups, characterised by 
decentralisation, poverty and unwillingness to compromise, often control mined 
territory and are responsible for the manufacture, trade, selling and use of landmines. 
Irregular nuisance mining is common and does not conform to the notion of a 
„minefield‟ with locations often unrecorded. The 2008 Landmine Monitor records 
ANSAs in at least 9 countries using APMs compared to 8 in 2007, 10 in 2006 and 13 
in 2005. ANSAs represent a major category of mine users today
308
 and represent an 
evident priority for engagement by the landmine regimes in order to achieve their 
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humanitarian goals. Indeed, the extension of APII to non state armed conflicts was a 
significant, if belated recognition of the realities of contemporary landmine warfare.  
 
However, the regimes have not focused on ANSAs. On a practical level, engagement 
poses a qualitatively different challenge to state actors. In political terms, states are 
often reluctant to engagement with ANSAs on their territory for fear of lending 
legitimacy to their cause. NGOs can therefore play an important role in engaging with 
ANSAs when states are unwilling or unable. Such a role is essential since the 
APMBC has no formal mechanism to engage with these actors. The NGO Geneva 
Call was established in 2000 with the specific mandate of engaging armed groups in a 
ban on APMs and in the respect for humanitarian norms. It does so through 
encouraging groups to adhere to Deeds of Commitment that mirror the requirements 
the APMBC places on states.
309
 Geneva Call‟s own research found around 60 ANSAs 
using landmines with the majority in Asia (31) and Africa (15).
310
 Although 60 % of 
landmine use by ANSAs occurs in the territory of non-APMBC states parties, this 
issue is relevant for regime members as in Colombia where both the FARC
311
 and 
ELN
312
 are frequent mine users.  
 
The functional role assumed by Geneva Call could not be carried out without the 
normative pull of the regime and its influence on states. Although Geneva Call‟s 
procedure of binding groups to a Deed of Commitment is outside the regime proper, 
there would be no foundation for such action without the stigmatisation that the 
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APMBC has fostered. There is also a relationship between state and non-state actors 
which becomes apparent through a deeper analysis of Geneva Call‟s work. This is 
shown on the one hand when the Sudan Peoples Liberation Army/Movement 
(SPLA/M) signed a Deed of Commitment in October 2001, an act which preceded 
and perhaps precipitated ratification of the convention by the Sudanese 
Government.
313
 On the other, such direct interaction has led to criticism from some 
states parties – predictably governments in conflict with such groups – that permission 
should be sought before engaging with them. Although the organisation has resisted 
such pressures, recognising the threat to its neutrality and therefore its effectiveness, 
this tension has emerged in APMBC meetings with criticism of Geneva Call‟s 
activities by members such as Turkey due to their work with the Kurdistan Workers 
Party (PKK). The existence of the APMBC regime creates spillover effects utilised by 
Geneva Call through association with the anti-APM norm.  
 
The first APMBC review conference held in Nairobi in December 2004 prompted the 
signatures of Estonia and Papua New Guinea as well as the full adherence of Latvia, 
Poland, Sri Lanka and Ethiopia to the regime. This was the biggest international 
gathering on the landmine issue since the APMBC was opened for signature in 
December 1997. Increases in regime membership as a result of this meeting provide 
important evidence that through its implementation mechanisms the regime continues 
to enhance political will through encouraging states to be on the „right side‟ of the 
issue. Moreover, Egypt announced a moratorium on production at the Nairobi Review 
Conference while China endorsed the purpose and objectives of the APMBC and 
expressed a desire to expand cooperation in this area. Similarly, non-states parties 
                                                                                                                                            
312
 National Liberation Army. 
226 
 
Belarus, Cameroon, Gambia, Lithuania and Ukraine all submitted voluntary Article 7 
reports, highlighting important political level spillover effects in the behaviour of 
states outside of the regime.  
 
Egypt, Finland, Iraq, Israel and Poland have all ceased production of APMs. A de 
facto global ban on licit trade in APMs has also been realised.  In these cases, political 
will is qualified by a desire to be seen to comply with the letter of the APMBC 
without signing up to all regime obligations. The case of POF in the UK discussed 
above is significant not just as a case of voluntary defection. Exposure of the issue 
resulted in rapid denials from the Pakistani government and the immediate recall of 
concerned embassy staff to Islamabad. This demonstrates that the breach was 
recognised as a serious international incident by the Pakistani government. This 
shows an important quality of normative interplay between regime members and non-
members with behaviour influenced despite the boundaries traced by the respective 
treaties and their supporters. It is particularly significant that following entry into 
force of the regime, the profile of the APMBC has raised the potential cost of 
discovery significantly in political terms. The ICBL in particular gauges regime 
effectiveness in quantitative terms with each new member representing a step towards 
the ultimate goal of universalisation. Yet the existing literature does not acknowledge 
this important qualitative contribution to regime effectiveness exerted by states‟ 
political compunction to fulfill key regime obligations without formally joining the 
regime. 
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The work of Geneva Call provides a positive example of regime effects and flexible 
approaches to implementation. However, it also provides important new insights to 
the APMBC‟s limitations. The key stipulations of the treaty have been adapted and 
applied to ANSAs. Yet Geneva Call‟s capacity is limited. As the single largest 
category of landmine users, ANSAs and their use of landmines represent an obvious 
focus of the regime from a mine action perspective. However, the reluctance of some 
states to address ANSAs on their own territory and of others to „rock the boat‟ by 
highlighting a sensitive issue has led to a contradiction between political and 
humanitarian imperatives. The inability of the regime to address the issue of 
corruption provides another important example of this phenomenon. As demonstrated 
by the case of POF, the regime exerts effects that raise the political stakes of not 
falling in line with the anti-APM norm. However, this is qualitatively different from 
an ability to enforce compliance with mine action-related regime commitments.  
 
This contradiction also provides an additional insight to the consequences for regime 
effectiveness of the composition of the implementation cluster. Despite the innovative 
collaborations that have characterised the regime formation process, the APMBC 
remains a state-based regime. Where national security interests emerge, political will 
is lost. The regime displays the paradox of having been created through the strong 
commitment of NSAs yet demonstrates resistance in its implementation to supporting 
these actors in fulfilling key regime goals with an evident humanitarian impact. The 
lack of engagement of ANSAs directly through the APMBC represents a missed 
opportunity to further encourage reciprocal arrangements whereby states‟ adherence 
to treaty provisions is mirrored by relevant non-state actors. 
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3.4 Humanitarian impact 
 
A humanitarian imperative provided the motor to the Ottawa Process, led to the rapid 
formation of the APMBC regime and reinforced the need to enhance the CCW regime 
demonstrating continued vigour in the implementation phase. As demonstrated in 
Chapter 4, the normative dimension, in particular the de facto stigmatisation of 
APMs, has been a powerful factor in generating the requisite political will for states to 
join the APMBC. Kjellman argues that the Landmine Monitor has served as a 
normative watchdog, keeping the goals and progress of the treaty in the spotlight.
314
 
However, while Kjellman is right that Landmine Monitor highlights a number of 
important regime implementation issues, this does not address issues that may be 
critical from a mine action perspective that are not taken up within the regime. A key 
nexus between the regimes and mine action is thus their effectiveness in addressing 
this central humanitarian objective. This section therefore assesses regime 
effectiveness in two dimensions: the humanitarian impact of the regimes; and, „force 
multiplier‟ effects of the regimes in linking mine action to related issues. 
 
There is evidence to suggest that this normative capital has been effectively 
operationalised in the implementation phase. In this regard, the contribution of the 
anti-APM norm to regime compliance can be measured by the absence of evidence or 
serious allegations of APM use by regime members in Landmine Monitor, despite the 
fact that many states were users in the recent past. The 2005 Landmine Monitor 
identifies landmine casualties in 58 countries during the period covered by the report, 
8 less than during the previous reporting period. However, it also estimates that there 
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were between 15-20,000 new landmine/UXO casualties in the same period.  Although 
the effectiveness of mine action is increasingly judged by such criteria, it does not 
follow that the regime – as demonstrated by the supply side focus of the ICBL – is 
necessarily able to judge its effectiveness in these terms.  
 
A similar critique within the regimes can be made of the facile assumption that any 
mine action is „a good thing.‟ As Brinkert notes, „the matter of resources to ensure the 
implementation of the convention is not as simplistic as a one-way flow of money 
from relatively wealthy, unaffected countries to relatively poor, mine affected 
counterparts.‟ Citing the ICBL as an example, Brinkert acknowledges that much 
remains to be done within the regime on the qualitative dimension of resource 
generation: „while the ICBL has been very effective in focusing attention on the 
supply side of the resource issue (i.e. how much is generated), it perhaps could give 
increasing attention to better understanding the demand side of the equation (i.e. how 
much is required).‟315 A predominant focus on extending regime membership 
represents a similarly quantitative approach that ignores both the quality of 
implementation and the ability of the regimes to address „hard‟ implementation issues.  
 
Mine action challenges correspond to many dilemmas faced in seeking sustainable 
measures to address complex security and development needs in fragile states. Mine 
action is an enabling activity for other reconstruction and development activities 
while, conversely, its gains are lost if states revert to conflict. It is therefore a 
significant but under-researched question to consider how far the two regimes support 
the integration of mine action with related security and development issues. It is 
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important to acknowledge the consequences of the landmine regimes in order to to 
develop new insights in this wider context. Expert assessments reviewing a decade of 
mine action work conclude that there is a danger of mine action being 
compartmentalised away from other security and development activities. This sets 
mine action apart from poverty reduction strategies and also leaves it vulnerable to 
accusations that costs are far greater than benefits vis a vis providing water or 
addressing preventable diseases.
316
 Reports highlight that mine action cannot be 
individualised but must be linked to related reconstruction and development efforts. In 
particular, achieving this goal requires „a more multidisciplinary and multi-sectoral 
approach as mine action realises the need for expertise and experience from numerous 
disciplines to achieve its goals.‟317 This finding reflects the broader challenge of 
ensuring coherence, making sure that efforts are tailored to specific local contexts and 
showing flexibility to address shifting priorities in challenging environments.  
 
There remains a need to de-mystify and mainstream mine action in order to better 
develop links with related humanitarian and development activities, moving away 
from what Horwood characterises as a „parallel existence.‟ This parallelism has been 
created or at least encouraged by the high profile and consequently elevated donor 
support created by the Ottawa Process.
318
 Given that regime members support mine 
acion as only one of many development commitments, the regimes offer important 
fora to bridge such gaps at a policy level. This expands the research question „do the 
regimes matter‟ under a humanitarian criterion for effectiveness beyond the confines 
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of the landmines issue to reflect the complexities of the security-development nexus 
within which it is situated. It also makes the case that if the very specific nature of the 
landmine issue and its profile has distanced it from other development issues, the 
landmine regimes should provide a means to bring mine action closer to wider 
development concerns.  
 
Mine action is an important development activity, both in its own right and as an 
enabling activity for other elements of reconstruction and development. However, this 
work can have limited or counter-intuitive results in humanitarian terms if not done 
carefully. The APMBC regime provides a unique framework to address issues of 
context because of the strong developing state membership evident in both its 
negotiation and implementation phases. However, like the issue of corruption, 
reluctance within the regime to address hard implementation issues such as 
inappropriate or counter-productive mine action activities is apparent. This represents 
a lost opportunity to enhance the humanitarian dimension of regime effectiveness that 
has not been acknowledged in the literature. In contrast, the CCW process has 
historically lacked support from the South and APII remains characterised by a lack 
of developing world support. There is no pool of local knowledge and expertise 
within the implementation cluster to engage on context-specific implementation 
challenges. The lack of support within the regime for national implementation is thus 
both a cause and effect of this narrow membership base. 
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4. Conclusions 
 
Analysing the implementation processes of the two landmine regimes in detail and 
through the lens of regime theory has enabled the elaboration of a number of new 
insights into APII and the APMBC. In particular, a more nuanced picture of 
determinants of regime effectiveness emerges through focused analysis of resource, 
political, and humanitarian factors. In addressing the major hypotheses that underpin 
our research, key findings from our analysis of landmine regime implementation that 
emerge from this chapter can be grouped under two themes: design factors that result 
in gaps between negotiated provisions and their implementation; and, the relationship 
between stakeholder clustering and the ability of the regimes to support mine action.  
 
Systematically analysing regime implementation processes within our research 
framework has proved instructive. Both regimes demonstrate high levels of 
compliance among regime members according to the letter of treaty requirements. 
Both regimes have increased membership over time while, although applying to a far 
greater extent to the APMBC, new resources that support the realisation of mine 
action goals have been mobilised as a consequence of both regimes. However, 
applying Underdal‟s twofold definition of regime effectiveness, this chapter 
demonstrates important gaps in the political will and material commitment of states 
parties to meet their own obligations and to support other regime members that 
require assistance.  
 
The interplay between domestic and international commitments is shown to be 
particularly significant as a determinant of regime effectiveness. Reflecting a negative 
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consequence of the norm cascade that impelled many states to join the regime, this 
chapter shows that domestic implementation of regime obligations has not been 
prioritised by mine affected states parties. The lack of national legal or bureaucratic 
frameworks and the absence of regime support in these areas present significant 
barriers to regime effectiveness. Moreover, in many cases involuntary defection is a 
major risk since regime compliance is beyond the means of mine affected states. 
Although recognised as a key mine action priority, the absence of a nexus between 
regime implementers and expert communities means that addressing these gaps 
through capacity building has not been a regime priority. Given that funding and 
technical support for national mine action programmes is largely provided by bi- and 
multilateral donors, this disjunction between regime and mine action priorities poses a 
serious challenge to the effectiveness of the APMBC. 
 
This chapter demonstrates costs in terms of extending regime membership and 
sourcing expertise in order to enhance regime effectiveness as a result of an 
exclusionary approach to regime participation within the CCW framework. Activities 
within APII that mirror APMBC initiatives such as equitable geographical rotation of 
regime responsibilities and a sponsorship programme are thus rendered largely 
redundant by the lack of interest in the regime by these stakeholders. In contrast, 
according to the prevalent narrative, the Ottawa Process is characterised by 
transparency and inclusiveness. However, our analysis of regime clustering dynamics 
demonstrates that strong participation of mine affected states in regime formation has 
not been mirrored by an influential role in implementation. Moreover, while expertise 
is increasingly networked within the mine action community, practitioners do not 
form a core element of the APMBC implementation cluster. Negative consequences 
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of this narrower implementation cluster on the ability of the regimes to support mine 
action that are introduced in this chapter are further developed in relation to 
humanitarian demining and stockpile destruction in Chapters 6 and 7. 
 
The under-emphasised role of ANSAs in the context of the regimes highlights that 
political imperatives are highly relevant to landmine regime implementation. 
Resistance from some regime members to the work of Geneva Call is an instructive 
example of the regime‟s response to a hard case implementation issue. Geneva Call‟s 
role is entirely consistent with the origins and values of the Ottawa Process with civil 
society taking the lead where states are reluctant to act. This clearly poses difficulties 
for some regime stakeholders. Unwillingness to address the issue of ANSAs and other 
hard cases such as corruption reveals that issues unpalatable for the diplomatic 
community or „off message‟ for the advocacy lobby are avoided within the regime 
despite the humanitarian costs of not fulfilling core regime objectives. 
 
Significantly, a protectionist approach is evident within both regimes that works 
against cooperation. The recent co-location of the secretariat function for the two 
regimes with the GICHD points to common implementation requirements that may 
offer the chance of greater coordination and perhaps cooperation in the future. 
Similarly, many of the implementation issues faced by the landmine regimes are not 
unique but reflect the broader security and development challenges faced by states 
emerging from conflict. However, the elevated profile of the issue area compared to 
other development priorities means that opportunities exist in terms of poltical will 
and resources that would not otherwise be available. This chapter demonstrates that 
the combination of a narrow implementation cluser and the „parallel existence‟ 
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phenomenon within mine action limits the effectiveness of both regimes. The need for 
mainstreaming mine action with related security and development issues in order to 
meet common goals is acknowledged by mine action stakeholders but particularistic 
interests and a lack of technical expertise provide significant, unacknowledged 
barriers to regime engagement with this agenda.  
 
This chapter demonstrates concrete implementation successes but also a number of 
gaps that limit the effectiveness of the regimes in achieving their overarching goals. 
Common to both regimes is the fact that, even if met, certain obligations do not result 
in „pay offs‟ that fulfil the underpinning security, development and humanitarian 
goals of the regimes. Moreover, addressing research questions relating to agency and 
normative considerations provide new insights into shifting dynamics across different 
phases of regime evolution and their consequences for regime effectiveness. These 
findings reinforce the hypothesis that the relationship between regime design and 
implementation is highly significant in shaping the effectiveness of the regimes. The 
following chapters build on these insights in order to systematically analyse regime 
effectiveness in the specific mine action pillars of humanitarian demining and 
stockpile destruction. 
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Chapter 6 
Humanitarian Demining and the Landmine Regimes 
 
1. Introduction 
 
This chapter contributes to our overall research objectives by seeking to better 
understand the contributions made by the two landmine regimes in the area of 
humanitarian demining. It therefore addresses the research questions introduced in 
Chapter 1 that engage with different aspects of regime effectiveness through 
analysing positive (or negative) influences that can be attributed to the two regimes in 
this area. This chapter therefore builds on the critical insights gained in Chapter 5 on 
the implementation and effectiveness of the two regimes and further refines this 
analysis in relation to humanitarian demining. It is also directly linked to the 
subsequent chapter that poses similar questions of implementation and effectiveness 
to the destruction of landmine stockpiles. By analysing two central elements of the 
mine action agenda from a regime perspective, our approach offers important research 
payoffs through exploring the different challenges posed by these activities and the 
ability of the regimes to address them. 
 
Conducting humanitarian demining to ensure that areas are free from landmines, thus 
making land safe for civilian use, is the most tangible way of achieving the 
humanitarian and developmental goals of the two regimes.
319
 The research motivation 
to focus on humanitarian demining in this chapter is thus founded on its central 
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importance in meeting core regime objectives set out in both APII and the APMBC. 
In line with our overall approach, it also brings out the fact that regime dynamics and 
effectiveness can depend greatly on specific sub-issues and commitments. This fills 
an identified gap in the existing literature. Despite measures within the CCW dating 
back to 1980, the increased profile of the issue as a result of the Ottawa Process and 
humanitarian demining efforts that preceded this process by nearly ten years, there is 
relatively little existing analysis of the relationship between the two landmine regimes 
and this vital work. Applying our research framework that links analysis of IHL treaty 
regimes to the mine action discourse enables us to determine humanitarian demining-
related criteria for effectiveness that can critically question the positive image 
projected by regime advocates.  
 
The apparent cognitive dissonance between advocacy actors and practitioners 
highlighted in earlier chapters is particularly marked in the area of humanitarian 
demining. Mike Croll, a former deminer and author of The History of Landmines, thus 
characterises the ban campaign as a double edged sword whose positives must be set 
against a diversion of resources away from humanitarian demining: „certainly the 
campaign brought a great deal of publicity to the issue, but it…..distorted the size and 
shape of the problem and distracted attention from the crux of the issue.‟320 Thus, key 
research questions further developed in this chapter address the interplay between 
technical and political considerations for regime effectiveness in the area of 
humanitarian demining. Further deepening our understanding of the consequences of 
disjunctions between humanitarian demining and regime actors represents a relaed 
research focus. This chapter also seeks to contribute new insights to our knowledge of 
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stakeholder clustering dynamics in the area of humanitarian demining, considering the 
interactions of mine affected states, civil society actors and mine action professionals 
as well as – in the case of APII – producers and users involved in this area of regime 
implementation. 
 
An important counter-factual question considers whether there is a causal link or a 
degree of parallelism between the regimes and the effectiveness of humanitarian 
demining. Developing new knowledge in this area is critical to understanding regime 
effectiveness because it provides a focus on the actual (rather than perceived) 
contribution of the landmine regimes to addressing a major issue on international 
humanitarian and development agendas. Because of the role of the Ottawa Process in 
pushing the landmines issue up the international policy agenda, it is tempting to 
assume a causal link between this regime‟s implementation and progress in the field 
of humanitarian demining. However, such a link should not be assumed given parallel 
efforts in the context of IHL and, fundamentally, a mine action community that has 
matured significantly in its appreciation of how to address the scourge of landmines.  
 
Humanitarian demining displays both lengthy historical antecedents and a short 
history as a distinct discipline. Mine action began in Afghanistan from 1988 with a 
UN-assisted appeal for funds to assist „humanitarian demining.‟ Humanitarian 
demining programmes subsequently expanded to many other countries,
321
 particularly 
in Asia, Africa and the Balkans, but also, though to a more limited extent, in Eastern 
Europe and the Americas. The state of the art in humanitarian demining emphasises a 
„toolkit‟ approach that combines the appropriate use of manual deminers, mine 
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detection dogs and mechanical demining equipment.
322
 However, there is a significant 
gap between „best practice‟ and the realities faced on the ground. Many practitioners 
point out that due to financial and practical constraints they must work with what they 
have (or what they are given) in often difficult conditions rather than achieving an 
„ideal‟ combination of capabilities.323 The reality of humanitarian demining as an 
evolutionary field points to the need for flexibility within the regimes in order to adapt 
to shifting challenges and priorities. Developing our analysis of regime learning 
within the regimes thus represents an important consideration for regime effectiveness 
in the field of humanitarian demining. 
 
This chapter systematically analyses the implementation and effectiveness of the two 
landmine regimes. It begins by analysing humanitarian demining considerations in 
regime provisions in order to further elucidate the interplay between design and 
implementation in relation to regime effectiveness. Building on Chapter 5, regime 
effectiveness in supporting humanitarian demining is considered under the themes of 
resources, political will and humanitarian impact. The chapter concludes by 
identifying new contributions to knowledge on the effectiveness of APII and the 
APMBC in their support to humanitarian demining. 
 
2. Regime implementation and humanitarian demining 
 
In order to explore the relationship between regime design and implementation this 
section focuses on the humanitarian demining-related provisions of the landmine 
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regimes. It begins by analysing regime rules in relation to the practical challenges of 
humanitarian demining. This section then assesses cases of voluntary and involuntary 
defection from humanitarian demining-related obligations. Finally, verification is 
considered as a means to understand the extent to which the regimes are aware of 
humanitarian demining challenges and flexible enough to adapt in order to better 
address them. 
 
2.1 Regime rules and field realities 
 
This sub-section considers regime obligations that are relevant to humanitarian 
demining. It brings together IHL and mine action literatures to investigate the 
hypothesis that practitioner expertise in both design and implementation phases is 
critical to regime effectiveness in this pillar of mine action. Where there is dislocation 
between the regimes and humanitarian demining, it considers the consequences in 
terms of the regimes‟ ability to exert positive change in this area.  
 
Knowing the extent and location of mined areas is a pre requisite for effective 
humanitarian demining. Thus, each state party to the APMBC must make „every 
effort to identify all mined areas under its jurisdiction or control in which anti-
personnel mines are known or suspected to be emplaced.‟ Further, „as soon as 
possible‟ these areas should be „perimeter marked, monitored and protected by 
fencing or other means, to ensure the effective exclusion of civilians, until all anti-
personnel mines contained therein have been destroyed.‟324 APII requires that „all 
reasonable precautions should be taken to protect civilians from the impact of mines, 
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booby traps and other devices,‟325 while their locations should be recorded in 
accordance with the requirements of the protocol‟s Technical Annex.326 Manually 
emplaced APMs that are not self-destructing and self-deactivating can only be used if 
„placed within a perimeter-marked area which is monitored by military personnel and 
protected by fencing or other means, to ensure the effective exclusion of civilians 
from the area.‟327 Locating and identifying mined areas thus represents a common 
priority across both regimes. 
 
In reality, few mined areas are fenced and in many cases animals, weather or the 
needs of local people result in the destruction or removal of such barriers as have 
existed. Even fence poles and wire have an intrinsic worth that may outweigh the 
protective value of the barrier. Contaminated land viable for hunting or farming is 
frequently used by locals in the full knowledge of the risks being run. Moreover, maps 
often do not exist given the widespread practice of „nuisance‟ mine laying in 
developing world conflicts targeted directly at civilian populations. Even where 
precise maps are available, the location of mines shifts over time due to weather and 
soil conditions, limiting their value. Landmine Monitor acknowledges that one aspect 
of the Article 5 requirement almost never met is that of perimeter marking and 
monitoring to ensure the safety of civilians. It is reported that only Denmark, France 
(in respect to a military base in Djibouti) and the UK (Falkland Islands) have taken 
such measures. These are clearly exceptional cases involving developed countries that 
know to a high degree of accuracy where these APMs have been emplaced. That no 
mine-affected state has been able to fulfil this obligation points to the fact that the 
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requirement is unenforceable in the context of developing countries with large, often 
unmapped swathes of contaminated land.  
 
APII reiterates the earlier Protocol II requirement for the recording of „pre-planned‟ 
minefields. However, many mined areas laid by government or irregular forces have 
either served immediate tactical reasons – so the provision does not apply – or when 
targeted at civilians have not been planned or mapped at all. Even in the Falklands 
where the location of mined areas is well known, landmines have shifted over time as 
a result of weather and ground conditions, rendering maps largely redundant. 
Although subject to little discussion at the 1979-80 negotiating conference, it was 
recognised even at the time that the concept of a „pre-planned‟ minefield was both 
vague and represented a degree of advanced preparation sufficient to exclude nearly 
all traditional minefields as well as the less clearly defined mined areas frequently 
encountered by deminers.
328
 India has subscribed to „a phased approach (that) will 
narrow the scope in which landmines can be used only for the defense of borders.‟329 
This approach stands or falls on whether India can meet its obligations: are mined 
areas perimeter marked and monitored? Have accurate maps of mined areas been 
made and exchanged with opponents at the end of hostilities to aid subsequent 
demining efforts? And, fundamentally, if there has been compliance with these 
measures, has this ensured that civilians have not suffered through the use of 
landmines? Reporting from the Kashmir region suggests that the difficulties of 
mapping and marking during conflict have made these provisions impossible to 
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implement effectively.
330
 Moreover, economic necessity and the effects of climate are 
further factors that have undermined the effectiveness of measures to accurately 
identify mined areas and warn civilians of potential hazards. This underlines the 
importance of Underdal‟s twofold definition of effectiveness. National compliance 
with the letter of regime commitments does not contribute to the intent and purpose of 
the regime by reducing the danger posed by these weapons. 
 
Neither regime acknowledges that in many cases the tactical use of landmines does 
not conform to the image of static, clearly defined minefields. Analysis of APMBC 
Article 7 reports demonstrates evidence of this gap between regime rules and field 
reality. Moldova reported full clearance of mined areas by August 2000 although 
subsequent reports have shown that communities continue to avoid certain „cleared‟ 
areas. Other areas not subject to clearance are also suspected of containing 
landmines.
331
 Similarly, the DRC in its Article 7 report states that „no mined area has 
yet been identified‟ whereas UN information confirms the presence of landmines 
within the national territory.
332
 While the stipulation to mark mined areas may be 
important regardless of the challenges of implementation, it is thus questionable 
whether mine affected regime members are able to identify accurately their mined 
areas. A further consideration is that where such information could be usefully 
provided, there is no obligation under APII to record the types of mines used, the 
pattern of mine laying or the location of individual mines, key information for the 
purpose of humanitarian demining. It is significant that the provisions on minefield 
marking and mapping contained in both treaty regimes reflect a broader lack of 
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appreciation of humanitarian demining concerns. While these challenges are not open 
to ready solutions, the two regimes are weakened by their failure to acknowledge 
these practical implementation challenges.  
 
The APMBC obliges member states to destroy or ensure the destruction of all APMs 
in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control „no later than ten years after the entry 
into force of this convention for that State Party.‟333 While placing the responsibility 
for clearance squarely on individual regime members, the term „ensure the 
destruction‟ of APMs is used deliberately to denote the external assistance that many 
post-conflict states require in fulfilling this obligation. Indeed, the APMBC requires 
states parties „in a position to do so‟ to assist in these efforts.334 Moreover, a request 
may be submitted seeking an extension of the destruction deadline for renewable 
periods of up to ten years.
335
 In the APMBC drafting process, the time period for 
destruction of mined areas was subject to considerable discussion while it was also 
proposed not to provide a specific deadline.
336
 This reflects a tension between ban 
advocates pushing for short deadlines and other regime actors seeking greater 
flexibility either in acknowledgement of the scale of the humanitarian demining 
challenge or as a means to dilute this core obligation. A fixed deadline was ultimately 
retained in order not to dilute the urgency of the issue. However, the renewal clause 
recognises the difficulty of this task in the context of capacity and resource deficits in 
heavily mine-affected states. The combination of fixed deadline and renewal clause is 
therefore significant because it embeds an unresolved tension between different 
regime stakeholders within the regime framework. 
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In contrast, APII neither commits states parties to clear the mines they laid nor to 
assist in mine action beyond a request that after the cessation of hostilities, former 
conflict parties provide information to facilitate this work „wherever possible.‟337 
APII does include a provision that requires all APMs to be detectable by commonly 
available mine detection equipment.
338
 If this provision cannot be complied with in 
respect to existing stocks, a nine-year deferral period is permitted. Of current APII 
members that are not party to the APMBC, Russia‟s compliance with APM 
detectability requirements is deferred until 2014. A nine-year deferral for the self-
destruct and self-neutralise provisions on remotely delivered APMs ends in 2010. 
Prokosch argues that landmine contamination in Afghanistan would be much less 
severe today if the Soviet Union had observed its earlier Protocol II obligations 
following ratification in 1982. Instead, „through lack of control and lack of publicity, 
the Soviet army felt free to act without fear of effective sanctions or public censure, as 
have government and opposition forces in many other conflicts since 1980.‟339 This 
example highlights a dual challenge to regime effectiveness. On the one hand, lengthy 
deferral periods for the implementation of key technical provisions come with 
humanitarian costs. On the other, this is exacerbated by the absence of political will to 
impel states parties to implement provisions for humanitarian reasons in advance of 
the required timeframe.  
 
Decisions made in both regimes on time limits for destruction of landmines were 
based on compromises. Arguably, this reflects in regime design the practical 
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challenges of implementation and the consequent need for flexible provisions that 
recognise them. It also makes clear the interests of different stakeholders and the 
flexibility required to agree provisions in a consensus framework. However, while 
both regimes display a lack of awareness of certain „field‟ realities, a core difference 
in the orientation and knowledge base of the two regimes is also highlighted. In the 
APII regime design process, destruction of stocks was understood as a technical 
exercise. In the context of the APMBC, practical difficulties of implementation and 
the humanitarian costs of different options were discussed at length in the negotiation 
of the regime. This is reflected in emphasis given to support for national 
implementation that is absent from the APII regime. 
 
Our analysis demonstrates commonalities and distinctions across the two regimes. In 
particular, this sub-section shows how contemporary use of landmines and the 
practical realities of mine affected states create significant barriers to implementation 
of regime obligations. While not recognised as such in the literature, the relevant 
regime provisions thus represent a „best case‟ scenario rather than achievable 
commitments. It is evident that in both regimes humanitarian demining expertise has 
not informed provisions in ways that ensure obligations are realistic and enforceable. 
This relates both to context-specific socio-economic or environmental concerns but 
also to understanding relevant security dynamics. Moreover, while our analysis of 
stakeholder clustering throughout this thesis highlights that the APMBC does provide 
space (unlike APII) for developing world concerns, neither regime demonstrates 
flexibility to address challenges to regime effectiveness faced by mine affected states. 
An important distinction is also apparent. While APII understands implementation in 
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technical terms, the APMBC acknowledges the need to support national stakeholders 
in achieving these goals. 
 
2.2 Involuntary and voluntary defection in regime implementation 
 
This sub-section builds on the previous one by considering how gaps between regime 
rules and mine action realities play out in the implementation phase. It identifies 
where compliance with humanitarian demining-related provisions has not been fully 
achieved and seeks to develop new insights into causes of voluntary and involuntary 
defection. Reflecting the different objectives of the two regimes, it considers both the 
use of landmines by APII and APMBC regime members and the APMBC-specific 
obligation to clear mined areas.  
 
On the central ban on the use of APMs, Angola, Ecuador and Ethiopia admitted using 
APMs as APMBC signatories. Allegations have also been made of use by signatories 
Burundi, Rwanda, Sudan and Uganda.
340
 However such conduct by states parties has 
been rare. As of January 2007, there were no allegations of APM use by signatories or 
full states parties for some 18 months. The drastic reduction in the use of APMs by 
states generates a pay off for humanitarian demining since this represents a 
measurable reduction in the likely number of future mined areas that the humanitarian 
demining community would have been called on to clear. The decline in mine use 
thus fulfils the humanitarian criterion for regime effectiveness. In terms of the 
strength of the anti-APM norm, it is also significant that a central pillar of the regime 
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– the prohibition on the use of APMs – has proved resilient during the decade since 
the APMBC regime entered into force. 
 
Landmine Monitor characterises the obligation to clear mined areas as „the greatest 
challenge to the integrity of the treaty.‟341 Furthermore, the Nairobi Action Plan 
agreed at the first APMBC Review Conference in 2004, calls on states to „strive to 
ensure that few, if any, States Parties will feel compelled to request an extension‟ to 
their ten year clearance deadline.
342
 However, of the 29 states with clearance 
deadlines in 2009 and 2010 it is estimated that 13 will struggle to reach this goal.
343
 
Indeed, at the meeting of APMBC states parties held in Amman, Jordan in November 
2007, the focus of the sessions dedicated to mine clearance was not on 
implementation challenges but modalities for requesting extensions to clearance 
deadlines.
344
 This provides evidence in implementation of the tension identified in the 
design phase between regime obligations and humanitarian demining realities. 
 
Inability to meet clearance deadlines suggests a significant gap between regime goals 
and the likelihood of their implementation that poses a dilemma for mine-affected 
regime members as well as for the regime more broadly. It also introduces a more 
nuanced distinction problematised in Section 3.3 below between achieving regime 
goals and meeting the humanitarian criterion for effectiveness. This is evident in the 
potential disconnect between the humanitarian demining imperative to reduce the 
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harm caused by APMs and the regime obligation to clear all mines regardless of their 
impact. 
  
A number of APMBC members that have not taken steps to clear mined areas in line 
with treaty commitments lack the appropriate domestic capacity to support this work. 
Thailand‟s likely missing of its clearance deadline is attributed to a combination of 
factors. Landmine Monitor identifies three causes: „mine action has not been a 
government priority, inadequate financial support, and the military structure of mine 
action in Thailand.‟345 For a number of other states parties, including Niger, 
Swaziland and Venezuela that have also not begun clearance operations, adequate 
capacity is clearly an issue. In each case, involuntary defection can be attributed to a 
combination of the scale of the task, the lack of domestic capacity or implementation 
mechanisms as well as insufficient political will. The ability of the regimes to 
influence these critical components for regime effectiveness in the area of 
humanitarian demining are considered in Section 3 below.  
 
The case of Venezuela is qualitatively different, crossing the line between involuntary 
to voluntary defection. Clearance of APMs – used to protect naval facilities near the 
border with Colombia – is alleged to be conditional on finding an alternative 
protection system.
346
 Military necessity therefore seems to be the key consideration in 
influencing Venezuela‟s non-compliant behaviour. Significantly, this failure to 
implement a clear regime obligation was highlighted by Landmine Monitor as early as 
2005. However, reflecting a reluctance to address sensitive implementation issues, 
this has not been taken up to date as an issue of non-compliance within the framework 
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of the APMBC regime.
347
 As discussed in Chapter 4, in contrast to the overtly 
humanitarian orientation of the APMBC, a founding principle of APII is the need to 
balance humanitarian concerns with those of military necessity. However, as in the 
case of Venezuela‟s alleged APMBC non-compliance, long-standing accusations that 
Russia employed landmines in Chechnya without marking, fencing or monitoring 
would represent a clear breach of the country‟s obligations under APII.348 In a parallel 
to the APMBC, this issue has been repeatedly raised by civil society campaigners but 
has not been addressed within the regime.  
 
The political factors that impede national implementation of humanitarian demining 
programmes come as no surprise to the UN-run programmes, NGOs and commercial 
companies engaged in humanitarian demining programmes. Reflecting the security 
dynamics that make landmine regimes a „hard‟ case, where political will remains 
elusive, conflicting national interests frequently play a role. This sub-section 
demonstrates that while some humanitarian demining commitments have been 
observed, important examples of voluntary and involuntary defection can be 
identified. From a mine action perspective, these may highlight the challenging nature 
of the work. However, from a regime perspective, findings show the inability within 
APII and the APMBC to acknowledge and address gaps in implementation at the 
national level. This directly links to research questions that associate effectiveness 
with the ability of the regimes to be evolutionary in order to address implementation 
challenges.  
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2.3 Verification 
 
Implementation goals can only be achieved if mechanisms are in place to make 
members aware of whether regime objectives are being met. This sub-section 
considers the role of verification in enabling the regimes to identify and engage with 
implementation challenges in the area of humanitarian demining. It assesses the 
strengths and weaknesses of formal as well as informal verification mechanisms, thus 
further substantiating insights developed in Chapter 5 in relation to humanitarian 
demining. 
 
Verification mechanisms provide an important means of understanding and 
monitoring regime implementation. As discussed in Chapter 5, the accuracy of some 
APMBC reporting is questionable given the lack of capacity in mine-affected states to 
survey the national territory, the absence of control of some areas of the country, 
particularly where ANSAs are present, and in some cases an evident reluctance to 
advertise „bad news.‟ Consequently, the Philippines and Bangladesh in their Article 7 
reports have rejected claims that there are known or suspected mined areas on their 
territory, despite reports to the contrary. In the case of Bangladesh, the army reported 
that border security forces – the „Na Sa Ka‟ – had laid mines along the border with 
Myanmar although the border guard leadership subsequently denied this.
349
  These 
discrepancies undermine the value of regime reporting as an analytical tool to support 
humanitarian demining planning and prioritisation. 
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The ICBL, in its de facto role as APMBC compliance watchdog, pays close attention 
through Landmine Monitor to the number of annual APMBC reports. However, less 
attention is paid to the quality of the data provided. This may be explained by the fact 
that advocacy experts and diplomats responsible for the meetings that consider 
implementation issues do not have humanitarian demining expertise in order to 
question the detail of the reports. This point is significant because it builds on earlier 
analysis of stakeholder clustering. The lack of practitioner expertise in the 
implementation cluster results in costs for how the regime is able to engage with 
humanitarian demining issues. 
 
As discussed in Chapter 5, below the level of the state, the role ANSAs play in this 
field receives insufficient attention within the two regimes. ANSAs represent a major 
category of mine users, often control mined territory and are responsible for the 
manufacture, trade and use of landmines.
350
 The ICBL, through Landmine Monitor, 
provides details of APM use by ANSAs but does not use its considerable influence to 
advocate for such actors to be addressed within the framework of the regime. This 
points to a reluctance to deal with a „hard case‟ issue that would cause disputes among 
regime members – notably those with armed groups on their territory – even though 
there is an evident benefit for humanitarian demining in engaging with this major 
category of landmine user. Although the two landmine regimes, in line with 
overarching principles of IHL, are binding only on states, the need to involve rebel 
opposition groups, insurgents, militias and warlord factions in efforts to ban or restrict 
the use of landmines has grown with an increasing awareness of their role. This gap in 
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regime engagement therefore has particular costs given that these actors are using 
landmines in more countries than government armed forces.
351
 
 
APII reporting is also deficient from a humanitarian demining perspective. Annual 
APII reports provide significant detail on mine action activities in order to promote 
transparency. However, there is no link between such transparency and obligations 
within the regime. The protocol‟s focus on the technical characteristics of landmines 
could provide a value-added to the demining community through clarifying technical 
data that would assist in their clearance and destruction. In Kosovo, following the 
NATO air campaign, details of NATO bombing missions as well as demining 
activities in support of its operations was only forthcoming following lengthy 
institutional bottlenecks and problems linked to security classification. These 
problems were overcome through the persistence of mine action practitioners and not 
through any intervention via the mechanism of the regimes. The regime has not 
developed a dialogue with the humanitarian demining practitioner community to 
refine such requirements. Lost opportunities to develop such synergies demonstrate 
the importance of stakeholder clustering to regime effectiveness. Specific regime 
provisions did not benefit from practitioner input while the continued absence of these 
actors in the implementation process means that the regime has not been able to 
evolve in order to better meet implementation challenges.  
 
The APMBC approach is in stark contrast to the CCW in terms of the role of informal 
verification. Civil society has not mobilised behind the APII regime. In part, this 
reflects the nature of the regime framework: civil society actors continue to be 
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excluded from all but the public plenary sessions of states parties‟ meetings. On the 
other hand, this exclusion is consistent with a conscious policy decision on the part of 
the ICBL that pursuing a ban on APMs is incompatible with engaging a regime that 
advocates a „restrictions‟ based approach to the issue. Regardless of the ICBL 
approach, analysis of the impact of informal verification provides additional insights 
to our understanding of regime interplay. Civil society plays a de facto role in APII 
verification since a section on CCW compliance is included in Landmine Monitor. 
This reflects a recognition by the ICBL of the benefit in highlighting non-compliance 
by APII regime members and as a result reinforcing a perceived gap in humanitarian 
terms between the two treaty regimes. However, while this advocacy-driven approach 
does not extend to pursuing a positive role in encouraging the implementation or 
universalisation of APII, it does raise the stakes for non-compliance. While this may 
not change the behaviour of militarily-significant states where national security 
concerns are at stake (e.g. Russia in Chechnya), it has contributed to increased 
transparency from regime members. 
 
I show that verification of humanitarian demining-related provisions is particularly 
vulnerable to an unwillingness to address defection. This results in a vicious circle 
with regime advocates de-emphasising issues that are „off message‟ in terms of the 
positive evolution of the regime while non-compliant states hide their conduct both to 
offset the political costs of exposure but also to avoid a potential loss of funding for 
humanitarian demining. By neglecting to follow through on the gaps in annual 
reporting or suggestions of non-compliance, an opportunity is missed to provide the 
mine action community with new information or support that would be of benefit for 
humanitarian demining. 
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3. Regime effectiveness and humanitarian demining 
 
Flexibility to adapt over time has been identified as a key component of successful 
regimes in different issue areas.
352
 In this respect, humanitarian demining has 
arguably witnessed a „gestalt shift‟ in recent years from emphasis on numbers of 
landmines cleared to their socio-economic impact as a guide to prioritisation.
353
 The 
mine action community is not fully situated within this new paradigm; although a new 
means of understanding the issue has emerged, its operationalisation, with the 
contingent benefits to mine affected communities, remains an ongoing process. The 
combination of an evolving mine action discourse with the recent emergence of APII 
and the APMBC reinforces insights developed in earlier chapters by showing that 
regime learning is a key quality to ensure that the regimes adapt to this evolving 
understanding of humanitarian demining. 
  
In order to develop new knowledge on the value added of the two landmine regimes, 
this section critically examines the linkages between the landmine regimes and 
humanitarian demining policy and practice. It systematically applies the research 
framework elaborated in Chapter 2 and builds on the broader analysis developed in 
the previous chapter in order to develop new insights to humanitarian demining 
effectiveness under the themes of resources, political will and humanitarian impact. 
Generating additional revenues for humanitarian demining provides a measure of 
regime effectiveness. However, if resources are one indication of an effective regime, 
a distinction needs to be made between resource generation as a result of the profile of 
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the issue and the effective targeting of these resources through the mechanism of the 
two regimes. The potential misuse of resources also links to a second key determinant 
of landmine regime effectiveness: the role of the regimes in fostering political will to 
act on regime obligations. Central research questions for this thesis that are further 
developed in this area include an elaborated analysis of political will. This concept is 
not fully expressed by regime membership but by states parties taking the challenging 
steps necessary to fulfil humanitarian demining obligations. Finally, given the 
intersection between regime goals and the broader rationale of IHL, a humanitarian 
criterion provides a third element of regime effectiveness.  
 
3.1 Resources 
 
Increased resources are only useful if they are deployed in ways that support the 
implementation of treaty objectives. A high level of funding on a macro level is 
important but for humanitarian demining purposes using these resources effectively 
and getting them to programmes in a timely manner is critical. An expert assessment 
published in 1999 on the first ten years of humanitarian demining programmes 
included recognition of the need for „better coordination and cooperation in exchange 
for the large pledges put forward.‟354 In September 2002, Norway, in advance of the 
2004 APMBC Review Conference, presented a non-paper proposing actions to 
„address all aspects of how to secure sufficient funding for reaching the aims of the 
Convention.‟355 In the non-paper, sustainability was recognised as the cornerstone for 
designing and implementing humanitarian demining programmes. For example, the 
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mine action programme in Kosovo is only one case that was plagued by such 
problems with the UN-commissioned review of the operation highlighting that „in any 
peacebuilding operation, mine action should not be a discretionary activity left to the 
charitable impulses of the donor community.‟356 As an example, the UN Mission‟s 
budget for 1999-2000 was not made available to the programme until late 2000.
357
 
Landmine Monitor also records a lack of sustained funding as causing lay-offs of 
personnel or the halting of demining operations during 2006 in Afghanistan, Croatia, 
Guinea-Bissau, Iraq, Mauritania and Tajikistan.
358
  
 
Resource constraints are not a new phenomenon and humanitarian demining 
programmes have frequently suffered from shortfalls or the slow disbursement of 
funding. However, the Norwegian initiative is significant because, for the first time, 
the key issue of effective rather than adequate funding was put on the regime‟s 
agenda. Until then, neither the core group of states nor the ICBL paid particular 
attention to the effectiveness of these resources in finding their way to the operational 
level despite its prominence as an issue within the mine action discourse. 
Significantly, in the intervening years since the non-paper was tabled, there has been 
no substantive progress within the regime on bridging the gap between overall 
resource levels and their application.  
 
Resource commitment by states with their own severe resource limitations provides a 
strong indication of political will to implement regime obligations. However, if 
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obtaining information on donor resources is an inexact science, this is all the more 
challenging for mine-affected states. Responses by mine affected states to a 
questionnaire issued by Norway point to a growth in mine action funding between 
1997-2002 amounting to USD $18 million in this period through expanded state 
budgets. Brinkert emphasises that, beyond the traditional donor base, states defining 
themselves as „in a position‟ to assist mine action in third countries include a further 
thirty-six member states from all regions of the world.
359
 Moreover, the allocation of 
funding for clearance by state-owned electrical utilities in Peru
360
 and public 
companies in Croatia
361
 demonstrates that such efforts are not limited to governments. 
Beyond financial support, examples of practical assistance generated by the regime 
from this broader category of states parties include: Argentine demining and 
explosive ordnance destruction in Kuwait; Brazilian support to mine action in Central 
America and Angola; Malaysian training for developing countries in demining and 
destruction techniques; and, Paraguayan peacekeepers‟ clearance work in the DRC.362  
 
Although contributions may be modest in comparison to those of Western mine action 
donors, they represent a significant potential „value added‟ to the quality of 
humanitarian demining assistance. This can be attributed to the „soft‟ regime 
requirement of assisting other states parties. Support from actors in the same region 
and with similar experiences to mine-affected states is particularly useful for 
humanitarian demining purposes as it is likely to be tailored to the needs of their 
neighbours. Such approaches reduce the risk of repeating a criticism frequently 
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levelled at mine action donors of providing inappropriate „Rolls Royce‟ solutions to 
developing world problems.  
 
As explored in Chapter 5, the issue of resources in poor countries, particularly 
provided by external actors and processed through weak bureaucracies, presents 
challenges of corruption within mine action. Humanitarian demining is particularly 
vulnerable in this area. In Cambodia, allegations in 1999 over falsified payroll records 
in the Cambodian Mine Action Centre (CMAC) proved the tip of an iceberg that led 
to further revelations concerning land being cleared at the behest of military 
commanders, logging firms and a former Khmer Rouge leader. CMAC had 
insufficient management and oversight capacity so with little coherent data about its 
practices, the allegations were reinforced, leading to a loss of donor confidence and 
consequent drop in support.
363
 Cambodia‟s high profile within the APMBC 
framework offers the potential to influence its policies. However, neither capacity 
building nor corruption issues that, if addressed, would have significant humanitarian 
demining payoffs have been taken head on within the regime framework. Cambodia 
provides an example of how hard issues relating to resources and more broadly to the 
conduct of a regime member that are highly relevant for humanitarian demining have 
not been addressed through the regime.  
 
Our analysis of resource mobilisation for humanitarian demining generates a number 
of significant insights for landmine regime effectiveness. The positive contribution of 
the APMBC to increasing resources for this activity is unsurprising. However, 
unprecedented support from non-traditional donors, often with their own resource 
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constraints, represents an important example of regime interaction effects. This is 
particularly significant when regionally driven and thus contextually relevant. Our 
analysis provides strong evidence that the three criteria for regime effectiveness are 
interrelated. The lack of take up within the regime of Norwegian-led efforts to apply a 
qualitative approach to resource issues is critical. This represents a key research 
finding that points to a damaging perception gap between regime implementers and 
the humanitarian demining community. It also reflects a broader knowledge gap 
between the cluster of regime implementation stakeholders and the humanitarian 
demining practitioners in the field that has clear implications for the ability of the 
regime to fulfil its humanitarian objectives. Finally, there is an evident but 
unacknowledged failure within the regime to deploy carrots and sticks that enhance 
capacity and strengthen political will of mine affected regime members to support 
humanitarian demining. 
 
3.2 Political will 
 
By placing responsibility for humanitarian demining on states parties, the APMBC 
recognises the importance of national ownership (and thus political will) as a pre-
condition for achieving regime objectives. This is consistent with the identification 
within the mine action community of the need for „a commitment to the development 
of skills and capacities which national and other authorities require in order to take 
effective command of mine action programmes‟364 as a sine qua non for sustainable 
national humanitarian demining programmes. The experience of humanitarian 
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demining practitioners shows that capacity building could provide significant benefits 
to effective implementation of the regimes‟ humanitarian demining provisions.365 
There is thus an evident complementarity between the regime framework and broader 
humanitarian demining goals. 
 
However, to date there is limited evidence of capacity building activities that ensure 
transparency, accountability and effective control of mine action at the national level. 
Kosovo provides a relevant case in point. Mine action was labelled from an early 
stage as an activity suitable to be handed over to the local authorities. The United 
Nations Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) handed responsibility for humanitarian 
demining to the Kosovo Protection Corps (KPC), largely made up of demobilised 
Albanian fighters and therefore closely identified with the Kosovo Liberation Army 
(KLA).
366
 Although viewed as a means to demobilise and reintegrate former 
combatants, this decision had several negative consequences. First, it deprived 
Kosovars who already had relevant skills of long term employment prospects; second, 
it resulted in poor work since insufficient training was given to the KPC mine 
clearance teams; and third it raised concerns over the political and ethnic bias of the 
force, particularly if deployed in ethnic Serb areas. Responsibility was handed over to 
newly created government authorities on 15 December 2001 – although senior 
management posts were still held by international staff – but was moved back to the 
United Nations Special Representative in 2004, reflecting the need for greater 
oversight and control. The fact that Kosovo represents the sole example of a 
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programme being handed back to „national‟ ownership demonstrates the lack of 
progress in this area with its consequences for humanitarian demining effectiveness.  
 
The relationship between international support and national ownership is not simply 
one where external actors support national capacity building. It is also incumbent on 
national actors to support their own mine action programmes. This political support of 
governments is essential but often lacking. In Cambodia, the HALO Trust must wait 
months for new vehicles and other equipment which has already arrived in country, 
because a policy of never paying bribes means that the customs service does not 
release them.
367
 Moreover, Grobbelaar cites an unnamed Southern African country 
where international demining staff need to reapply for a work visa every three 
months.
368
 Similar examples of bureaucratic logjams and efforts to obtain fees in 
order to navigate them could be cited in most mine-affected countries. These 
problems are well known among donors, policy makers and practitioners. However, 
the APMBC regime – which requires states parties to make every effort to assist 
humanitarian demining – plays no role in attempting to address such behaviour within 
its membership or as a condition for humanitarian demining support. 
 
Analysis in earlier chapters demonstrates important regime effects on influential states 
that are not members of both regimes. The US position is characterised in the existing 
literature as at the same time a leading force behind APII and an APMBC 
„rejectionist.‟ US support for humanitarian demining has not been reflected by any 
movement on a political level towards acceptance of the anti-APM norm. Indeed, 
under the Bush administration there was a policy shift that de-emphasised the 
                                                 
367
 Interview with HALO Trust Cambodia Country Manager, Siem Reap, 1 July 2001. 
263 
 
eventual move from APMs to other weapons systems fulfilling similar functions 
without their humanitarian problems.
369
 However, US support for humanitarian 
demining reinforces the hypothesis that the two regimes are best understood as part of 
a wider IHL regime addressing inhumane weapons. In 2006 the US chaired the Mine 
Action Support Group (MASG), responsible for coordinating policy among 24 major 
mine action donors. This structural leadership role is very different from the „pariah‟ 
label promoted by the ICBL in response to its non-membership of APMBC. Certainly 
the US role in humanitarian demining demonstrates the interlocking and overlapping 
nature of the regimes with common goals more significant than regime membership. 
 
Regimes in other issue areas suggest that support from influential states can influence 
the bahaviour of a broader range of actors. Although it may be argued that US 
commitment to a ban on APMs would result in emulation effects among some other 
states, it is questionable whether US policy would have a direct impact on key 
militarily significant APMBC rejectionists such as China or Russia. That these two 
states are members of the APII regime is itself politically significant. Yet from a 
humanitarian demining point of view, regime membership has no bearing on Russian 
and Chinese landmines already in the ground in post-conflict and conflict-ridden 
states around the world or on the fact that Russia continues to use APMs in 
Chechnya.
370
 The compliance of these states with APII detectability requirements will 
have effects on potential future humanitarian demining activities. However, the 
proliferation of Chinese and Russian weapons over past decades has not (as with the 
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US) been offset by a countervailing commitment to humanitarian demining that has 
increased significantly since the entry into force of the regimes. 
 
As a leading member of the APII regime, the US has invested significantly in 
alternatives to APMs as well as in ensuring compliance of existing systems with the 
regime‟s detectability requirements. These measures to make landmines more readily 
detectable reduce the risks to deminers in the field. US support for humanitarian 
demining therefore contributes to the APMBC regime‟s core goal of reducing the 
humanitarian suffering caused by these weapons. The contrast between a commitment 
to humanitarian demining and a policy position that is no nearer an APM ban provides 
further evidence to reinforce the hypothesis that embracing the core political message 
of the Ottawa Process (a universal ban at all costs) is not a precondition for 
substantive progress in realising humanitarian demining payoffs. Ken Anderson, a 
former ICBL campaigner, questions the value of the APMBC regime without US 
membership.
371
 Yet this argument ignores a more nuanced reality that in terms of 
support for humanitarian demining, important dynamics that transcend partisan 
regime positions generate effects among members and non-members that contribute to 
achieving the regime‟s underpinning objectives.  
 
While the topic of ANSAs has been discussed at APMBC Standing Committee 
meetings since 2005 as well as at the sixth meeting of state parties, the role played by 
Geneva Call is particularly relevant from a humanitarian demining perspective. As 
with verification and compliance monitoring, informal arrangements have been 
developed where the regime proper has lacked the ability to address a key mine action 
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issue. It is therefore legitimate to assess how effectively the range of stakeholders at a 
sub-state level with a role to play in humanitarian demining are addressed. That the 
European Parliament, on 7 July 2005, called on ANSAs to sign the Geneva Call Deed 
of Commitment demonstrates the increasing importance attached to such obligations 
by the international community.
372
 Yet despite the resistance of some regime 
members, Geneva Call could not have developed its role without the normative pull of 
the regime. Indeed, it is important to note that stigmatisation also generates emulation 
effects below the level of the state. For ANSAs that control mined areas, 
acknowledgement of the illegitimacy of these weapons is an essential first step to 
opening up that land for clearance. The stigmatisation of APMs is also felt on the 
ground, contributing to a widespread perception of demining as an „honourable‟ 
profession.  
 
Our analysis of the ability of the regimes to increase political will for humanitarian 
demining demonstrates the multi-layered nature of regime effectiveness. On one level, 
deep linkages are delineated between the regimes based on a recognition that 
humanitarian demining contributes to a shared humanitarian imperative. The de facto 
support of the US for the humanitarian demining goals of the APMBC and the 
willingness of different ANSAs to give up these weapons both represent an 
acknowledgement and consequence of their illegitimacy. However, if the role of 
ANSAs has been discussed within the APMBC, it remains a „hard case‟ that the 
regime has not directly addressed. Stakeholder clustering in the implementation 
phase, in particular the absence of practitioner expertise, thus has direct consequences 
for humanitarian demining since implementation challenges remain unacknowledged. 
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Deficits in political will thus represent a cause and effect of limited regime support to 
humanitarian demining since a lack of contextually-grounded knowledge combines 
with a reluctance to address politically sensitive implementation issues. 
 
3.3      Humanitarian impact 
 
Ultimately, the effectiveness of APII and the APMBC rests on their impact in 
addressing the humanitarian costs associated with landmines. Both regimes are 
underpinned by an imperative to reduce the suffering posed by landmines. 
Humanitarian demining seeks to achieve this goal through ensuring that individuals 
and communities are free to live without the risk of death or injury through the 
presence of these weapons. It is also important to acknowledge that landmines 
represent only one part of a broader challenge to build peace and lay the foundations 
for sustainable development. This section therefore assesses the regimes in two 
dimensions: the effectiveness of technical regime provisions in fulfilling humanitarian 
objectives; and, the role of the regimes in linking humanitarian demining to broader 
security and development goals. 
 
Article 6 of the APMBC encourages cooperation to improve the role of technology in 
humanitarian demining. This is an important provision in the light of the findings of a 
UN-sponsored study into global operational needs for mine action that „in some cases, 
donors have forced unsuitable and ineffective equipment on national programmes and 
local demining projects. This has harmed the relationship between donors, 
researchers, industry and the user community.‟373 In the context of demining 
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technology, this reflects a common perception, reinforced by experience from 
practitioners, of wasted resources spent on expensive, inappropriate equipment that 
fail once exposed to the rigors of climatic and other conditions as well as the lack of 
spare parts common to post-conflict environments.
374
  
 
Although the gap between technology and field realities is recognised in the report of 
the 2006 conference of APMBC states parties, inappropriate donor support has not 
been directly addressed in the framework of the intersessional work programme. As 
discussed in Chapter 5, these meetings bring together both donors and representatives 
of mine affected states but the humanitarian demining practitioner community does 
not play a prominent role in this implementation mechanism. Two significant findings 
can be drawn on the relationship between agency and regime effectiveness in this 
area. First, a lack of technical expertise in the regime implementation phase works 
against problem solving based on the realities of humanitarian demining. Second, 
despite efforts to ensure broad developing world representation, there remains an 
inherent asymmetry between donors and recipients, unaddressed within the regime, 
that prevents the latter from criticising the nature of the support they receive for fear 
of receiving less in the future. This insight echoes Beier‟s observation that while the 
Ottawa Process „collapsed political time‟ in the regime design phase, there is 
„unchanged political space‟ for the developing world in the regime‟s 
implementation.
375
 These challenges also further demonstrate an underlying weakness 
in the regime‟s inability to mobilise expertise or political will to address the „hard‟ 
implementation challenges posed by humanitarian demining.  
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Although APII‟s stipulated self-destruct and self-neutralise requirements would avoid 
death or injury to anyone stepping on a landmine after the end of its active life, in 
practice this would provide no additional benefit in terms of the effectiveness of 
humanitarian demining. All objects emitting a metal signature must be excavated in 
the same way and all landmines must be treated as „live‟ for the purpose of clearance. 
As demining expert Tim Lardner points out, „it doesn‟t matter to my deminers on the 
ground whether there are no mines or whether there are a thousand mines, in the five 
hectares of land they are told to clear.‟376 More broadly, as demonstrated in the UN 
global needs study, the requirement to clear surrounding vegetation and excavate 
every metal source in a contaminated area means that the numbers of landmines, 
dangerous or otherwise, has little or no bearing on the rate of clearance.
377
 The 
humanitarian benefits in terms of future use of APMs that would flow from the 
application of these APII provisions are therefore more than offset by the much 
greater threat posed by landmines already in the ground. 
 
APII‟s detectability provisions are considered within the regime as a major 
contribution to humanitarian demining. Michael Matheson, chief US negotiator at the 
1995-96 CCW Review Conference, correctly argues that greater detectability of 
APMs – instead of the difficult to detect and long-lived APMs frequently used in 
developing world conflicts around the globe – save lives among deminers and military 
personnel operating in a mine-affected area.
378
 The compliance of China and Russia 
with this provision is instructive. The former has already met its detectability 
obligations while the latter has deferred compliance to 2014. It is significant that these 
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states and their militaries have recognised the hazards to their own forces of 
„undetectable‟ APMs and phased out such models from their arsenals on their own 
initiative. The APII regime thus provides a framework that unites self-interest – from 
the point of view of military utility – with a humanitarian demining payoff. However, 
it is wrong to suggest (as Matheson does) that this has led to a significant reduction in 
civilian casualties. Increased detectability (as opposed to self-destruct or self-
neutralise capabilities) even if adopted universally would therefore provide no 
significant humanitarian benefits for civilian safety. Moreover, the detectability 
provision in APII can only relate to current and future stocks of APMs. This fails to 
recognise the temporal dimension of the landmine issue; from a humanitarian 
demining perspective, the vast majority of the post-conflict hazards to be cleared pre-
date APII so the restrictions have no bearing on their work. 
 
It is widely recognised that while the identification and clearance of high-impact areas 
of mine infestation can lead to major benefits in the shorter term, work to remove the 
mine threat from certain areas – given the resources available and the unavoidably 
painstaking nature of manual clearance – will be a matter of decades. It is also 
acknowledged that this work will result in commensurately diminishing returns when 
the costs are weighed against humanitarian benefits. The scale of the demining task in 
severely mine-affected states was acknowledged during the APMBC regime design 
phase. However, „100% clearance‟ was retained as the benchmark for regime 
compliance. The distinction between absolute goals and relative benefits highlights 
contrasting measures of effectiveness within the regime and understood by the 
humanitarian demining community. They reflect a concern within the regime – built 
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into the design phase and carried through to implementation – that failing to define 
and meet unequivocal targets will undermine regime credibility. From a humanitarian 
demining perspective, a different emphasis is on whether investing scarce resources in 
striving to achieve absolute targets represents a justifiable humanitarian payoff.  
 
This divergence between regime and humanitarian demining priorities in the 
understanding of what constitutes effectiveness persists in the implementation phase 
and is captured in the distinction between „mine free‟ and „impact free.‟ The APMBC 
is inflexible that compliance means „100% free‟ of APMs whereas for humanitarian 
demining purposes the goal is to eliminate the threat posed to populations by these 
weapons. If there is minimal humanitarian risk from APMs then scarce resources are 
better invested elsewhere. Djibouti recognised this important distinction by declaring 
itself to be „mine safe‟ rather than „mine free‟ in its Article 7 report. In the Falkland 
Islands, Argentine minefields have been perimeter-fenced and monitored by British 
forces with the result that the only casualties recorded in the twenty-five years since 
the end of the conflict are British soldiers involved in mine clearance.
379
 In the 
Falklands, the landmine and UXO contamination has no humanitarian impact while 
the territory that is mined – beaches and peat areas380 – have little or no socio-
economic value. There is therefore no imperative for the civilian population to enter 
these areas while a permanent UK military presence regularly conducts mine 
awareness training and ensures that perimeter fencing and marking remains in place. 
Although under Article 9 of the APMBC the UK is obliged to clear the Falklands 
minefields by 1 March 2009, both the islanders and the UK government have 
suggested that the cost and effort would be better invested in severely mine affected 
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regions. Even the UK NGO Landmine Action, highly critical of government policy in 
the regime formation phase, proposed under the „Falklands Initiative‟381 that a ten 
year clearance extension be granted to the UK in exchange for additional revenues to 
be provided for severely mine affected states during this period. 
 
At least one state party may have misinterpreted humanitarian demining-related 
obligations through describing measures to emplace permanent minefield marking – 
thus implying that the land would not be cleared.
382
 This represents a qualitatively 
different case from pursuing a nuanced approach to the merits of clearance in the 
absence of humanitarian impact. The example of Kosovo, where responsibility for 
mine action in the province was prematurely handed to newly founded provisional 
government authorities, provides further evidence of the complexity of this issue. In 
Kosovo, there is significant disagreement between UNMAS declaring the province 
„impact free‟ and the HALO Trust resumption of clearance operations as a result of 
the continuing high numbers of civilian casualties. Local mine action authorities detail 
only relatively few dangerous areas yet „HALO knows these figures to be incorrect 
and is planning a joint survey….to define the remaining threat from cluster munitions 
and landmines‟.383 The same problems of certitude therefore apply whether the 
objective is to be „mine‟ or „impact‟ free. 
 
These examples demonstrate an inherent tension between the desire not to dilute the 
clarity of the anti-APM norm and considerations relevant to the effectiveness of 
humanitarian demining. In the case of the APMBC, if the consequence of regime 
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obligations is to push states to expend resources that could better be used for other 
development priorities in the hunt for the „last mine‟ then this is irrationally wasteful. 
However, our analysis of resource and political will factors that contribute to states 
parties inadvertently or deliberately failing to meet regime obligations is compelling. 
This reinforces the finding that the humanitarian imperative underpinning the regime 
must be nurtured in order to support humanitarian demining outcomes, even if this has 
an associated cost on the level of specific activities. APII provides for a qualitatively 
different approach to these concerns. Humanitarian demining issues and expertise 
were marginal to the negotiation of the regime. The impact of design factors on 
regime effectiveness is evident in provisions that do not take into account temporal 
considerations or the highly challenging environments within mine affected countries, 
in particular ignoring current levels of mine contamination. Furthermore, emphasis on 
the technical characteristics of weapons leaves little room for consideration of the 
civilians affected by them. Thus, while the regime creates positive effects, it also 
highlights an important distinction between a implementation of humanitarian 
demining-related provisions and the humanitarian impact of the regime. 
 
The humanitarian imperative underpinning both regimes points to the need to 
understand humanitarian demining in relation to wider security and development 
challenges. There is an evolving policy literature that attempts to situate humanitarian 
demining within broader peacebuilding and development fields. The literature 
emphasises how humanitarian demining reduces civilian deaths and injuries and 
allows refugees and the internally displaced to return home. It assesses its important 
enabling role for rebuilding economies, transport and other infrastructure as well as 
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providing jobs. Moreover, the human resource base for humanitarian demining points 
to potentially mutually reinforcing links between mine action and related activities 
such as DDR, SSR or SALW programmes. There is an unrealised potential for the 
integration of mine action with other peacebuilding activities. The APMBC regime 
acts as a convenor for states and multilateral institutions with humanitarian, security 
and development goals of which humanitarian demining forms only a part. Similarly, 
although the APII provision on information exchange following the cessation of 
hostilities is weak, it does point to an area recognised by the mine action community 
for its practical and political benefits where the regime could reinforce efforts to 
include mine action in peace agreements.
384
  
 
Achieving better integration with other peacebuilding and development issues 
therefore represents a realistic objective with clear humanitarian payoffs for both 
regimes. However, echoing a conclusion drawn from a review of donor policy 
statements that „the link between mine action and peacebuilding is generally 
acknowledged, but poorly developed,‟385 these „spillover effects‟ have not been 
considered within the framework of the regimes. This lack of synergy between mine 
action and broader peacebuilding and development has been acknowledged through 
Canada establishing a Contact Group on „Linking Mine Action and Development‟ in 
the APMBC.
386
 However, there is resistance to developing these linkages within the 
regime. In part this reflects fear of a reduction in overall funding levels for 
humanitarian demining or a dilution of the effectiveness of humanitarian demining 
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programming.
387
 But it also represents an acknowledgement that the success of the 
Ottawa Process has stemmed from the way APMs have been isolated and stigmatised 
as a humanitarian threat. The relative lack of integration of mine action is thus 
significant. It enhances our understanding of regime dynamics by showing that there 
is actually a common interest shared by APMBC regime partisans and mine action 
practitioners to maintain the uniqueness of the issue area. While not discussed in the 
existing literature, systematically applying our research framework to the area of 
humanitarian demining thus clarifies different costs to regime effectiveness (as well 
as some benefits) from the perspectives of resources, political will and humanitarian 
impact in pursuing this strategy.  
 
4. Conclusions 
 
Analysing the implementation processes of the two landmine regimes in detail and 
through the lens of regime theory provides new insights to confirm the hypothesis that 
the relationship between regime design and implementation is critical to landmine 
regime effectiveness. In particular, an important distinction is demonstrated between 
overtly beneficial „ideal‟ provisions and their effectiveness in support of humanitarian 
demining. A number of provisions in both regime frameworks, through flaws and 
compromises in regime design, are largely redundant in the face of a combination of 
climate, geography and the socio-economic needs of local populations. From a 
military utility perspective, in the context of APII there was awareness among the 
original drafters of the protocol that the term „pre-planned‟ minefield was opaque and 
unrealistic in relation to both traditional and asymmetric uses of landmines. These 
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insights thus contribute to addressing research questions that consider the relationship 
between international regime commitments and national implementation processes by 
demonstrating considerable costs in terms of regime effectiveness as a result of failure 
to address field realities in regime design.  
 
If the regimes exert positive effects on resource mobilisation for humanitarian 
demining, this chapter highlights an important distinction between quantitative and 
qualitative criteria for effectiveness in the area of resource generation. While 
resources have increased measurably, the regimes do not contribute to efforts to 
ensure that funding translates into targeted, sustained and effective support to 
humanitarian demining. The regimes are particularly weak in focusing the influence 
and conditionalities that could be applied when faced with „hard cases.‟ Thus, while 
misuse of donor resources is open knowledge in many demining contexts, it is not a 
focus within the regime. Perception gaps between association within the regimes of 
effectiveness with the level of funding made available for mine action and the more 
nuanced definition applied in this thesis reflect an important split between an evolving 
mine action discourse and regime frameworks that are unable to learn and adapt to 
more qualitative criteria for effectiveness. 
 
Chapter 4 deconstructs the highly political landmine regime formation process while 
Chapter 5 builds on this by providing new insights to both political as well as 
technical determinants of regime effectiveness in the implementation phase. This 
chapter reinforces these research findings by demonstrating that to shape effectiveness 
in the area of humanitarian demining the regimes must address both these dimensions. 
Emulation effects have proved a major factor in swelling APMBC regime 
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membership. However, this chapter elaborates a qualitatively different set of 
challenges relating to the political will necessary to implement humanitarian 
demining-related provision. In many mine affected states, the desire to cut a positive 
international figure through regime membership has not been followed up with 
domestic implementation measures or in some cases has led to misleading reporting 
of the level of compliance with humanitarian demining obligations. Moreover, the 
number of APMBC members seeking extensions to clearance obligations shows the 
challenge of achieving this goal for mine affected states, regardless of considerations 
of political will.  
 
A central implementation challenge is the ability of the regimes to support mine-
affected regime members to fulfil humanitarian demining-related obligations and 
avoid defection. This chapter demonstrates that domestic implementation of regime 
obligations is either not a priority or is beyond the means of many mine affected 
states. The absence of domestic implementing legislation provides a clear indicator of 
such a lack of commitment that is acknowledged in the humanitarian demining 
community but has not provided a catalyst for action within the regimes. The inability 
of the APMBC to link political will for regime formation to a commensurate 
commitment to implementation nuances our understanding of the influence of norms 
across different phases of regime development. The lack of focus on hard 
implementation challenges also further clarifies the costs of disjunctions between 
regime and mine action priorities. This demonstrates an unacknowledged gap in the 
focus of the regimes that ignores humanitarian demining-related implementation 
challenges in practice.   
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This chapter demonstrates that if knowledge related to humanitarian demining is 
becoming more effectively networked, the APMBC implementation process – driven 
by politico-diplomatic and advocacy expertise – is de-linked from this evolving 
discourse. The APII regime, although addressing technical implementation issues, is 
similarly disengaged since its focus is not on humanitarian demining but on issues of 
detectability and self-destruct / self-neutralise that underpin the regime‟s restrictions-
based approach. The consequence for both regimes is that they fulfill an important 
role in packaging and disseminating information and analysis. However, the capacity 
is lacking to assess this in qualitative terms and engage in necessary course 
corrections. Our analysis of how influential regime stakeholders are clustered in 
implementation demonstrates a lack of developing world buy in during the 
implementation phase. This provides an important corrective to the accepted narrative 
of the APMBC as a „participatory‟ regime. Critically, gaps in regime design have not 
been filled through opening up decision making mechanisms to a broader range of 
expertise in the implementation process. 
 
Tensions between the concepts of „mine free‟ and „impact free‟ add to our knowledge 
of the significance of the dislocation between the APMBC regime and mine action 
priorities in the area of humanitarian demining. There is a clear challenge to regime 
effectiveness if states parties declare themselves mine free for political reasons or 
through a lack of appreciation of the threat in their own countries. On the one hand, if 
„mine free‟ becomes a negotiated term rather than an absolute requirement then this 
would permit the better targeting of resources to humanitarian demining operations. 
However, such an approach also runs the risk of eroding the key normative foundation 
of the regime and thus reducing the pressure on regime members (as well as non-
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members) to comply with its provisions. Lowering the bar for compliance to „impact 
free‟ could also increase the risk of voluntary or involuntary defection through states 
misunderstanding or deliberately misinterpreting their obligations. This dilemma 
poses a key challenge for the evolution of the APMBC regime because it presents a 
significant barrier to aligning regime and mine action goals. 
 
This chapter provides a critical analysis of the implementation and effectiveness of 
the two landmine regimes in the area of humanitarian demining. Different frames of 
reference and communities within design and implementation clusters have resulted in 
only one regime – the APMBC – that focuses directly on humanitarian demining. 
However, the APII regime contributes to humanitarian demining goals given the 
potential benefits offered through regulating different categories of landmine. Yet the 
common feature of both regimes – provisions that have proved difficult or unrealistic 
to enforce in the face of implementation challenges – point to a significant dislocation 
between the regimes and the humanitarian demining community. These gaps 
represent missed opportunities for the regimes to generate positive effects on 
humanitarian demining policy and practice. The following chapter builds on this 
analysis through assessing common or distinct challenges to regime effectiveness in 
the context of landmine stockpile destruction. 
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Chapter 7 
Stockpile Destruction and the Landmine Regimes 
 
1. Introduction 
 
This chapter contributes to our overall research aims through developing new insights 
into the contribution of the landmine regimes to destroying all stocks of landmines 
prohibited under the respective treaty frameworks. The technical, resource and 
security implications of stockpile destruction provide important considerations for 
research questions that address the interrelated technical and political dimensions of 
regime effectiveness. The burden on affected states to clearly identify and destroy 
stocks on their territory informs our understanding of how international commitments 
translate into national level implementation. Related research questions specific to 
stockpile destruction consider the clarity of provisions on which stocks must be 
destroyed and when, the feasibility of commitments in relation to the challenging 
environments in which stockpile destruction takes place, the ability of the regimes to 
incentivise or enforce compliance as well as the implications of deferral periods and 
other compromises that came about through negotiations in the regime design phase.  
 
In practical terms, stockpile destruction represents the only way to ensure landmines 
are never used. A growing awareness of the importance of stockpile destruction to 
achieving underpinning humanitarian goals is reflected in the emphasis placed within 
the two treaty regimes on states meeting their destruction deadlines. Stockpile 
destruction also has an inherent attraction for political and advocacy purposes since it 
is easily measured (in comparison to activities such as mine risk education or victim 
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assistance) and thus may represent an easily demonstrable success story for the 
regimes. This chapter builds on the findings within Chapter 6 that analyse the costs to 
regime effectiveness of disjunctions between regime and mine action priorities. This 
issue is further developed through analysing the potential tension between a focus on 
mines destroyed as a quantitative (and highly visible) measure of regime effectiveness 
and the evolving understanding within the mine action community that emphasises 
the qualitative criterion of socio-economic and humanitarian impact in determining 
effectiveness. 
 
Fulfilling the regimes‟ stockpile destruction obligations requires a combination of 
technical capacity and the political will to take this step. It is therefore regarded as a 
key commitment that, if not met by states parties, would undermine regime goals and 
credibility. With different regime memberships and contrasting approaches to 
stockpile destruction, understanding how the regimes contribute to addressing the 
resource, political and humanitarian dimensions of stockpile destruction represents a 
central research objective of this chapter. Given both the costs of stockpile destruction 
and the national security implications of giving up this capacity, contributing to 
research questions that address and explore the ability of the regimes to identify and 
deal with defection is particularly significant in this chapter. 
 
This chapter seeks to understand the effectiveness of the regimes in influencing the 
behaviour of both regime members and non-members. Regime interplay dynamics 
that result in effects beyond regime membership may be particularly significant given 
that states with huge stockpiles of APMs are not members of the APMBC while a 
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number of APII member states have deferred compliance with certain of its key 
provisions.  
 
Concerns of agency in relation to how the regimes address stockpile destruction are 
highly relevant given the disconnect, highlighted in earlier chapters, between 
stakeholder clusters involved in the design and implementation phases of the regimes. 
The role played by practitioner communities responsible for stockpile destruction is 
thus an important focus of this chapter. Building on analysis in Chapters 5 and 6, if 
the regimes address the challenges of stockpile destruction solely from the perspective 
of state actors, regime effectiveness is impaired by the lack of emphasis on stockpiled 
landmines held and used by ANSAs. Thus, while IHL in general and the landmine 
regime leadership in particular may demonstrate strongly state-centric dynamics, how 
the regimes interact with international and sub-state actors in the area of stockpile 
destruction is highly significant for regime effectiveness. 
 
The APMBC contains provisions specifically dealing with stockpile destruction while 
this activity is a consequence of complying with a number of restrictions contained in 
APII. This chapter begins by critically analysing stockpile destruction implementation 
through the regimes in the light of insights drawn from the mine action discourse. 
New understandings on why defection occurs are developed through relating regime 
obligations to technical and political stockpile destruction challenges. Applying the 
research framework utilised throughout this thesis, it then considers the effectiveness 
of measures to destroy stockpiled landmines through the two regimes under the 
themes of resources, political will and humanitarian impact. This chapter concludes 
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by considering new contributions to knowledge drawn from an individual and 
comparative analysis of APII and the APMBC in the field of stockpile destruction. 
 
2. Regime implementation and stockpile destruction 
 
This section considers the relationship between regime provisions and the challenges 
faced in supporting stockpile destruction in different mine affected contexts. Given 
the range of implementation challenges related to stockpile destruction, this section 
considers ways in which the regimes support states parties in meeting their 
obligations. While acknowledging that the line between the two may be blurred, cases 
of involuntary and voluntary defection are considered. Compliance monitoring and 
verification in relation to stockpile destruction is addressed in order to further 
elaborate on our research questions into the significance of regime learning for 
landmine regimes. This section therefore considers how far the regimes are aware of 
challenges and can adapt to provide for more effective implementation.  
 
2.1 Regime rules and field realities 
 
It is a central tenet of regime theory that regime rules should reflect a clear 
understanding of the measures required to implement them, demonstrating the 
intrinsic link between regime design and implementation. Chapter 4 analyses how the 
language contained in the provisions of both regimes reflects particularities of the 
regime design process and, in particular, the knowledge base of the design clusters. 
From a mine action perspective, the definition of stockpile destruction set out in the 
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IMAS
388
 does not clarify what should be destroyed: APMs, AVMs or other weapons 
and ammunition. This approach reflects the reality that landmines are frequently 
stockpiled with other munitions that may themselves pose a hazard. Consequently, in 
the context of post-conflict stockpile destruction undertaken for security reasons, the 
destruction of landmines is not distinguished from other explosive ordnance. 
Conceptual fuzziness is also a deliberate step so as not to align too narrowly with the 
definitions of a single regime framework.  
 
The contexts within which stockpile destruction takes place suggest a distinction 
between three types of stockpile destruction: the disposal of competently stored state 
inventories of landmines; the destruction of caches of arms found in post-conflict 
countries (as undertaken in Iraq following the US-led invasion); and, the destruction 
of weapons found and grouped for destruction as a result of humanitarian demining 
activities.  
 
In the first category of state inventories, the two landmine regimes have made a clear, 
measurable, and with the APMBC, dramatic impact in reducing global landmine 
stockpiles. Landmine Monitor calculates that in the mid 1990s, 131 states possessed 
stockpiles of more than 260 million APMs. 2008 estimates suggest that 44 countries 
now stockpile about 176 million APMs. Among APMBC states parties, as of August 
2008, 144 of the 156 regime members have completed destruction of their stockpiles. 
Collectively this represents a total of some 42 million stockpiled APMs destroyed 
since the treaty‟s entry into force set against some 14 million still held by regime 
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members.
389
 Compliance with APII requirements has led to significant destruction of 
non-compliant stocks. China in November 2005 declared that it had destroyed some 
500‟000 landmines not compliant with APII. The US in June 1998 completed 
destruction of over 3.3 million dumb (non-self destruct) landmines, retaining only 
those needed for training and research as well as for use in the South Korean de-
militarised zone.
390
 These figures demonstrate that while stockpile destruction raises a 
number of significant challenges, observance of the relevant provisions has had a 
demonstrable quantitative impact in reducing global landmine levels.  
 
In the latter two categories (post-conflict caches and weapons collected through 
humanitarian demining), destruction activities have always formed a necessary part of 
mine action but have not been the focus of significant attention within the framework 
of the regimes. It is therefore important to distinguish regime-specific effects from the 
broader impact of mine action activities. One important set of implementation issues 
relates to how far the provisions for stockpile destruction in both regimes are 
consistent with field realities and requirements within the mine action community. It 
also throws up politically sensitive questions on defection unpacked below that relate 
to how stockpile destruction obligations are interpreted by regime members.  
 
Article 4 of the APMBC obliges regime members to ensure the destruction of all 
stockpiled APMs „it owns or possesses or that are under its jurisdiction or control, as 
soon as possible but not later than four years after the entry into force of this 
Convention for that State Party.‟391 There is therefore a clear timetable for the 
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destruction of stockpiled APMs. Unlike Article 5 on mine clearance, which sets a 
deadline of ten years for the clearance of mined areas but allows the possibility of 
extension periods, the stockpile destruction deadline is non-renewable. Similarly, 
although APII contains no specific provisions on the destruction of stockpiles, if a 
state party is unable or unwilling to make stocks compliant with provisions on 
detectability, self-destruction or self-neutralisation, then destruction is the only 
feasible alternative. As Maslen notes, „since the Protocol prohibits the use or transfer 
of an unlawful weapon, it is likely, in practice, to destroy it.‟392 A deferral period of 9 
years for these provisions therefore represents a de facto deadline for stockpile 
destruction (unless stocks are adapted for compliance). 
 
However, stockpile destruction continues to be a significant challenge for APMBC 
regime implementation. Remaining stocks held by regime members represent the 
„hard cases‟ in terms of capacity and political will that must be destroyed in line with 
regime rules. Outside of the APMBC framework, the major holders of stockpiles – 
China (110 million), Russia (74 million) the US (10.4 million), Pakistan (6 million) 
and India (4-5 million) – are APII members and therefore must ensure compliance 
with its provisions.
393
 The relevance of APII in this area is further emphasised by the 
fact that these major landmine stockpilers are highly unlikely to sign up to an APM 
ban in the foreseeable future. 
 
The 2004 Nairobi Action Plan calls for two mutually reinforcing sets of actions in 
order to achieve the treaty‟s stockpile destruction objectives. First, states parties are 
requested to identify and report on all stockpiled APMs, to establish national and local 
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capacities necessary to meet their deadlines and to develop plans, identify priorities, 
problems and requests for assistance in a timely manner. Second, states parties „in a 
position to do so‟ are required to assist others in meeting stockpile destruction 
obligations.
394
 These requirements reflect obligations applicable to both regimes and 
capture the two key elements of successful implementation:  
 
 The ability and willingness of states to meet their obligations 
 The level of assistance provided by third parties in meeting these goals 
 
The APMBC regime, through its regular implementation monitoring meetings, has 
acknowledged the distinction between explicit regime provisions and the context-
specific challenges of implementing them. Recognising the danger of losing track of 
whether landmines have been stockpiled, retained for training purposes or destroyed, 
Action 15 of the Nairobi Action Plan requires:  
 
When previously unknown stockpiles are discovered after stockpile destruction deadlines have passed, 
report such activities in accordance with their obligations under Article 7, take advantage of other 
informal means to share such information and destroy those mines as a matter of urgent priority. 
 
However, the disjointed relationship between these requirements and field realities are 
well illustrated through considering the experience of a mine affected regime member. 
Angola, with work hampered because landmine caches are frequently found in 
heavily mined and difficult to access areas, has suggested that it may require an 
extension to its deadline for destruction of APM stockpiles. The terse statement in 
Landmine Monitor to the effect that „the Mine Ban Treaty does not allow extensions 
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for stockpile destruction‟395 fails to acknowledge or address the implementation 
challenges that caused Angola to miss its destruction deadline in the first place. 
Although strictly in breach of its treaty obligations since January 2007, defection is by 
a heavily mine-affected state in need of assistance. A lack of recognition of this 
reality in the regime‟s response to Angola‟s implementation challenge is significant 
because it suggests a gap between the form of regime support and its substance in 
supporting regime members in practice. 
 
2.2 Involuntary and voluntary defection in regime implementation 
 
This sub-section builds on the preceding analysis of gaps between regime provisions 
and practical stockpile destruction challenges by analysing defection in this area of 
the mine action agenda. States‟ ability to meet their obligations is a key determinant 
of successful implementation. Given the cost and potential complexity of stockpile 
destruction, the danger of involuntary defection would seem to be significant for 
mine-affected states. This poses a dilemma since many countries have neither the 
resources nor the technological base to develop appropriate destruction facilities. The 
need within the regime framework to support national implementation is therefore 
evident. States willingness to meet regime obligations is at least as important in 
understanding implementation. The potential for voluntary defecion therefore 
represents an important component of our analysis. 
 
In a statement to the Standing Committee on Stockpile Destruction, the DRC declared 
that it had fulfilled its APMBC stockpile destruction commitment by destroying all 
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stockpiled APMs under its control „that it had been able to identify.‟396 The statement 
went on to acknowledge the likelihood of finding additional stockpiles in the future in 
parts of the country under the control of ANSAs. The existence of such stocks has 
been confirmed through the small numbers of APMs handed over to the United 
Nations through its DDR programme.
397
 For the ICBL, this statement creates an 
unsatisfactory doubt as to whether the DRC is compliant with its Article 4 
obligation.
398
 However, the ambiguity is not the result of a lack of clarity over regime 
obligations but rather a reflection of the inability of the government to exert oversight 
and control over the national territory.
 399
 A December 2005 roundtable meeting on 
the implementation of the APMBC in DRC demonstrated a further dimension to the 
challenge faced by the state in highlighting the absence of a coherent structure or clear 
management responsibilities responsible for the country‟s treaty obligations within 
the government. This situation was exacerbated by the instability faced by the post-
conflict government during a period of political transition in the build up to national 
elections.
400
  
 
In a similar example, Afghanistan declared at the May 2006 meeting of the Standing 
Committee on Stockpile Destruction that all „known‟ stockpiles would be destroyed 
by its March 2007 deadline. However, at the same meeting Afghan representatives 
acknowledged the challenge of addressing „the need for local commanders and 
villagers to voluntarily give up their stockpiled caches or to disclose the locations of 
                                                                                                                                            
395
 Landmine Monitor (2008): p.9. 
396
 Presentation by the DRC, Standing Committee on Stockpile Destruction, Geneva, 11 May 2006. 
397
 United Nations, Statement on the Issue of Stockpile Destruction to the Intersessional Programme 
(2005). 
398
 Landmine Monitor (2006): p.326.   
399
 In June 2005, the United Nations Mission in DRC (MONUC) reported that the Union of Congolese 
Patriots – Lubamba (UPC/L) had been responsible for mine laying. UN OCHA „Monitoring de la 
Situation Humanitaire en RDC, du 11 au 17 Juin 2005‟. 
289 
 
them.‟401 While the deadline was missed by 6 months, Afghanistan‟s formal 
notification of the completion of stockpile destruction in October 2007 retained the 
proviso that this relates to „known‟ stockpiles.402 Subsequent to this date further small 
quantities of APMs have been recovered from caches while there has also been 
reporting of minelaying by Taliban forces.
403
 
 
How far provisions provide latitude for differing interpretations and enable regime 
members to evade their obligations is an important consideration across different 
types of regime. This challenge has been exemplified in the APMBC context by 
Turkmenistan, stating in its first Article 7 report in October 2001, that 761‟782 APMs 
remained from an initial stockpile of 1.7 million. Destruction was estimated to take 8 
years and an extension to its destruction deadline was requested.
404
 Interventions by 
the co-chairs of the Stockpile Destruction Standing Committee saw Turkmenistan 
clarify that it would meet its deadline and that only 250‟000 APMs remained.405 In 
subsequent reporting of its successful destruction programme, it was announced that 
some 70‟000 APMs would be retained for training and testing as provided for under 
Article 3. This figure is well beyond the numbers understood by other states parties to 
be required for training or testing and was criticised for breaching the spirit of the 
treaty. The Turkmen Embassy to NATO subsequently wrote to the European 
Commission stating that in February 2004 some 60‟000 further APMs would be 
destroyed.
406
 Finally, in April 2005, all stocks including those originally reserved for 
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training were destroyed. An addendum provided by Landmine Monitor points out that 
all these figures were wildly inaccurate since the Turkmen authorities had confused 
the number of cassettes with the number of individual APMs. Rather than 70‟000 
APMs the real figure at that point was 572‟200!407 
 
Clarity, support from regime members, coherence and links between primary 
obligations and enabling provisions are identified within different regimes as 
important considerations for the implementation of regime rules.
408
 Although formally 
joining the regime on 1 March 1999, Turkmenistan only attended an intersessional 
meeting in June 2004 for the first time and failed to attend the subsequent 2005 
meetings. Similarly, its first two Article 7 reports were incomplete and the third 
consisted of a four-sentence statement. The short space between signature of the 
treaty (3 December 1997) and ratification (19 January 1998) reinforces the hypothesis 
that provision for domestic implementation modalities represents an important 
indicator for commitment to national implementation.  
 
The cases analysed in his sub-section provide important insights to implementation 
challenges in the area of stockpile destruction. This allows us to identify missed 
opportunities but also limitations in what the regimes can achieve in preventing 
defection. APMBC reporting by Afghanistan and DRC highlight the practical 
difficulties certain regime members face in ascertaining the numbers and locations of 
APM stockpiles on the national territory. Declarations by states are thus shown to be 
inadequate where ANSAs retain de facto control of parts of the national territory. It is 
untenable for the government to claim full compliance with its national stockpile 
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destruction obligations given the number of armed groups at large across the country 
that certainly hold stockpiles and in some cases have been accused of mine laying. 
Stockpile destruction challenges also demonstrate both the potential for abuse as well 
as the lack of capacity in some states to internalise and implement obligations through 
their own bureaucratic structures. The lack of depth to central state structures – the 
inability to effectively implement, manage and oversee regime commitments at the 
national level – render meaningless the quantitative approach to implementation 
promoted within the regime. Instead, thse cases of involuntary defection reinforce our 
research finding that the absence of qualitative approaches that emphasise national 
capacity building represent a barrier to realising regime goals.  
 
Turkmenistan‟s stockpile destruction history provides additional insights. This case is 
significant both in highlighting capacity gaps that contribute to regime defection and 
in demonstrating the limitations of regime support for implementation in this area. 
Given that Turkmenistan has few diplomatic ties to other countries and very limited 
engagement in the APMBC intersessional work programme, there has been limited 
scope for the regime to engage Turkmenistan over its commitments. The difficulty of 
engaging with a state that has severe capacity deficits and does not want or is not able 
to engage in a process of implementation within the framework of the regime is 
therefore apparent. 
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2.3 Verification 
 
As discussed above, beyond practical implementation challenges, political will 
represents a key consideration for stockpile destruction. More than withholding use, 
destruction represents the ultimate step in giving up a useful military capability. In 
this regard, compliance monitoring and verification are particularly important for 
regimes in different issue areas in providing checks and balances on regime members. 
This sub-section therefore buids on earlier analysis of implementation challenges and 
cases of defection from stockpile destruction obligations to refine our understanding 
of the ability of the regimes to identify and address implementation challenges 
through compliance monitoring and verification. 
 
APMBC Article 7 reports require states parties to report on the size of APM 
stockpiles,
409
 the numbers and types of mines retained for training in humanitarian 
demining-related activities
410
 and progress in stockpile destruction efforts.
411
 
Emphasis is placed on accessibility of information to all interested parties
412
 so 
reports are made freely available on the website of the United Nations Department for 
Disarmament Affairs (DDA).
413
 APII reporting requirements do not specifically 
mention stockpile destruction but do require reporting on „steps taken to meet 
technical requirements of this protocol.‟414 To facilitate reporting, states agreed to a 
common reporting format while VERTIC, the UK-based organisation specialising in 
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verification of disarmament treaty obligations, developed a guide to assist states 
parties in fulfilling their reporting requirements. E-MINE is a further mechanism 
developed to support stockpile destruction, providing a consolidated reference point 
for technical papers, guidelines and lessons learned on stockpile destruction.
415
 An in-
kind donation from Canada to UNMAS enabled the system‟s development. It thus 
represents an example of bilateral mine action support by an APMBC member to the 
UN that also contributes directly to meeting regime goals. Significantly, enhancing 
transparency represents a common objective that aligns regime and mine action 
interests. This approach has led to increased confidence within the regime as well as 
technical spport for implementation through making available consolidated advice on 
stockpile destruction.  
 
Chapters 5 and 6 demonstrate the influential role of informal verification mechanisms 
in the absence of „active‟ verification within either regime. Civil society, mobilised 
through the ICBL, plays a central role in APMBC verification of stockpile destruction 
provisions while also monitoring CCW compliance issues. As with humanitarian 
demining, Landmine Monitor represents the most important source for information 
and analysis on states‟ compliance with their stockpile destruction obligations under 
the landmine regimes. Despite a common verification framework, stockpile 
destruction can be distinguished from the other pillars of mine action because of the 
dominant role played by states and commercial companies in conducting this activity. 
Landmine Monitor’s function is thus particularly significant as a mechanism that 
provides the views of a network of individuals reporting from the countries in 
question. The state or commercially driven nature of stockpile destruction means that 
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this may be the only evidence base or alternative view emerging from certain states 
parties.  
 
Russia ratified APII on 2 March 2005 and for the first time disclosed the size of its 
landmine stockpile, consisting of 26.5 million APMs of which 23.5 million are to be 
destroyed by 2015 after a nine year deferral period.
416
 The implementation challenge 
is particularly complex because Russia possesses between 7-10 million PFM-1 type 
APMs that are highly sensitive and well beyond their shelf life.
417
 In order to meet 
stockpile destruction obligations, Russia developed a method of destruction involving 
encasing in concrete which has been widely acknowledged as crucial in destroying 
over 13 million of these weapons to date.
418
 On the other hand, according to 
Landmine Monitor’s Russia author R. Dogov, destruction plans and adequate 
resources are not in place with little commitment by Russian authorities and a lack of 
engagement by international actors. He also suggests that inappropriate storage 
conditions and „self-switching‟ of mines to combat mode pose a very high risk of self-
detonation. This forms part of a broader problem, acknowledged by Dogov that „In 
Russia itself, demining activities lack standardization, verification, and control 
mechanisms. They cannot be regarded as humanitarian, and the scale on which they 
take place is inadequate.‟ 419 
 
As the major category of mine users, ANSAs represent an important target for 
verification measures. The 2008 Landmine Monitor reports ANSA stockpiles of 
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APMs on the territory of 9 states parties.
420
 However, in most cases these numbers 
represent stockpiles seized by government forces. Verification therefore provides a 
very partial picture that is of limited utility because it fails to capture the size of the 
stockpiles available to armed groups. Once seized, the weapons are no longer a 
humanitarian threat unless states fail to destroy them in line with their obligations. 
Geneva Call acknowledges the difficulty of obtaining good data on stocks held by 
ANSAs, attributing this in part to a reluctance to show their hand. In line with 
defection challenges faced by national actors in some mine affected states, it also 
reflects a lack of oversight and control over weapons caches,
421
 including both factory 
and home made devices, that can be cached, buried under ground, or in some cases 
kept in the homes of civilians. Verification of ANSA stockpiles thus represents a 
doubly challenging regime obligation for national authorities and international actors 
since both quantitative and qualitative data is difficult to obtain. 
 
This sub-section highlights a fundamental distinction between implementation 
processes under the two regimes. Essentially these can be characterised as „active‟ 
and „passive‟ approaches to verification and its relationship to regime 
implementation. The diverse actors within the APMBC implementation cluster are 
mobilised in ways that encourage identification of potential implementation 
challenges. States parties are lobbied by civil society to address implementation 
challenges while common interests have fostered links to expert communities – both 
donors and technical specialists – that can contribute to problem solving. In contrast, 
APII states parties report on stockpile destruction in order to demonstrate compliance 
with regime rules. Yet there is limited transparency on how regime commitments are 
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to be achieved and no mechanism whereby comparative experience can be shared or 
advice sought that could address implementation challenges. Analysing official versus 
civil society views of Russia‟s stockpile destruction record is instructive. Providing 
information on APM stockpiles is an important step. But the fact that for Russia this 
only occurred in 2005
422
 demonstrates a response to a regime commitment as opposed 
to a desire to support humanitarian goals. Reflecting analysis in previous chapters, 
Russia‟s stockpile destruction commitments cannot be isolated from the reality of its 
continued use of APMs. The absence of „active‟ verification informed by mine action 
practitioners thus contributes to sustaining the lack of confidence reflected in 
Landmine Monitor reports. 
 
3. Regime effectiveness and stockpile destruction 
 
That stockpile destruction is the most recent activity to be recognised as one of the 
pillars of mine action suggests an earlier lack of focus on this issue. While stockpile 
destruction is now understood as a key element of mine action, it continues to receive 
little attention on a policy level as a regime implementation issue. This reflects the 
widespread perception that it is purely a „technical‟ activity. In this context, the need 
for flexibility to adapt to better achieve regime objectives as the challenges of 
implementation become more apparent over time is a central dimension of regime 
effectiveness. Underdal‟s twofold determination is therefore particularly relevant to 
regime effectiveness in the area of stockpile destruction. Increased resources and 
political will in this area represent two key indicators of regime effectiveness.
423
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Moreover, if stockpile destruction is carried out ineffectively or provokes other 
negative consequences then it fails to meet the humanitarian criterion for 
effectiveness that underpins both regimes and which distinguishes IHL regimes from 
many other issue areas.  
 
This section considers the effectiveness of APII and the APMBC‟s contribution to 
stockpile destruction. Increased support by donors and national actors for stockpile 
destruction as a result of the influence of the landmine regimes is one clear indicator 
of effectiveness. Yet achievements must also be set against the scale of the task still to 
be completed and the likelihood of goals being realised. Flexibility to address 
changing demands over time is crucial. This quality includes addressing evolving 
appreciations of stockpile destruction requirements or challenges that arise during the 
implementation process such as those posed by different interpretations of regime 
obligations. In order to fulfill Underdal‟s definition in the sense of the realisation of 
underpinning regime objectives, three criteria are applied. Resources made available 
for this activity are a key consideration given the costs associated with stockpile 
destruction and the resource deficits faced by many mine-affected states. Political will 
refers to the ability of the regimes to gain support for regime objectives among regime 
members, non-members as well as international and non-state actors. Finally, this 
section considers the humanitarian criterion for effectiveness. How far has the 
regimes‟ focus on stockpile destruction made an impact on the humanitarian suffering 
caused by these weapons in different contexts? 
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3.1 Resources 
 
While stockpile destruction has been folded into wider security assistance 
programmes in different regions, few donors have placed significant emphasis on 
stockpile destruction as a priority in their commitment to mine action. One argument 
explored below is that this may be attributed to its apparently technical nature in 
comparison to the more overtly „humanitarian‟ pillars of mine action. This is 
consistent with a „norm bandwagon‟ effect influential in facilitating APMBC regime 
formation. Moreover, as an activity mostly conducted by national militaries and 
commercial companies, stockpile destruction does not involve a diverse 
implementation cluster when compared to other mine action sectors. This is 
compounded by the fact that the regime formation phase was internationalised and 
therefore relatively transparent, thus exerting political pressure on states to join the 
regime. However, implementation takes place on a national level where both pressure 
and support – in the form of expertise and resources – are lacking. This has costs in 
terms of regime effectiveness.  
 
Canada provides one of the few examples of a bilateral donor that contributes 
significant resources for stockpile destruction, providing technical expertise, material, 
equipment and financial support. Canada has supported mine action in Central 
America through the OAS Comprehensive Action against Anti-personnel Mines 
(AICMA) programme. Echoing the regional approach to regime formation, one 
element of this programme of support involved using the 3
rd
 meeting of states parties 
to the APMBC in Managua as a target date for the destruction of all APM stockpiles 
by regime members in the region. This provides a significant example that 
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demonstrates how regime goals can be achieved through fusing the technical and 
political dimensions of the implementation process. Using political deadlines to 
achieve technical regime objectives in this case provides a powerful means of exerting 
positive conditionality on regime members.  
 
Multilateral institutions have proved effective vehicles in supporting stockpile 
destruction. Work through NATO‟s Partnership for Peace Programme (PfP) with 22 
APMBC states parties has resulted in the destruction of more than 6.25 million 
APMs.
424
 The PfP Programme provided a means to support Ukraine in the destruction 
of its (non-PFM-1) APM stocks. The Belarus Ministry of Defence has accepted 
technical assistance from the European Commission to assist in the destruction of 
3.37 million PFM-1 APMs while the European Commission also awarded a contract 
worth Euro 3 million for the destruction of Ukraine‟s 5.95 million PFM-type mines.  
From a security perspective, the broader policy implications of PfP stockpile 
destruction work were underlined by then NATO Secretary General Lord Robertson 
who characterised it as „a very practical example of our concrete cooperation on 
defence reform and our joint efforts to eliminate the legacy of the Cold War‟.425 This 
initiative has also been identified as reducing the risk of trafficking posed by 
stockpiled weapons in the former Soviet Union.
426
 
 
Angola‟s stockpile destruction programme is jointly funded by the European 
Commission (85%), the Government of Angola (10%) and UNDP (5%). This positive 
example of external assistance in conjunction with national commitment to the 
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destruction programme is particularly conspicuous in the absence of a broader picture 
of resources dedicated to stockpile destruction by mine affected states. This is an 
important lacuna given that alongside the less tangible quality of political will, 
resource commitment provides the clearest indication of regime members taking 
responsibility for their obligations. While some mine affected states do provide such 
information, the lack of information on stockpiles and their destruction is particularly 
acute in the case of ANSAs. Among APMBC member states, only the DRC has 
included details in its Article 7 reporting of APMs seized from non-state groups.
427
 
Moreover, as the work of Geneva Call demonstrates, while ANSAs may be prepared 
to commit resources and destroy stocks under their Deed of Commitment, such 
activities are not conducted under the regimes‟ verification mechanisms so issues of 
transparency and accountability remain. 
 
It is important to acknowledge the resource imperative for stockpile destruction 
beyond the level of financial assistance. For example, destroying ordnance found 
through humanitarian demining operations is frequently undermined by the difficulty 
of obtaining significant quantities of high explosive to carry out in situ destruction. 
The APMBC regime discourse ignores this practical issue for stockpile destruction 
implementation. This points to an additional gap between the regime‟s political 
objective of achieving comprehensive implementation and its ability to understand 
contextually defined implementation challenges and mobilise its membership to 
achieve these objectives in practice. Stockpile destruction thus provides another 
dimension to inform our hypothesis that stakeholder clustering is critical to landmine 
regime effectveness. The lack of practitioner expertise in the implementation cluster 
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impairs regime effectiveness through the lack of appreciation of the challenges to be 
overcome in this area. 
 
If the generation of resources is one indicator of an effective regime then neither APII 
nor the APMBC can be considered effective under this criterion. I demonstrate that 
one reason for this gap is a reluctance to support a technical dimension of a 
humanitarian issue area. However, this has costs because it fails to take into account 
the significant humanitarian payoffs offered by stockpile destruction. While less 
visible in regime implementation, it is significant that this criterion continues to affect 
states‟ choices. This reflects a lack of practitioner input to regime implementation in 
this area that could demonstrate significant returns from relatively modest material 
mor financial investments in mine affected states. 
 
3.2 Political will  
 
Only through engaging in the process of implementation can states fully understand 
the implications of regime obligations. While the APMBC has clearly led to increased 
political will for stockpile destruction in developed states, the learning curve is 
particularly steep where states lack the capacity to ensure international obligations 
will be implemented at the national level. As discussed in Chapter 5, failing to enact 
domestic implementing legislation or to adopt other necessary measures as a result of 
the short time period between signature and ratification are indications that the costs 
of regime membership have not been fully assessed. Both the cost and the sensitivity 
of permanently removing landmines from arsenals represent significant obstacles to 
regime effectiveness. In particular, treating stockpile destruction as a technical 
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activity fails to take into account the need to generate political will to implement 
destruction programmes. This section therefore considers the influence of the regimes 
in generating the requisite political will to implement their stockpile destruction 
requirements. In particular, how regimes adapt in the face of challenges that only 
become apparent during the process of implementation is considered in order to 
further explore our research questions relating on regime flexibility and learning.  
 
Article 3 of the APMBC allows „the minimum number absolutely necessary‟ of 
APMs to be retained for „the development of and training in mine detection, mine 
clearance or mine destruction techniques.‟428 Some 216‟000 APMs are currently held 
by states parties for research and training purposes as permitted under this provision. 
More than half retain between 1-5 thousand APMs with 23 states retaining less than 
1‟000. 4 states account for nearly one third of retained APMs.429 It is significant that 
38 APMBC states parties that retain APMs for training and testing have not reported 
using any for these activities over two consecutive years. This suggests an absence of 
political will to re-evaluate training and testing needs over time to ensure consistency 
with the minimum requirement stipulated under Article 3.  
 
In Sudan, „mines retained‟ has become a highly political issue that has been linked to 
the development of the peace process. Thus, following the principle agreed in the 
2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), 5‟000 landmines kept by the Sudanese 
armed forces have been matched by the exact amount held by the Government of 
Southern Sudan People‟s Army. This represents the only example within the landmine 
regimes where the domestic implementation mechanism for international obligations 
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is found in the terms of a peace agreement and highlight an important potential 
confidence building dimension to engagement in stockpile destruction. 
 
Russia‟s innovative destruction programme for its PFM-1 stocks demonstrates that it 
has addressed a major technical challenge in order to implement regime obligations. 
Full disclosure of the national landmine arsenal for the first time also constitutes an 
important political step that goes beyond Russia‟s overt regime commitments. The US 
has also been more transparent than required by APII in announcing the political and 
operational caveats that apply to landmine stocks not yet destroyed or made compliant 
with the provisions of the regime. The US has said that it reserves the right to use 
non-self destruct APMs in South Korea but only until 2010. Non self destruct AVMs 
may be used for the same period although only with Presidential approval.
430
 Beyond 
these reservations, all stocks have been modified to comply with APII or destroyed. 
These examples from militarily significant states point to broader APII regime effects. 
Encouraging transparency among members beyond regime obligations demonstrates 
that states parties are not only constrained by the letter of their commitments but also 
feel the need to be seen to be complying with the intent and purpose of the regime. 
 
The examples of Russia and the US reflect the overlapping and interlocking 
relationship between technical requirements and the broader political context within 
which the regimes are situated. This provides evidence of a positive emulation effect 
with non-regime members also complying with certain treaty provisions in the area of 
stockpile destruction. In 2005, South Korea disclosed its stockpile of 407‟800 APMs, 
significantly less than had previously been indicated by officials. Israel also reported 
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for the first time on the destruction of its outdated stockpiled landmines.
 431
 This 
points to regime effects contributing to transparency and thus confidence building in 
even those militarily-significant states that would appear to place the highest premium 
on retaining these weapons. Importantly, the normative push that obligates regime 
members and non-members to show commitment to the humanitarian principles 
underpinning the regimes also reinforces our hypothesis that there is a strong – though 
subliminal – interplay between the two landmine regimes.  
 
As international legal instruments, the two landmine regimes bind states as opposed to 
non-state actors. This poses a challenge to the relevance of the regimes given the 
number of internal armed conflicts in which stockpiles are held by ANSAs and the 
consequent need to exert influence over sub-state actors in this area. While states are 
bound to address conduct by any actors that contravene treaty obligations as part of 
their national implementation measures, many are unable or unwilling to do so in the 
context of ANSAs. This represents an important challenge to regime effectiveness 
since ANSAs controlling territory have been acknowledged as more likely to hold 
stocks of APMs. Researc also shows that these actors may be willing to destroy 
stockpiles either as a confidence building measure or as a form of reparation for 
affected communities in areas under its control.
432
 The political dynamics of stockpile 
destruction are thus also applicable to ANSAs and represent a means for the regimes 
to influence their conduct. The Polisario Front in the Western Sahara, following 
signature of its Deed of Commitment, destroyed over 3‟000 landmines in February 
2006 according to international standards, witnessed by MINURSO, the United 
Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS), and representatives of foreign governments, 
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the media as well as various NGOs. In other cases, such as Iraqi Kurdistan and 
Somaliland,
433
 land has been cleared but destruction left to international NGOs 
operating in the area.  
 
Stockpile destruction by the Polisario Front provides a positive example with clear 
benefits for individuals and communities. It also demonstrates a mutually reinforcing 
implementation cluster involving the regime, civil society and international 
organisations (the UN) in supporting national implementation. However, this and 
other examples also provide important insights into the limitations of regime 
implementation in the context of ANSAs and stockpile destruction. The political 
payoff for the ANSA gained through being seen to comply with international good 
practice in this area meets the group‟s need for recognition and legitimacy. This is 
contrary to the national interests of the state against whom these groups are in 
conflict. For this reason, the work of Geneva Call has been criticised by some 
APMBC member states for not seeking a mandate from the state concerned. This 
criticism demonstrates that the regime does not provide a mechanism in this area to 
change the cost-benefit calculus of political interests in favor of achieving regime 
goals. 
 
The previous sub-section analyses the resource costs associated wth addressing 
stockpile destruction as a technical endeavour. Research questions under the theme of 
political will build on these findings through demonstrating complex regime dynamics 
derived from the highly political nature of this activity. While in some areas (mines 
retained for training) regime members are not motivated to revisit earlier decisions, 
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other aspects of stockpile destruction implementation demonstrate a strong 
willingness to go beyond regime commitments. I demonstrate important effects 
stemming from this behaviour. Thus, additional transparency by APII states parties 
such as Russia and the US not only contributes to confidence building within the 
regime but also leads to emulation effects from other non regime members. Stockpile 
destruction also demonstrates an important quality of regime interplay. In particular, 
for non-APMBC members, demonstrating that compliance obligations have been 
exceeded, albeit in a different regime, provides an important opportunity to be 
associated with the moral clarity of the anti-APM norm. Increased political will to 
support APII regime objectives is therefore a by-product of staying on the „right side‟ 
of the landmine issue by association with the Ottawa Process.  
 
3.3 Humanitarian impact 
 
Membership of both regimes has resulted in the destruction of millions of stockpiled 
APMs. However, to apply a humanitarian criterion for regime effectiveness, the value 
of this work must be set against those landmines still held and in some cases used by 
states such as Russia, China, India and Pakistan. This section therefore considers 
regime effectiveness in relation to the humanitarian impact of the regimes in the area 
of stockpile destruction. It also analyses the extent to which humanitarian objectives 
are realised through linking stockpile destruction to broader security and development 
goals. 
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Different interpretations of the Article 1 obligation not to „assist‟ anyone to engage in 
a prohibited activity link the scope of the regimes to the humanitarian payoffs that can 
be realised through stockpile destruction. 31 states parties have declared foreign 
stockpiling of APMs on the territory of a state party by a non-regime member as 
prohibited. Tajikistan is the only case where an APMBC regime member has reported 
holding the APMs of a non state party (Russia) on its territory. Norway, which had 
jurisdiction and control of US APMs stored on its territory on behalf of NATO, ruled 
that the landmines would have to be removed by 1 January 2003, the deadline for 
completion of its stockpile destruction under the APMBC. Maslen argues that to be in 
accordance with the provisions of Article 4, the APMs should have been destroyed 
and that their transfer was not permitted under the treaty since it was not for the 
purpose of destruction.
434
 He also suggests that a states party‟s military forces that 
win control of APM stockpiles while on peacekeeping or other missions on the 
territory of a non-state party would be obliged to destroy them, citing the example of 
French peacekeeping troops in Afghanistan destroying 70‟000 APMs stored near 
Kabul airport in February 2002 as an example.
435
 
 
Germany, Japan, Qatar and the UK have stated that US APM stocks in their territories 
are not under their jurisdiction and control, so are not part of their regime obligations. 
Landmine Monitor scrutinised the US stockpiling of military hardware (including 
APMs) on container ships off the British Indian Ocean Territory of Diego Garcia to 
which, along with other British Overseas Territories, the UK Landmines Act was 
extended in 2002. The UK position was that:  
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We wish to affirm that US stocks do not fall under our national jurisdiction or control and we do not 
therefore have any obligations under Article 4…..in respect of them. We have fully complied with our 
obligations in respect of stocks that were under our jurisdiction or control.
436
 
 
The argument that the US ships have „state immunity‟ and are therefore not a UK 
responsibility was later „clarified‟ with the British government accepting that if APMs 
were unloaded this would constitute a breach of treaty obligations.
437
 The UK 
restatement of its position was in response to questions posed in the framework of 
APMBC meetings followed by parliamentary questions initiated by the ICBL. In this 
case, the two-level dimension of IHL regime obligations is well illustrated by 
concerns over regime compliance expressed at an international level creating effects 
through being re-articulated at a national level. 
 
The process of implementation demonstrates how certain sensitive issues such as 
foreign stockpiling and other ambiguities were unresolved during the regime design 
phase. The meaning of „assistance‟ under the APMBC has been addressed at the 
national level in different ways. National security concerns have been particularly 
revealing in encouraging certain state parties to interpret regime obligations in 
different ways. Where there have been suggestions that conduct by regime members 
has not been in the humanitarian spirit of the regime, as in the case of US stocks held 
off Diego Garcia, it is significant that targeted advocacy at international and national 
levels encouraged the UK to clarify its position. However, an inherent ambiguity 
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remains in the relationship between international obligations and the latitude allowed 
for national implementation. 
 
Stockpile destruction is an obligation of regime membership. From a mine action 
perspective it may be motivated by a range of security and development concerns.  
Recognition of an underlying developmental rationale for stockpile destruction was 
facilitated through clarification by the Development Assistance Committee of the 
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD DAC) that donor 
support for stockpile destruction can be recognised as Official Development 
Assistance (ODA).
438
 This reinforces the regimes‟ stockpile destruction obligations by 
nesting them within the broader processes that development donors seek to support 
while also providing an additional incentive that donors can contribute to achieving 
development aid targets through supporting stockpile destruction as part of their ODA 
contributions.
439
 Moreover, the United Nations supports stockpile destruction though 
its mine action activities, as a by-product of DDR programmes as well as through 
resource mobilisation activities. UNDP has declared that stockpile destruction should 
form a part of any integrated mine action programme that it supports.
440
  
 
In many post-conflict environments, abandoned stockpiles represent a danger to 
civilians, security personnel as well as to those charged with destroying them. This is 
currently most evident in Iraq and Afghanistan where the roadside bombs that cause 
many casualties among soldiers as well as civilians have often been pilfered from 
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unguarded stockpiles. From a security perspective, the concept of a broader security 
framework for stockpile destruction has been elaborated by the European 
Commission, which characterises stockpile destruction as an important element of its 
support for a human security agenda.
441
 This demonstrates a parallel to many 
successful security regimes with positive behaviour change achieved through issue 
linkage between regime implementation and the broader agendas of bi- and 
multilateral actors. The different rationales for support to stockpile destruction put 
forward by the UN and the European Commission acknowledge the relevance of this 
activity in addressing both „hard‟ and „soft‟ security challenges. This provides an 
important new insight that where significant support for stockpile destruction has 
been forthcoming through the regimes, this has been linked to broader policy 
frameworks and political interests.  
 
While stockpile destruction may not have the visibility of other pillars of mine action, 
a range of motives are apparent for supporting it: the OECD DAC supports stockpile 
destruction for developmental purposes; NATO from a security angle and the 
European Commission as well as the UN for a combination of both. While such 
support could occur without reference to the regimes, linking support for stockpile 
destruction to APMBC membership has proved a powerful conditionality. European 
Commission stockpile destruction assistance was in parallel to, and conditional on, 
Ukraine and Belarus‟ ratification of the APMBC regime. Linking stockpile 
destruction assistance to their regime membership has thus  resulted in the destruction 
of millions of APMs that may otherwise have posed a humanitarian or security risk. 
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Through the entry point of stockpile destruction, it has also bound the two countries to 
all the other applicable regime obligations. It is thus significant to recognise that 
destruction of stocks was facilitated by a combination of technical/financial support 
and political conditionality linked to regime membership. Through association with 
the underpinning security and development rationales for stockpile destruction in a 
given context, the regimes raise awareness of and support for this activity. However, 
these represent a reaction to rather than a significant part of either regime discourse. 
This represents a lost opportunity to build on an important regime effect and thus 
enhance the humanitarian impact of the regime. 
 
This sub-section contributes a number of important insights to the significance of 
nesting landmine regimes within the broader framework of IHL. Normative 
considerations are highly significant in addressing gaps in regime design through 
encouraging behaviour change. The dual focus of the ICBL at international and 
domestic levels in exerting pressure on the UK government to clarify its position on 
foreign stockpiles provides an important example of the organisation‟s influencing 
role in the implementation phase. Our analysis of stockpile destruction also provides 
new insights into the interplay of different internaional regimes and organisations 
through associating landmine regime implementation with wider security and 
development imperatives. Regime effectiveness in the area of stockpile destruction is 
thus reinforced by the nexus between humanitarian obligations international 
assistance and associated political conditionalities for regime membership. 
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4. Conclusions 
 
This chapter provides a critical analysis of the implementation and effectiveness of 
the stockpile destruction-related provisions of the two landmine regimes. It 
demonstrates that the ostensibly technical (rather than overtly political or 
humanitarian) nature of stockpile destruction coupled with the evident success already 
achieved in this area contributes to a lack of emphasis on stockpile destruction within 
the landmine regimes. Significantly, a focus within the APMBC regime on 
encouraging states parties to meet destruction deadlines means that impressive 
statistics on mines destroyed mask a critical distinction between the numbers of 
APMs destroyed by the majority of states parties and a more modest achievement in 
eradicating stockpiles and caches in mine affected states. This  lacuna helps us to 
understand gaps in the regime‟s ability to address stockpile destruction hard cases that 
result in evident humanitariasn costs. 
 
Ensuring that states parties are supported in fulfilling obligations recalls the critical 
relationship between international and domestic regime commitments. Although 
international regimes are agreed on the level of states, our analysis of stockpile 
destruction dynamics shows that in many cases successful implementation depends on 
the support of international and sub-state actors. The work of Geneva Call in 
supporting the engagement of ANSAs in all aspects of the landmine ban is instructive. 
Confirming our findings in Chapter 6 in relation to humanitarian demining, this 
chapter demonstrates that, despite informal compliance verification mechanisms 
highlighting the significant scale of stockpiles controlled by ANSAs, the regime has 
not been able to deal with them given the sensitivity of the issue for some regime 
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members. As in other areas of APMBC support to mine action, failure to address such 
hard cases represents a significant barrier to regime effectiveness. It is particularly 
significant that in the area of stockpile destruction a lack of emphasis on the ANSAs 
issue within the implementation process is not the result of a lack of knowledge but of 
a lack of political will to address a sensitive topic. 
 
This chapter demonstrates that gaps in political will are compounded by inadequate 
human and organisational capacity in the area of stockpile destruction. Rapid 
signature and ratification without related domestic implementation measures when 
linked to such capacity gaps is directly linked to defection from stockpile destruction 
obligations. In the case of the APMBC, emphasis on the integrity of the anti-APM 
norm that sees states parties „succeed‟ or „fail‟ in meeting obligations within a given 
timeframe fails to take into account challenging, context-specific implementation 
challenges. Our analysis of regime dynamics in the area of stockpile destruction thus 
contributes to the tension identified in earlier chapters between regime and mine 
action priorities. It is important that binding obligations are not diluted. However, this 
chapter demonstrates that regime effectiveness is affected because specific defection 
challenges faced by mine affected states parties are not addressed. Our analysis of the 
cases of DRC and Turkmenistan thus confirms that implementation is inhibited less 
by the clarity of regime commitments and more by a lack of capacity and political 
will on the level of national actors. Therefore, while additional resources for stockpile 
destruction have been channelled to mine affected states through the APMBC regime, 
underlying capacity deficits on the national level remain unacknowledged, thus 
undermining regime effectiveness. 
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Our analysis of the contributions of the regimes in the area of stockpile destruction is 
particularly relevant to addressing research questions that look at the significance of 
stakeholder clustering. Despite an ostensibly open framework for regime 
implementation, politico-diplomatic and advocacy communities that dominate the 
APMBC implementation cluster lack the knowledge to respond to the implementation 
challenges of mine-affected states. Thus, while the regime has raised awareness of the 
risk of involuntary defection faced  by certain regime members, it has been less 
effective in addressing stockpile destruction defection. As „conventional‟ stockpiles 
diminish through compliance with commitments under both regimes, the remaining 
implementation challenges will increasingly be hard cases.  Stockpile destruction 
dynamics thus reinforce our research finding that a continued emphasis on 
entrepreneurial leadership (at the expense of practitioner expertise) in the 
implementation phase prevents the regimes from learning and adapting to address 
implementation challenges by tapping into the broader mine action community of 
practice. 
 
Even with the vastly increased profile of the landmine issue as a result of the Ottawa 
Process, stockpile destruction has not received particularly high levels of donor 
funding. However, the interrelationship between stockpile destruction and broader 
security and development concerns is significant. This chapter shows that the 
interplay of regime obligations with wider security and development commitments 
has proved a significant contributing factor in increasing both political will and 
available resources for stockpile destruction activities. APMBC membership as a 
condition for EU stockpile destruction assistance for Ukraine‟s PFM-1 stocks resulted 
in the destruction of millions of other APMs as a consequence of this conditionality. 
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Stockpile destruction thus demonstrates important dynamics of „intermeshing‟ or 
„networking442 between an international regime and international organisations on the 
basis of common goals. Stockpile destruction thus benefits from the wider normative 
imperative that encourages states to stay on the right side of this issue. Where such 
pressures cannot be brought to bear (as in the case of Turkmenistan) the regime has 
fewer options to exert this influence in support of implementation.  
 
While only the APMBC has specific stockpile destruction provisions, both regimes 
link stockpile destruction to the realisation of overall regime goals. In both cases, 
important, positive regime effects are discerned in the area of stockpile destruction. 
By drawing together IHL and mine action practitioner literatures, this chapter also 
demonstrates a number of gaps in understanding, missed opportunities and unrealised 
synergies in this area of mine action. While unpacking characteristics that are 
particular to stockpile destruction, our analysis also reinforces research findings for 
mine action more broadly developed in earlier chapters. The following concluding 
chapter brings together insights developed through systematically applying the 
analytical framework of regime theory to the landmine regimes across the different 
chapters. New contributions to knowledge are assessed and the implications of our 
findings for an IHL research agenda are considered. 
                                                 
442
 Levy, Young and Zurn (1995): p.279. 
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Chapter 8 
The Effectiveness of International Landmine Regimes 
 
1. Introduction 
 
This thesis provides an in-depth analysis of international landmine treaties within the 
broader framework of IHL. A key research motivation is that the role and 
achievements of the respective regimes are assumed by different stakeholder groups 
according to their own specific interests. Examining international actions on landmine 
issues from a regime perspective has thus proved useful in enabling the development 
of new insights into complex and interdependent regime dynamics. This concluding 
chapter considers the insights and contributions to knowledge that have been 
developed through addressing the hypotheses and research questions introduced in 
Chapter 1 and refined in Chapter 2 throughout the various thesis chapters. 
 
The first overall hypothesis underpinning the research questions explored through this 
thesis posits that the interplay of design and implementation factors is critical to 
landmine regime effectiveness. While regime theory has contributed to knowledge in 
subjects such as trade, security and the environment, the issue area of IHL has not 
been analysed from a regime perspective. Our focus on the relationship between 
design, implementation and effectiveness of the landmine regimes therefore addresses 
a lack of critical analysis on this issue which, it is argued, mean that the impact of the 
regimes in supporting mine action objectives and addressing the humanitarian 
suffering posed by these weapons is unclear.  
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The second main hypothesis addresses the significance of regime interplay and 
nesting dynamics for landmine regime effectiveness. Analysing APII and the APMBC 
as nested regimes situates these specific cases as part of a long history of efforts under 
international law to alleviate the humanitarian suffering caused by weapons through 
regulation or prohibition. This perspective enables us to critically question the 
accepted narrative that juxtaposes the two regimes in order to consider „deep‟ linkages 
that highlight evidence of regime interplay. Our understanding of measures to ban or 
restrict landmines is deepened by providing – through the lens of regime theory – a 
first systematic, analysis of these efforts that brings together insights from IHL and 
mine action discourses within a coherent analytical framework. Systematically 
applying a definition of effectiveness that emphasises a combination of observing 
regime rules and the extent to which underpinning regime objectives are achieved has 
been particularly important in order to better understand the relationship between 
setting and implementing regime goals. 
 
In order to move beyond the analytical constraints of a limited implementation period, 
it has proved useful to deepen our understanding of IHL regimes with a longer 
historical pedigree. Consideration of Hague Declaration 3 and the 1925 Gas Protocol 
as regimes has enabled us to pose nuanced questions for the landmine regimes on the 
basis of more drawn out processes of regime development. In particular, this approach 
enhances our understanding of effectiveness in this issue area through clarifying the 
impact over time of factors such as gaps between regime obligations and regime 
goals, normative considerations as well as stakeholder clustering in earlier IHL 
regimes. Analysing these historical case studies as regimes also provides an original 
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contribution to knowledge through critically re-evaluating an existing literature in this 
issue area from a new perspective. 
 
This concluding chapter begins by considering findings developed from our main 
hypothesis relating to the interplay between regime design and implementation. It 
then addresses our second main hypothesis by identifying how our understanding of 
IHL in general and the landmine regimes in particular have been enhanced or refined 
by considering issues of regime interplay and nesting. Through our systematic 
analysis of IHL and mine action literatures within a coherent research framework, a 
penultimate section focuses specifically on research findings in the area of landmine 
regime effectiveness that address the costs of disjunctions between regime and mine 
action priorities. Finally, findings outlined in this chapter are considered against wider 
research priorities in this field. 
 
2. Key research questions for landmine regimes 
 
This section considers contributions to knowledge developed through addressing our 
first main hypothesis. Building on insights into the interplay between design and 
implementation, it then considers the relationship between technical and political 
factors for regime effectiveness. Finally this section points to important agency 
considerations, in particular the significance of stakeholder clustering for regime 
effectiveness.  
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2.1 The interplay between design and implementation 
 
Analysing APII and the APMBC through the lens of regime theory clarifies the extent 
to which the regimes meet their specific and overarching goals. Regime design is 
shown to be highly influential in shaping subsequent implementation and 
effectiveness of both landmine regimes. This thesis demonstrates that the transition 
from the regime formation phase to the qualitatively different process of 
implementation creates significant challenges. As discussed below, findings may be 
counter-intuitive, with an apparent „strength‟ in regime design actually representing 
an obstacle when transferred to the regime implementation phase. Moreover, regime 
rules – in particular the weight accorded to different actors in shaping the negotiating 
process – are shown to be particularly significant in their subsequent influence on 
regime implementation. 
 
Including „safety valves‟ within regime frameworks allows regimes to function in the 
face of implementation challenges. APII with its permissive language, long entry into 
force periods and opportunities for extension to deadlines thus offers a number of 
safety valves for states. In contrast, the APMBC presents a rigid set of obligations for 
its members. Yet we can observe that the absence of flexibility in the APMBC 
contributes to the effectiveness of the regime exactly because commitments are clear 
and unequivocal. Regime members are under no illusion as to the extent of their 
obligations. In practice, therefore, this thesis demonstrates that the regime design for 
APII that allows – through optional deferral periods – for flexibility in meeting 
regime obligations has not been more effective when set against the APMBC 
imperative to preserve key norms and principles through avoiding reservations or 
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permissive language. Moreover, the integrity of the APMBC regime on a normative 
level and the absence of a safety valve in APII regime rules that would have given 
greater space to civil society concerns clearly play a significant role in contributing to 
contrasting regime dynamics.  
 
APII functions as a regime for different reasons. Long implementation and optional 
deferral periods means that there are no surprises for regime members. Clearly 
defined rules of engagement for regime participation, including consensus decision-
making and very limited accountability beyond the level of states, similarly provides 
for confidence-building inside the regime. Although within the APII implementation 
process there are regular experts meetings, these remain largely at a governmental 
level. This factor again contributes to the stability of the regime while at the same 
time representing a cost in terms of the ability to problem-solve that a broader 
expertise base would provide. 
 
The limitations of regime design only become fully apparent during the 
implementation process. How regimes learn therefore represents an important concept 
in addressing the technical and political hurdles to fulfilling regime obligations. 
However, our analysis of the relationship between landmine regime provisions and 
mine action realities demonstrates that even where learning mechanisms exist, 
without clustering the appropriate expertise, fostering political buy-in and supporting 
national capacities to address hard issues, the right lessons cannot be drawn.  Chapters 
6 and 7 show that measures adopted within the APMBC to provide for greater clarity 
on implementation have had limited impact because greater transparency has not led 
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to increased accountability. Concrete measures have not been developed to address 
underlying regime challenges of political will and capacity. 
 
2.2     The relationship between technical and political factors 
 
The interplay of technical and political considerations is shown to be an important, 
under-analysed consideration for landmine regime effectiveness. Regimes are 
negotiated at a political level but implementation is strongly influenced by a 
combination of political and technical challenges faced by regime members. As 
Chapter 4 demonstrates, the process of APMBC regime formation focused on 
influencing the political calculus for regime membership. However, if states assume 
obligations at the international level, they must implement them at the national level. 
The political and substantive costs associated with these measures in certain cases 
pose problems for implementation that effective regimes should be able to recognise 
and address. Our analysis of the implementation of the stockpile destruction 
provisions of the APMBC highlights an important dislocation between political and 
technical levels. The relative lack of donor support for this activity stems from its 
apparently technical (rather than humanitarian) profile. Yet at the same time, an 
implementation cluster lacking practitioner expertise fails to address technical 
challenges. The technical-political split is highly significant because the regime is 
unable to recognise potential humanitarian payoffs that could be achieved through 
relatively small investments in supporting stockpile destruction. This reinforces our 
research finding that, regardless of clear regime obligations or adequate resources, 
capacity building and political will are critical to regime effectiveness. 
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A common feature of both regimes is the absence of a formal verification mechanism. 
This contributes to non-compliance being a sub rosa issue rather than featuring 
prominently within either regime. The absence of formal compliance monitoring and 
verification compounds a reluctance to openly address „hard‟ issues – such as 
corruption – that may pose problems for certain regime members and consequently 
undermine the positive image of the regime. This points to a key research finding. The 
regimes do not lack empirical data on implementation challenges: Landmine Monitor 
represents a tool for regime learning, providing the single, comprehensive information 
source on states parties‟ compliance. But the regimes neither harness the technical 
understanding needed to develop appropriate mechanisms nor bring to bear the 
requisite political will to address sensitive implementation challenges. 
 
On a political level, meeting stockpile destruction targets is acknowledged as key to 
regime credibility. However, implementation of the stockpile destruction provisions 
of the APMBC is considered from a technical perspective, measured in terms of 
whether regime members complete destruction within the stipulated timeframe. 
However, Chapter 7 demonstrates that in practice this endeavour is highly political. In 
mine affected states where national authorities do not have full control of their 
territory, meeting stockpile destruction commitments may be impossible. This 
practical challenge is compounded by an unwillingness to address the politically 
sensitive issue of how to engage with ANSAs that use or stockpile APMs. Capacity 
challenges in mine affected states are thus compounded by a double deficit of political 
will at both the national level and within the regime.  
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This thesis demonstrates that the extent to which political and technical considerations 
bifurcate or reinforce each other are both under-estimated and highly significant 
factors for APII regime effectiveness. If the scope of the regime and the flexibility of 
its deferral periods for implementation reflect the political limitations of a process 
defined by the consensus requirement, the focus of the regime on new technologies 
and future use of these weapons is a reflection of the technical knowledge base of the 
designers. While there may be political incentives for developing countries to 
participate in the regime in the company of major powers, the regime offers few 
substantive incentives given that restrictions offer an expensive, technically 
challenging solution that for a mine affected state does not address the basic problem 
of mines already in the ground. In itself, initiatives that seek to widen participation 
within the APII regime are significant as attempts to foster regime learning. Yet, if 
such measures do not make sense from the perspective of regime goals and capacities 
they will have limited utility. Without such reflection it is difficult to identify the 
incentives for developing states to contribute meaningfully to the APII regime. 
 
2.3   Key actors and the significance of stakeholder clustering 
 
A secondary research question explored through this thesis is that the contribution of 
„implementers‟ during the design phase is a key contributing factor to the 
development of effective treaty provisions. Given that many implementation 
challenges only become apparent after regime rules are agreed, experience from the 
landmine regimes reinforces the central role of expert communities in both these 
phases of regime development. The absence of mine action expertise or voices from 
mine affected countries within APII has resulted in a regime that does not address the 
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concerns of these constituencies. Consequently, as shown in Chapter 4, the central 
challenges of dealing with mines already in the ground and the costs for developing 
countries that come with technological re-engineering of weapon stocks were not a 
factor in the regime design process. Similarly, the focus of APII provisions on 
traditional military operations does not reflect experience in contemporary conflicts 
with landmines utilised as a weapon of fear against civilian populations. 
 
For the APMBC, one important finding is that there is an absence of communication 
and coordination between politico-diplomatic and advocacy communities active 
within the regime implementation process and the practitioner community engaged in 
the different pillars of mine action. This clarifies an important distinction between a 
true epistemic community and an APMBC implementation process that is still 
strongly influenced by norm entrepreneurs. This insight feeds into a broader research 
finding that emphasis on „brand loyalty‟ over cooperation in the implementation 
phase has adverse implications for regime effectiveness. As shown in Chapters 6 and 
7, learning within the framework of the APMBC has been stymied by a lack of mine 
action expertise and a consequent inability to problem solve in the area of practical 
implementation challenges. Thus, capacity gaps in the implementation phase do not 
impair regime effectiveness in terms of fulfilling obligations but they do reduce 
opportunities for the regime to evolve in order to more effectively reduce the 
suffering caused by these weapons. 
 
This thesis demonstrates that how actors combine and relate to each other is a critical 
determinant for regime effectiveness in this issue area. The composition of such 
clusters at various points in regime evolution represent an important regime dynamic 
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that strongly influences how cooperation and problem-solving occur. The literature 
surrounding the Ottawa Process focuses on the importance of the civil society 
coalition and its relationship to a core group of committed states for regime formation. 
A broad cluster of involved actors including states, civil society, experts and 
representatives of mine affected states bring different influences to bear on the 
process of regime formation. Participation is thus an important part of this narrative. 
As demonstrated in Chapter 4, this combination of policy makers, practitioners, 
advocates and „victims‟ proved decisive in winning support for the regime and 
undermining countervailing (predominately technical) arguments. However, the 
successful self-selection dynamic was effective in garnering support from the 
undecided rather than providing crucial input to the development of the treaty. Indeed, 
compared to other IHL treaties, the APMBC is marked by the lack of changes made to 
the initial draft during the negotiating process. In contrast to the prevalent discourse 
on the regime formation process, participation was less crucial to the design of the 
treaty text than to increasing political will in favour of membership. This points to an 
important gap between entrepreneurial leadership as distinct from structural or 
intellectual leadership, reflecting the decision making dynamics of a „global‟ coalition 
with a much more narrowly constructed leadership. 
 
A distinction between representation and influence becomes particularly significant in 
the implementation phase. The effectiveness of APII is constrained by the unchanged 
nature of the implementation cluster, in particular, a continued lack of 
entreprenneurial leadership able to champion transformational change. The „closed‟ 
nature of the CCW regime, reflected by a limited public record of negotiations and 
few post-facto analyses, offers scant opportunities for regime learning. Indeed, 
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innovations within the APII regime – such as the introduction of a sponsorship 
programme to encourage participation from mine-affected states – reflects an 
emulation effect in response to measures adopted by the APMBC although within a 
very different regime framework. In contrast, within the APMBC the influential 
constellation of actors has shifted with a different balance of political will and 
technical expertise generating important consequences. While regime formation was 
clustered around a diverse group of advocacy-focused actors, supportive states and 
expert communities, implementation has seen the regime governed by a narrower 
cluster of advocates and the politico-diplomatic community. There is a continued 
involvement of mine affected states but, counter-intuitively, the implementation 
cluster places less rather than more emphasis on mine action expertise.  
 
Significantly, both practitioners and those that have assumed a leadership role in 
regime implementation share a consensus that there is no need to rely so heavily on 
the practitioner community now that the regime has achieved a broad and growing 
membership. One reason for this is provided by the opening page of the HALO Trust 
website which states clearly that „HALO is not distracted by involvement in 
campaigns and conferences. We have a simple mission statement – „getting mines out 
of the ground, now.‟‟443 Thus, while leadership of the implementation process is 
tightly controlled by non-experts, the mine action expert community is also – 
consciously – less directly associated with regime implementation because of their 
focus on mine action and not the regime per se.  
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 www.halotrust.org 
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Through assessing different aspects of implementation, the regular intersessional 
meetings provide the major APMBC mechanism for regime learning. Meetings are 
generally attended by diplomats (many based in Geneva) and agendas are shaped by 
the APMBC secretariat – the GICHD in collaboration with core group states and the 
ICBL. Representation from mine-affected countries is encouraged through a 
sponsorship programme and a policy of co-chairing of committees. These meetings 
provide a forum to gauge implementation. However, as elaborated in Chapter 5, the 
form and composition of the cluster of relevant regime actors means that the nature of 
the meetings is geared towards information sharing and awareness raising rather than 
problem-solving. The common characterisation of the APMBC in the literature as a 
crossroads where state and non-state actors meet on an equal footing is challenged by 
the composition of this cluster. In implementation, the centrality of a core group of 
states and the ICBL conditions the regime‟s effectiveness through constraining its 
ability to learn in order to better address regime challenges. 
 
Our analysis of stakeholder clustering dynamics highlights important shifts across 
APMBC regime formation and implementation phases. A particularly important 
finding is that the advocacy-driven approach so critical to the process of regime 
formation has costs when applied in regime implementation. The ICBL provided 
targeted advocacy that proved key to building a strong coalition in favour of a ban on 
APMs. Landmine Monitor represents a transition mechanism for the ICBL from 
advocacy to monitoring and verification service provider for the regime. However, 
there is a gap between the knowledge generated by Landmine Monitor research and 
demonstrable regime responses. If Landmine Monitor is critical in identifying the 
extent to which states are meeting their obligations, a significant gap lies in the ability 
328 
 
to operationalise these findings within the regime through addressing voluntary as 
well as involuntary defection. Reflecting the central role of the ICBL within the 
APMBC implementation process, this points to an expertise gap at the heart of regime 
decision making. The prevalence of entrepreneurial over intellectual leadership 
highlights a conflation of expert communities with civil society in a wider sense. The 
absence from the implementation cluster of mine action expertise is therefore highly 
significant for regime effectiveness. 
 
3. Analysing IHL and mine action as linked sub-regimes within a nested 
IHL regime framework 
 
This section articulates new insights and addresses gaps in the existing literature 
through addressing our hypothesis that regime interplay and nesting within a broader 
IHL framework are important issues for landmine regimes. Building on the research 
questions addressed through the various chapters, this section considers research 
findings in two dimensions. First, regime interplay dynamics are analysed. Second, 
the significance of regime nesting and the embedding of landmine regimes within the 
broader normative framework of IHL is assessed.  
 
3.1 Norms and regime interplay 
 
The significance of normative content to regime effectiveness in IHL regimes more 
broadly and the landmines issue in particular represent important secondary research 
questions explored through this thesis. Chapter 4 demonstrates that the „norm 
bandwagon‟ phenomenon of the Ottawa Process is a central factor in accounting for 
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the broader membership of the APMBC in comparison to APII. The significance of 
being seen to be a concerned international actor was underlined from the outset of the 
Ottawa Process by growing international support subsequent to the first Ottawa 
conference. In contrast, while APII has not exerted a pull factor beyond a core 
constituency of predominantly Northern states, membership has proved politically 
significant in order to exhibit commitment and concern for the landmine issue without 
signing up to a ban on APMs. 
 
Less visibly, an important quality of regime interplay is demonstrated through a de 
facto conditionality imposed on a number of levels by the anti-APM norm. Thus, 
beyond the loss of a military capability, it is significant that the calculus for joining 
the regime includes the policy step of contradicting the US position, a significant 
decision for close allies such as the UK as well as the many states dependent on US 
security and development assistance. The behaviour of EU applicant states was 
strongly influenced by the need to be seen to be on the right side of the issue – even 
where there was a cost in terms of their defence-industrial base – persuaded that the 
political opprobrium of non-membership outweighed any potential costs of joining the 
regime. In the case of South Africa, its prominent role in the Ottawa Process 
embodied an internationalist concern, post-Apartheid, to be seen to re-enter the 
international community as a morally proactive actor. 
 
A significant gap in the literature on both APII and the APMBC lies in regime 
interplay dynamics beyond regime membership. The policy orientation of the US is 
particularly significant given its structural leadership role in many international 
regimes. As demonstrated in Chapters 6 and 7, the desire to be associated with the 
330 
 
anti-APM norm has led to the US increasing its support for mine action as well as 
placing greater emphasis on active participation in the APII regime. From a starting 
point of the US treating the CCW as one among many of its arms control obligations, 
it has become the leading force in both promoting APII compliance and in developing 
new instruments such as Protocol V to address wider categories of post-conflict 
hazard. This stance combines a desire to demonstrate good international citizenship 
with the inherently political tactic of promoting measures that can be „managed‟ in a 
forum with clear rules as opposed to a less biddable Ottawa-style framework. 
 
Our analysis of historical IHL case studies provides useful insights to the significance 
of „stigmatisation‟ for the effectiveness of certain IHL regimes. This concept links 
concerns over specific weapons to a wider IHL agenda.  Chapter 3 demonstrates that 
the de-legitimisation of chemical weapons through the 1925 Gas Protocol influenced 
the behaviour of non-regime members and was a necessary precursor to the later 
CWC. It is significant that the emergence of a norm against these weapons enhanced 
political will in support of further, more far reaching measures. This historical 
analysis helps us to deepen our knowledge of interlocking and overlapping dynamics 
of landmine regime formation. A landmine regime could not be formed on this single 
issue in 1980 but embedding it within the CCW enabled the formation of the regime. 
Increased political will subsequently led both to the additional restrictions in APII and 
to the momentum behind the Ottawa Process. 
 
An important set of research findings relates to the anti-APM norm and how this has 
influenced the behaviour of actors within the APMBC and across the two landmine 
regimes. There is a de facto international ban on licit trade in APMs (Russia and 
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China have ceased APM exports) while APM production has also greatly decreased. 
The APMBC thus continues to generate norm bandwaggon effects which resonate 
with a broad swathe of the international community. Bi- and multilateral mine action 
donors have explicitly linked funding to regime membership. This has led to broader 
payoffs since, as demonstrated in Chapter 7, a membership conditionality linked to 
support for stockpile destruction has obliged these states to meet the full range of 
regime obligations. An array of different non-APMBC members – from the US to 
Russia and India – have thus increased their commitment to APII or aligned 
themselves with APMBC priorities in order to associate themselves with the 
normative position associated with this process. This effect has also led to increased 
transparency – beyond stated APII obligations – by states such as Russia and China, a 
significant step for actors that place such emphasis on national security concerns. 
 
Recalling Putnam‟s two-level game, we see states remaining outside the regime in 
order to meet the requirements of one domestic constituency (the security 
establishment). At the same time they adopt measures and increase funding for mine 
action in order to demonstrate to other domestic constituencies (including civil society 
but also other groups within government) as well as to the international community 
that they are committed to the norm of reducing the humanitarian suffering caused by 
these weapons. The US, which has not used APMs in combat since 1991, is perhaps 
one of the strongest de facto supporters of the regime and its humanitarian objectives. 
US mine action support thus highlights that APMBC regime membership is not a 
precondition for fulfilling regime goals. Relatedly, continued ICBL criticism of the 
US as „Ottawa rejectionist‟ demonstrates how removed this perspective is from an 
understanding of regime payoffs in relation to mine action effectiveness.  
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Chapter 4, shows how juxtaposing the Ottawa and APII processes in normative terms 
was a highly successful tactic to highlight the need for a new international instrument 
geared towards an unequivocal ban on APMs. However, this broader normative 
framework is significant because it points to an unacknowledged bridge between the 
regimes within the broader framework of IHL. Both Russia and the US have gone 
well beyond their APII obligations in showing transparency on APM policy and 
technical information on stockpiles. These positive emulation effects that build on the 
need to show commitment to humanitarian principles demonstrate a strong if 
subliminal quality of regime interplay. Significantly, such conduct by major militarily 
significant states generates further emulation effects among other non-APMBC 
members also keen to stay on the „right side‟ of the issue. A continued „demonisation‟ 
of the US by the ICBL for its non-membership of the APMBC therefore seems to 
reflect a counter-productive hangover from the regime formation phase given the pre-
eminent US role in mine action and the lack of opposition of the US in substantive 
terms to the underlying goals of the treaty. 
 
3.2     Regime nesting 
 
It is argued that regimes in different issue areas are strengthened through being nested 
within broader normative frameworks. Indeed, it has proved analytically useful to 
situate APII and the APMBC as part of this broader IHL regime. The case studies on 
dum dum bullets and chemical gas demonstrate important qualities of regime 
resilience through the mutually reinforcing relationship between these historical 
regimes and newer IHL treaties. Our analysis of Hague Declaration 3 shows that the 
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impact of the regime on the subsequent use of these rounds provides only a partial 
picture of regime effectiveness. Spillover effects into more recent efforts to prohibit 
certain weapons represent important regime nesting dynamics that provide for a more 
nuanced understanding of IHL regime effectiveness. Thus, even if specific provisions 
have become less relevant over time, the mutually reinforcing relationship of the 
regime to the customary IHL principles of superfluous injury and unnecessary 
suffering strengthens the underpinning regime norm while encouraging regime-
compliant behavior.  
 
Critically examining the prevalent narrative, actively propagated in the literature
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and discussed in Chapter 4, that the Ottawa Process is unique in terms of civil 
society‟s central role and a key victory for an emerging human security agenda has 
generated a number of insights. As Chapter 3 demonstrates, absent the force 
multiplier effects of globalisation, the processes that led to the ban on dum dum 
bullets and the 1925 Gas Protocol saw influential roles played by a wide array of civil 
society bodies in conjunction with sympathetic states. The media also had an 
important role in pushing states to the negotiating table in both these earlier IHL 
regimes. This „myth‟ of immaculate conception is not significant in itself but does 
have implications for regime effectiveness if it contributes to reinforcing artificial 
divisions between regime stakeholders and thus to lost synergies in the 
implementation phase. 
 
This thesis demonstrates that the nexus between de-legitimisation and political will is 
particularly significant in the context of a regime nested within the broader framework 
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of IHL. Stigmatisation results in regime effects that extend far beyond obligations 
associated with regime membership. Both increased US mine action support and the 
non-use of APMs since the entry into force of the treaty reflect the humanitarian 
imperative underpinning the APMBC. This displays strong parallels to the US 
relationship to the 1925 Gas Protocol. Thus, Chapter 3 argues that while the US did 
not join the regime for many years, the stigma associated with chemical gas meant 
that the use of these weapons was never an option since the regime‟s entry into force. 
 
Blurred lines between political will to join the APMBC regime and a more nuanced 
analysis of the behaviour of different states in the implementation phase, demonstrates 
an important quality of normative interplay that extends beyond regime membership. 
If militarily-significant non-APMBC members have fulfilled some regime 
obligations, accusations of non-compliant behaviour levelled at Pakistan in the POF 
case are significant for different reasons. The rapid response of the Pakistani 
government in seeking to refute these allegations demonstrates that a breach of the 
UK‟s national obligations under the APMBC was regarded by them as highly 
sensitive in political terms. An important regime interplay effect is demonstrated by 
the APMBC raising the political costs of discovery for states in breach of its 
obligations, regardless of regime membership in the strict legal sense of IHL. 
 
4. Regime effectiveness 
 
Building on a definition of effectiveness drawn from the wider regime theory 
discourse which focuses on considerations of resources and political will, the 
particular characteristics of the landmine regimes are addressed by third aspect of 
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effectiveness, humanitarian impact. Critically assessing IHL and mine action 
discourses within a single analytical framework links related but previously 
disconnected discourses. This approach has proved useful in addressing research 
questions that consider disjunctions between regime and mine action priorities. The 
following section considers new insights gained through applying these three 
dimensions of effectiveness to APII and the APMBC. 
 
4.1      Resources 
 
The APMBC places the onus on states parties to fulfil obligations yet in nearly all 
cases mine action is strongly assisted by the expertise and financial support of 
international actors. The convening role of the regime is therefore essential in order to 
bridge resource and capacity gaps by supporting regime members in fulfilling their 
obligations. This thesis demonstrates that the APMBC is effective in generating 
additional resources for mine action. Counterfactual questions are addressed by 
regime membership conditionalities placed on funding support, evidence of 
interaction effects through commitments by non-traditional donors as well as the 
timing of new commitments by different donors that coincide with entry into force of 
the regime. Important emulation effects are also shown with non-APMBC members 
such as the US increasing mine action funding to demonstrate political commitment 
as a response to criticism of its non-membership of the regime. This resource dynamic 
displayed by the structural leader of the APII regime highlights an important contrast 
between the two regimes. While the APMBC has generated resources through 
effective marketing of a humanitarian brand, APII has neither the entrepreneurial 
leadership nor the moral clarity to provoke such effects. 
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The APMBC regime focuses expertise in a number of areas, such as for the 
development of national mine action strategies or assistance in designing domestic 
implementing legislation. However, in other areas the capacity needs of mine affected 
regime members are not aligned with the regime implementation process. This 
represents a significant contradiction between the regime‟s emphasis on national 
ownership and its lack of emphasis on capacity building as a key enabling activity. A 
lack of resource commitment in this area highlights a significant gap between regime 
and mine action priorities.  
 
As discussed in Chapter 5, the case of Cambodia highlights challenges associated 
with resource generation. Cambodia is not failing to meet any of its explicit APMBC 
obligations so this is not an issue for the regime. Underdal‟s distinction between 
effectiveness in fulfilling obligations as opposed to achieving regime goals is evident: 
if national authorities are undermining mine action work then this clearly runs against 
the overarching humanitarian objectives of the regime. Real or perceived corruption 
represents a sensitive issue for the regime that the APMBC leadership has proved 
reluctant to address. Thus, if additional financial resources are a demonstrable 
achievement of the APMBC, the regime plays only a modest role in how those 
resources are targeted and used. 
 
This thesis demonstrates that the gap between resource generation and effective 
deployment of these resources is particularly evident in the area of humanitarian 
demining. Despite strong awareness of this issue within the mine action community, 
country-based evidence from Landmine Monitor and efforts to focus on the challenge 
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of resource sustainability within the APMBC led by Norway, the regime has not made 
progress on this issue. This is a critical research finding because our focus on 
resources highlights how perception and knowledge gaps between regime 
implementers and expert communities coupled with a reluctance to address hard 
implementation issues significantly inhibits the effectiveness of the regime in 
fulfilling its overarching humanitarian objectives. Thus, while the mine action 
community is undergoing a „gestalt shift‟ from quantitative to humanitarian or socio-
economic impact-driven approaches, the regime implementation cluster is unable to 
bridge the gap between adequate and effective resources. 
 
4.2     Political will 
 
The literature surrounding the Ottawa Process highlights the effectiveness of the two-
track regime formation process in building political will in favour of the regime. 
While our research findings help to understand the positive dynamics underlying this 
process, important new insights demonstrate ways in which political will was absent 
in this phase. During APMBC treaty negotiations the core group displayed a 
reluctance to include issues – such as assistance for mine victims – that might 
complicate the task of achieving a widely-adopted treaty centred on an APM ban. As 
shown in Chapter 4, the focus on this overarching political goal meant that discussion 
on technical issues related to the draft treaty was minimal. The successful strategy 
was therefore to address hard issues that might be found in the details by avoiding 
them. Beyond the US, unable to countenance an unadulterated ban but still wanting to 
drive the process, red line issues were never brought to the fore during the negotiating 
process. By contrast, in the APII framework, the consensus requirement for decision-
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making meant that the political and technical red lines were clear. With the „nuclear 
option‟ of banning weapons off the table, negotiations focussed very much on a 
technical level.  
 
This thesis demonstrates that understanding the shifting dynamic from the political 
process of regime formation to the implementation of obligations that are both 
technologically-challenging and politically-sensitive is key to regime effectiveness. 
Chapters 6 and 7 underline hidden costs in implementation related to the APMBC 
norm bandwaggon effect. Our analysis shows that early signature and ratification 
without consideration for the implications of regime obligations has costs in terms of 
the implementation of provisions related to humanitarian demining and stockpile 
destruction. If the anti-APM norm created widespread support for the APMBC, it 
does not follow that there is commensurate political will by states to meet their 
obligations. Narrow gaps between signature and domestic ratification by a number of 
mine-affected states may signal the strength of the anti-APM norm yet also provide a 
clear indication that the full costs of membership are not being considered.  
 
A major challenge to regime effectiveness can subsequently be discerned when 
member states lack the relevant capacities or lose their enthusiasm in the more 
technically challenging, expensive and sensitive (in domestic terms) implementation 
phase. This points to an apparent paradox with the anti-APM norm encouraging 
adherence yet at the same time blinding states to the costs of membership. 
Furthermore, these costs are higher for mine affected states given that the challenges 
of capacity and political will are particularly acute in the settings most in need of 
support from the regimes. 
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Resource challenges within the APMBC demonstrate that an important aspect of 
distinguishing implementation from effectiveness is how regimes deal with hard 
cases. A hard implementation issue that the regime has not addressed is in the area of 
inappropriate donor support. Technology for mine action is one area where there is a 
nexus between a clear mandate within the APMBC (Article 6) to improve its role and 
strong evidence from mine action practitioners that technology is frequently 
expensive, inappropriate and ineffective. Despite this issue having been raised within 
the regime, there has been no progress on it within the implementation process. This 
demonstrates a serious challenge to regime effectiveness. Beyond the lack of 
practitioner expertise in the implementation cluster, the regime has chosen not to 
address this sensitive issue and neither expert communities nor the affected states that 
receive such support have the leverage to change this. 
 
In the mine action literature, the absence of ownership and a related lack of attention 
to capacity building is regarded as a major shortcoming of existing programmes. This 
issue has not been directly addressed within either regime, begging the question 
whether this is recognised as a significant issue for regime effectiveness. Chapters 6 
and 7 reinforce our research finding that mine-affected states have a less well-defined 
and influential role in APMBC implementation than in the regime formation phase. 
Given that in many mine-affected contexts the state itself cannot be considered as a 
unitary actor, this demands a more nuanced understanding within the regime of 
voluntary and involuntary defection. Both regimes lack the technical/contextual 
awareness to support mine affected states in ways that reinforce political will and 
mitigate against non-compliance. While less relevant in the APII regime with its 
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narrower membership base, this demonstrates an important distinction within the 
APMBC between the principle of „ownership‟ that is central to the APMBC 
framework and how this is translated into practice through building national capacity 
with international assistance. 
 
4.3     Humanitarian impact 
 
As IHL regimes, the effectiveness of APII and the APMBC rests on their impact in 
reducing the humanitarian costs of landmines. Support to mine action represents the 
most tangible way to deliver on the humanitarian objectives of the regimes through 
reducing risk to individuals and communities. The evident decline in the use of APMs 
as a result of the APMBC clearly constitutes a major success in terms of the 
humanitarian criterion for effectiveness. However, this thesis demonstrates that a 
quantitative approach to implementation resting on statistics such as regime 
membership or stockpiles destroyed does not address the qualitative concerns of 
affected states or mine action practitioners. Relatedly, the lack of focus within the 
regime on capacity building contributes directly to involuntary defection and thus to 
reduced regime effectiveness.  
 
Chapter 7 shows that while implementation of stockpile destruction provisions is 
understood within the regime as a technical endeavour, in fact this is a highly political 
process. Failure to recognise this interplay has costs in terms of the humanitarian 
dimension of regime effectiveness when the political imperatives that led states to join 
the APMBC regime have not been subsequently matched by a commensurate focus on 
the requirements assumed by taking such a step. Failing to address both the political 
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and technical challenges that result in defection by regime members in meeting 
clearance or stockpile destruction targets present, humanitarian, security and 
developmental challenges that have not been fully recognised within the framework 
of the regimes.  
 
Applying a humanitarian criterion for regime effectiveness allows us to critically 
question claims of effectiveness relating to certain APII provisions. In particular, this 
approach provides an important corrective to arguments deployed within the regime 
as to the humanitarian impact of obligations for the increased detectability of 
landmines. Compliance with this provision offers no humanitarian payoff for civilians 
since these at risk groups have no access to mine detection equipment. More broadly, 
all provisions that apply to current and future stocks of landmines ignore the field 
reality that the humanitarian threat relates to mines already in the ground long before 
provisions were agreed. The significant additional protection for military personnel 
and deminers does represent a humanitarian payoff. But it is significant that 
compliance with these provisions by China and Russia also demonstrates how the 
regime unites self-interest with a humanitarian demining payoff since both these 
states were motivated by an awareness of the risks to their own forces posed by 
„undetectable‟ APMs. 
 
Our analysis of regime effectiveness in its humanitarian dimension demonstrates a 
significant tension between regime and mine action priorities. A commitment to 100% 
clearance as a regime benchmark is inconsistent with the onus of mine action to 
demonstrate clear payoffs for conducting this work. Paradoxically, the regime 
therefore seeks to preserve the anti-APM norm at the expense of more effective 
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humanitarian demining. However, the tripartite definition of effectiveness applied in 
this thesis is important because it demonstrates the interrelated nature of these criteria. 
For the APMBC, our research findings in the areas of resources and political will 
show that nurturing the normative imperative of the regime in implementation is key 
to promoting compliance while also generating emulation effects beyond the regime. 
Lowering the bar from „mine free‟ may also contribute to defection through states 
misunderstanding or deliberately misinterpreting their obligations. Conducting certain 
humanitarian demining activities that do not have evident humanitarian, security or 
developmental payoffs may therefore be a necessary price to pay for maintaining the 
integrity of the regime and thus ensuring broader regime effectiveness. 
 
5. An IHL regime research agenda 
 
This thesis has provided a systematic analysis of key aspects of the design, 
implementation and effectiveness of international agreements relating to landmines 
within a broader IHL framework. Through addressing a number of related secondary 
research questions, the main hypothesis that the relationship between regime design 
and implementation is critical to understanding landmine regime effectiveness has 
been strongly validated. Moreover, considering research questions relating to our 
second main hypothesis on the importance of regime nesting and interplay in this 
issue area provides a number of important new insights. This concluding section 
considers the implications of these new contributions to knowledge for further 
research into IHL regimes more broadly and landmine regimes in particular. 
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In both regimes, our research framework that unites IHL with the mine action 
practitioner discourse problematises important gaps between „ideal‟ provisions and 
field realities. The application of Underdal‟s definition of effectiveness is particularly 
important in demonstrating that even when met, certain obligations do not have 
security, development or humanitarian payoffs. Research findings from this thesis that 
highlight a lack of clarity on regime effectiveness within APII and the APMBC raise 
important issues for how treaty designers and implementers in the broader IHL field 
address effectiveness issues. This challenge is further complicated by a counter-
intuitive but significant disjunction between regime and mine action interests that 
means that effective mine action may undermine the integrity of the APMBC regime. 
Thus, further work on IHL effectiveness must seek to address complex questions in 
which design, agency and normative considerations are intermeshed.  
 
Our understanding of the concept of regime learning in this issue area has been 
refined through analysing stakeholder clustering dynamics across regime formation 
and implementation. A lack of input from mine action practitioners in implementation 
has significant adverse implications for the ability of the regimes to learn and evolve. 
On the one hand, despite claims to openess in the case of the APMBC, there has been 
an approach based on entitlement rather than transparency in allocating influential 
regime roles. On the other, a lack of engagement in implementation is not simply a 
reflection of the preferences of controlling interests within the regimes but is also a 
consequence of a self-conscious (and self-interested) desire to treat mine action as a 
„black art‟ set apart from broader policy, programming and budgetary considerations. 
This points to a gap in our knowledge of how to influence stakeholder clustering and 
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regime leadership dynamics in this issue area that requires further work to develop 
more nuanced understandings that can support learning within these regimes. 
 
This thesis demonstrates that the two regimes are intrinsically linked even if this is not 
widely understood or acknowledged in the existing literature. Interlinkages between 
APII and the APMBC, if remaining taboo within the regimes, generate dynamics that 
impact on regime effectiveness. Although a mechanism of one regime, the function 
provided by Landmine Monitor influences behaviour in both through its reporting on 
APII compliance issues. More broadly, an important quality of regime interplay 
results in effects that support common goals regardless of regime membership. 
However, despite evident complementarities and latent synergies, little effort has been 
made to bring the two regimes closer together. Further research on regime interplay 
dynamics therefore offers opportunities to address an issue that is both neglected in 
the existing literature and may offer important payoffs across the two regimes. 
 
Exploring regime nesting dynamics within the broader framework of efforts under 
IHL to address inhumane weapons highlights significant, under-emphasised aspects of 
the relationship between the two regimes that only emerge when they are embedded 
within the wider historical context of IHL. Critically examining historical antecedents 
enables us to better understand the importance of the concept of stigmatisation for 
IHL regimes. This is confirmed by the catalysing effect on both state and non-state 
actors of the anti-APM norm in promoting the observance of regime objectives as „the 
right thing to do.‟ Although not the research focus of this thesis, a number of 
emulation effects in the broader IHL agenda can be discerned as a result of the 
landmine regimes. Regime consequences and spillover effects therefore point to an 
345 
 
important focus for further research in the wider IHL field. In particular, building on 
our analysis of APII and the APMBC, the ability of IHL regimes to exert effects 
beyond their membership represents a significant, under-researched area for further 
work. 
 
Further clarifying the relationship of mine action to related activities also necessitates 
greater understanding of how international regimes, international organisations, states 
and NSAs interact within a given issue area. APMBC membership conditionalities 
links the realisation of regime goals to the broader security and development agendas 
of actors such as the EU and the UN. Analysis of „sticks‟ and „carrots‟ associated with 
regime membership thus points to the need for further research in order to better 
situate mine action within poverty reduction, development and peacebuilding 
frameworks. The ability to create virtuous cycles through a combination of 
conditionalities and incentives offers an important area for further work that can 
contribute new insights into the overlapping and interlocking nature of regimes, 
institutions, states and NSAs in an interdependent world. Drawing on our analysis of 
landmine regimes, understanding determinants and variables that can contribute to 
such integration – while recognising legitimate concerns within the issue area 
communities over „mainstreaming‟ or „securitising‟ humanitarian work – therefore 
represents an important research priority. 
 
In conclusion, the original contributions to knowledge developed in this thesis come 
from applying a coherent analytical framework to the design, implementation and 
effectiveness of landmine regimes. Regime theory offers only one approach to better 
understanding international efforts to address these issues. However, this contribution 
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is significant exactly because it provides a first scientific, critical assessment of 
landmine regime strengths and weaknesses that pose a number of questions for their 
further evolution. The security, development and humanitarian objectives of a field of 
work that will still require decades of international and national commitment provide 
a compelling argument for further research to support the fulfilment of landmine 
regime goals. 
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